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Churchill and the approach to Mussolini and Hitler in May 1940: a note

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  26 October 2009

Jonathan Knight
Jonathan Knight
Affiliation:
Assistant Professor of Political Science, State University of New York at Albany
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Extract

Historians are bound by the historically conditioned values that shape their judgments of what are important facts and their interpretations of those facts. This is especially true for ‘official’ historians who must serve both their craft and their government. David Carlton points to this process in the course of evaluating the official history of the development of Britain's nuclear arsenal.1 Unfortunately, Dr Carlton diminishes the effectiveness of his position by the manner in which he chooses to illustrate it.

Type
Research Article
Information
Review of International Studies , Volume 3 , Issue 1 , April 1977 , pp. 92 - 96
Copyright
Copyright © British International Studies Association 1977

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References

page 92 note 1. ‘Great Britain and Nuclear Weapons: The Academic Inquest’, Brit. J. International Studies, ii (1976), p. 167Google Scholar, n. 1.

page 92 note 2. (London, 1962).

page 92 note 3. Carlton, op. cit. p. 167, n. 1. The Cabinet Minutes - Cab. 65/13, 142nd meeting - are 7 pages long. Attached to them is a telegram from Lord Lothian in Washington describing President Roosevelt's suggestion that if Britain were defeated the Navy be transferred to Canada or Australia. He also made the “curious observation” that if the King fled England he should go to Bermuda and not Canada: “the American republics may be restless at monarchy being based on the American continent”. The War Cabinet, in discussing this telegram, remarked that “President Roosevelt seemed to be taking the view that it would be very nice of him to pick up the bits of the British Empire if this country was overrun. It was as well that he should realize that there was another aspect of the question”.

page 93 note 1. The conversation is described in Woodward, op. cit. (1970), p. 201.

page 93 note 2. Churchill told the War Cabinet what he intended to say to Reynaud and later in the day gave an account of his discussion with the French Premier,ibid, pp. 197–8.

page 93 note 3. Woodward,op. cit. (1962), pp. 48–50.

page 93 note 4. Cab. 65/13, 142nd meeting. The remarks which follow are drawn from this document.

page 93 note 5. Woodward, op, cit. (1970), pp. 202–4.

page 95 note 1. The characterization of Mussolini's response is Lord Lothian's (ibid, p, 205). For Churchill's message to Reynaud seeibid. pp. 206–8.