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Bargaining power among potential allies: negotiating the North Atlantic Treaty, 1948–49

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  26 October 2009

Nikolaj Petersen
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Bargaining power is a somewhat neglected concept in the study of international negotiations. Who comes on top in the negotiating process and why, i.e. its power or influence aspect, has never been a central perspective of negotiation theorists. The ‘classical’ negotiation theorists of the 1960s1 make only passing references to the effects of differences in power resources on international negotiations, and even though more recent works pay considerably more attention to such variables,2 they can hardly be said to be central to the field. Nor has bargaining as a particular instance of the exercise of power been an important preoccupation of power theorists. Perhaps for these very reasons, the concept has remained a rather tricky one, often being used as an ad hoc or residual factor to ‘explain’ what cannot otherwise be accounted for. However, Christer Jönsson has argued that ‘focussing on bargaining power promises to be… an avenue to further clarification of the perennially elusive concept of power’.3 To what extent what he calls the ‘bridge-building and cross-fertilization between power analysis and bargaining studies’4 may also contribute to a better understanding of international negotiations, is an empirical question to which this article will attempt to give at least a preliminary answer.

Type
Research Article
Information
Review of International Studies , Volume 12 , Issue 3 , July 1986 , pp. 187 - 203
Copyright
Copyright © British International Studies Association 1986

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References

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30. Memo from British Embassy, Washington, 13 07 1948, Foreign Office (FO) files, piece no. 73074.Google Scholar

31. Reid notes that US negotiators would sometimes ‘use the alleged views of the Senate as a device to strengthen [their] bargaining position.… It is an argument, even if flimsy, that is difficult for a foreigner to question since, if he does, he puts himself in the position of asserting more knowledge of senatorial opinion than the United States administration’ (Reid, op. cit., note 6, p. 96). The other participants who represented less pluralistic political systems were unable to manipulate similar dependencies on parliamentary opinion. There were two main factions in the State Department who disagreed vehemently over the Atlantic Pact. One group, led by John Hickerson, Director of the European Office, was convinced, as early as the British government, of the need to conclude an Atlantic alliance and did not lie far from the British attitude with respect to the character of the US commitment. The other group was led by George Kennan, the influential director of the Policy Planning Staff: it was doubtful whether a military alliance was the right answer to what they saw as mainly a political problem; such military problems as there were, could be solved by more informal procedures, such as military aid and joint planning. Charles Bohlen agreed with Kennan on most things, and also Secretary Marshall was receptive to Kennan's arguments. On the other hand, Under-Secretary Lovett, who was in actual charge of the Pact negotiations, tended to side with Hickerson and his principal aide, Th. Achilles of the Western European Office. The actual influence of the two groups fluctuated during 1948, but gradually the Hickerson group gained the upper hand. See Petersen, op. cit. (note 25).

32. Ibid.

33. Reid, op. cit. (note 6), p. 57.

34. Ibid., p. 60.

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54. Ibid.

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57. Jönsson, op. cit. (note 3), p. 256.

58. ‘In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.’

59. Petersen, op. cit. (note 25).

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61. Reid, op. cit. (note 6) p. 30.

62. George Kennan in his memoirs relates one instance where Lovett killed a proposal by referring to the Senate's probable refusal to go along. ‘The objection was final. It produced only a moment of glum silence. I could not help but wish, though, that one of our European friends had stood up at that point and said, “Mr. Lovett, if you and your colleagues in the State Department cannot speak for American policy in this matter will you kindly introduce us to the people who can?”’ Kennan, G., Memoirs 1925–1950 (London, 1968), pp. 413–414.Google Scholar

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