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11 Schneider and Teske, ‘Toward A Theory of the Political Entrepreneur: Evidence from Local Government’, pp. 739–40.

12 Sheingate, ‘Political Entrepreneurship, Institutional Change, and American Political Development’, pp. 198–9.

13 Schneider and Teske, ‘Toward A Theory of the Political Entrepreneur: Evidence from Local Government’, pp. 739–41.

14 Tallberg, Leadership and Negotiation in the EU, pp. 19–29.

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23 We would like to thank an anonymous referee for pointing out this important distinction.

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34 Among the non-permanent SC members that participated in the summit, Japan and India (but also Venezuela and Zimbabwe) conceded that the Soviet seat should be taken by the Russian Federation, but called for a SC more reflective of the realities of the new era (UN Doc. S/PV.3046, 31 January 1992). Neither did Germany raise any objections, not least because Moscow was the only permanent member that had raised the issue of a German SC permanent seat as early as September 1990. See The Independent (7 January 1992).

35 See Resolution 48/26 of 1993.

36 See ‘Malaysia's Position on Security Council Reform’ (3 July 1996), available at: {http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/reform/malaysia.htm} accessed on 10 November 2007.

37 During his period in office, the Ambassador of Malaysia held meetings with 165 of the 185 UN members. These meetings helped him acquire a broad overview of the positions held as well as any possible converging points of reference (Indian Express, 20 July 1997).

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43 The most militant states comprised Pakistan, Argentina, and Mexico, which did not want to see their regional rivals (India, Brazil) elevated to permanent membership and other regional powers, such as Egypt or Indonesia. See in particular the very critical statement of the Permanent Representative of Pakistan in the OEWG (20 April 1997).

44 See UNCLOS III, Rules of Procedure, UN Doc. A/CONF.62/30/Rev.2 (1976), especially Rules 37–40. Oxman, Bernard H., ‘The Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea: The 1976 New York Sessions’, The American Journal of International Law, 71:2 (1977), pp. 248–249CrossRefGoogle Scholar .

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51 10 UNCLOS III, Official Records 6, 8, UN Doc. A/CONF.62/62 (30 April 1978).

52 In the 1976 Colombo Summit, the Non-Aligned Countries ‘emphasize[d] the highly constructive role of the Group of 77 in the negotiations for advancing the cause of the developing countries and particularly in the establishment of the New International Economic Order’ (cited in Jankowitsch and Sauvant, The Third World Without Superpowers (New York: Oceana Publications, 1978), pp. 303–5).

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63 See, for example, Doc. ENDC/PV.298 (23 May 1967), p. 9; Doc. ENDC/PV. 334 (28 September 1967), pp. 6–7 and 8; Doc. ENDC/PV.293 (14 March 1967), p. 10; and Doc. ENDC/PV.304 (13 June 1967), p. 6.

64 Resolution 2346 (19 December 1967).

65 Interview with John Edmonds, Chief British Negotiator in the ENDC (April 1994).