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Alliance and the British way in warfare

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  26 October 2009

Lawrence Freedman
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Extract

The British Way in Warfare was the title of a book by Basil Liddell Hart published in 1932. It was an elaboration of ideas first propounded a year earlier in a celebrated lecture on ‘Economic Pressure or Continental Victories’ to the Royal United Services Institute. Like many of his generation, the more Liddell Hart reflected on his own encounter with war (he had been gassed and wounded at the Somme), the more he became convinced that such folly must not be repeated. This required transforming the very conduct of war. With equal conviction he believed that he had hit upon some answers. These appeared as general principles of strategy—the ‘indirect approach’—and a particular policy for his own country— ‘limited liability’. He claimed that he was doing little more than distilling the essence of a long–standing national approach. This was ‘the British Way in Warfare’.

Type
Research Article
Information
Review of International Studies , Volume 21 , Issue 2 , April 1995 , pp. 145 - 158
Copyright
Copyright © British International Studies Association 1995

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References

1 Hart, Basil Liddell, The British Way in Warfare (London, 1932)Google Scholar.

2 On the influence of the Somme on Liddell Hart, see Strachan, Hew, ‘ “The Real War”: Liddell Hart, Crutwell, and Falls’, in Bond, Brian (ed.), The First World War and British Military History (Oxford, 1991)Google Scholar.

3 Through the centuries sea–power had been used for two purposes: ‘one financial, which embraced subsidizing and military provisioning of allies; the other military, which embraced seaborne expeditions against the enemy's vulnerable extremities’. Hart, Basil Liddell, ‘Continental Victories or Economic Pressure’, Journal of the Royal United Services Institute (1931), p. 500Google Scholar.

4 Howard, Michael, ‘The British Way in Warfare: A Reappraisal’, in Howard, M. (ed.), The Causes of Wars (London, 1983)Google Scholar.

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7 Liddell Hart, ‘Continental Victories’, pp. 487–8.

8 Howard, ‘The British Way’, p. 180.

9 Churchill, Winston S., The Second World War, Vol. 3. The Grand Alliance (1948–1953), pp. 607–8Google Scholar. See Cohen, Eliot, ‘Churchill and Coalition Strategy in World War II’ in Kennedy, Paul (ed.), Grand Strategies in War and Peace (New Haven, 1991)Google Scholar.

10 He told de Gaulle: ‘Each time I have to choose between you and Roosevelt, I shall always choose Roosevelt… Each time we have to choose between Europe and the open sea, we shall always choose the open sea.’ Cited in Reynolds, David, Britannia Overruled: British Policy & World Power in the 20th Century (London, 1991), p. 30Google Scholar.

11 Pierre, Andrew, Nuclear Politics: The British Experience with an Independent Strategic Force, 1939–1970 (London, 1972)Google Scholar; Baylis, John, Anglo–American Defence Relations. 1939–1984: The Special Relationship (London, 1984)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Clark, Ian, Nuclear Diplomacy and the Special Relationship: Britain's Deterrent and America (Oxford, 1994)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

12 See Freedman, Lawrence, The Price of Peace: Living with the Nuclear Dilemma (New York, 1986)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

13 Freedman, Lawrence, Navias, Martin and Wheeler, Nicholas, Independence in Concert: The British Rationale for Possessing Strategic Nuclear Weapons, Nuclear History Program: Occasional Paper 5 (Center for International Studies, University of Maryland, 1989)Google Scholar.

14 CAB 128/27 7 July 1954. Jan Melissen, ‘The Struggle for Nuclear Partnership: Britain, The United States and the Making of an Ambiguous Alliance’, PhD thesis, Rijksuniversiteit Groningen, 1992.

15 Freedman, Lawrence, ‘British Nuclear Targeting’, Defence Analysis, vol. 1 (1985)Google Scholar.

16 Gowing, Margaret, Independence and Deterrence: Britain and Atomic Energy, 1945–1952, vol. I, Policy–Making London, 1974), pp. 152–9Google Scholar. A major drawback was considered to be the leftist sympathies of leading French nuclear scientists, and in particular Joliot–Curie.

17 The possibility was discussed in the late 1950s as France's nuclear intentions became clearer. As leader of the Opposition, Edward Heath expressed himself in favour of closer nuclear cooperation with France. He spoke of a future European defence system, including ‘a nuclear force based on the existing British and French forces which could be held in trusteeship for Europe as a whole’. Heath, Edward, Old World, New Horizon: Britain, the Common Market and the Atlantic Alliance (London, 1970), p. 73CrossRefGoogle Scholar. In government he tried but failed to improve cooperation.

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19 However see Ullman, Richard, ‘The Covert French Connection’, Foreign Policy, No. 75 (Summer 1989)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

20 The most critical official expression of the Strategic Defence Initiative is to be found in the speech by the then Foreign Secretary, Howe, Sir Geoffrey, ‘Defence and Security in the Nuclear Age’, on 15 March 1985. Reprinted in RUSIJoumal, vol. 130 (June 1985)Google Scholar.

21 On the Reykjavik summit, see Mandelbaum, Michael and Talbott, Strobe, ‘Reykjavik and Beyond’, Foreign Affairs (Winter 1986–1987)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. For a discussion of some of the themes of the summit, see articles in International Security (Summer 1987)Google Scholar.

22 This was not too serious in the case of SDI, although those who took the programme at face value asserted that it was. This is discussed in Freedman, Lawrence, ‘The Small Nuclear Powers’, in Schwartz, David and Carter, Ashton (eds.), Ballistic Missile Defense (Washington, DC, 1984)Google Scholar.

23 Thatcher, Margaret, The Downing Street Years (London, 1993), p. 471Google Scholar.

24 Sunday Times, 20 December 1987Google Scholar; Aviation Week & Space Technology, 21 December 1987Google Scholar.

25 A Joint Commission on Nuclear Policy and Doctrine was established by the two countries in November 1992. At the Franco–British summit of July 1993 this was turned into a permanent standing body. According to Secretary for Defence Malcolm Rifkind, ‘The most striking and welcome aspect of this joint work has been the confirmation that there are no differences between France and the United Kingdom on fundamental nuclear issues’. ‘UK Defence Strategy: A Continuing Role for Nuclear Weapons?’, Speech to Centre for Defence Studies, London, 16 November 1993.

26 On the pressures to send troops to Beirut in 1983 and Mrs Thatcher's reluctance to do so, see The Downing Street Years, pp. 326–7.

27 On Grenada, see The Downing Street Years, pp. 328–33. On Vietnam, see Pimlott, Ben, Harold Wilson (London, 1992), pp. 385–8Google Scholar.

28 See for example Sir John Slessor's proposal at a meeting of the Chiefs on 17 July. Farrar–Hockley, Anthony, The British Part in the Korean War, vol. I, A Distant Obligation (London, 1990), pp. 100–1Google Scholar. The key advantage of this—in the spirit of limited liability—was that it could be implemented by the American Air Force without requiring a greater British contribution. The problem with this scheme was that the Americans were already actually committed to a land campaign. To suggest that they should adopt an alternative course presumed that they would be driven out of Korea. To push this option would appear, correctly, as a defeatist rationale for British passivity.

29 “Too often in the past we have taken our time to make a decision with the result that often, when we have done what was in line with American ideas, we have got no credit or approval for it: the decision has followed upon and seemed to be extracted from us by the massive discussion, criticism and pressure that has been built up in the United States…” Farrar–Hockley, The British Part, p. 103. Alex Danchev confirms that for Franks, ‘the initial British reaction to any major question is the most important from the American point of view’. Danchev, Alex, Oliver Franks: Founding Father (Oxford, 1993), p. 125Google Scholar.

30 Farrar Hockley, The British Part p. 103. Jong– yil, Ra, ‘Special Relationship at War: The Anglo–American Relationship during the Korean War’, Journal of Strategic Studies, vol. 7 (September 1984), pp. 309–10CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

31 Freedman, Lawrence and Karsh, Efraim, The Gulf Conflict (London, 1993), pp. 74–76Google Scholar. Also on Britain and the Gulf, see Howarth, Jolyon, ‘United Kingdom Defence Policy and the Gulf War’, Contemporary European Affairs, vol. 4 (1991)Google Scholar; and Fawcett, Louise and O'Neill, Robert, ‘Britain, the Gulf Crisis and European Security’, in Gnesotto, Nicole and Roper, John, Western Europe and the Gulf (Paris, 1992)Google Scholar.

32 The Downing Street Years, p. 819.

33 Now the one frigate in the Gulf, off Dubai, was to be supported by a frigate from Mombasa and another which had been in Malaysia.

34 The British role is described in Secretary of State for Defence, Statement on the Defence Estimates: Britain's Defence in the 90s, vol. 1 (Cmnd 1559–1, July 1991)Google Scholar; House of Commons Tenth Report from the Defence Committee, Session 1990–91, Preliminary Lessons of Operation Granby (August 1991)Google Scholar.

35 General de la Billiere, Sir Peter, Storm Command: A Personal Account of the Gulf War (London, 1992)Google Scholar.

36 De la Billiere, Storm Command, pp. 82–3.

37 De la Billiere, Storm Command, p. 99.

38 De la Billiere, who had begun his active service in Korea, refers to an ‘unhappy incident in the Korean War when a British brigade had fought under an American command’ (Storm Command, p. 81). He does not elaborate but he must be referring to the battle of Imjin in April 1951 when 29 Brigade attempted to hold a hopeless position in the face of a massive Chinese offensive. Despite being left isolated and without proper support, they did in fact succeed in slowing the offensive, but at the cost of 1,000 casualties—a quarter of the British front–line strength. Of the 850 men of the Gloucesters only 169 could be mustered after the battle. The bulk had been taken prisoner. Max Hastings has commented how many of those involved with Imjin ‘believed that it revealed the fatal disadvantages of committing an independent national brigade group in a major war’. To illustrate the point he cites one officer's observation that when Brigadier Tom Brodie told the largely American Corps headquarters ‘that his position was “a bit sticky”, they simply did not grasp that in British Army parlance, that meant “critical” ’. Hastings, Max, The Korean War (London, 1987), pp. 260–1Google Scholar.

39 De la Billiere, Storm Command, p. 93.

40 De la Billiere, Storm Command, p. 93.

41 De la Billiere, Storm Command, p. 153.

42 The Downing Street Years, p. 796.

43 The 1990 Defence Estimates warned that the ‘defence planner’ must keep in mind the ‘darker’ possibilities; ‘he must look to possible mistakes and failures in the political scene, rather than successes’. Political shifts ‘can happen—or be reversed—much faster than defence provision can be changed, run down or re–built’. Secretary of State for Defence, Statement on the Defence Estimates 1990, vol. 1, Cmnd 1022–1 (London, 1990), p. 17Google Scholar. The warning next year was that while the ‘Soviet capability to mount a large–scale offensive into central Europe is diminishing’ and so no longer put the demands as before on NATO, risks were still faced, though these were ‘far less obvious and monolithic’:

The Soviet Union remains an unstable military superpower, whose capabilities need to be counter–balanced if stability is to be preserved in Europe. These capabilities still present the most serious, if not the most immediate, threat to Western security.

Secretary of State for Defence, Statement on the Defence Estimates 1991, vol. 1, Cmnd 1559–1 (London, 1991) p. 31Google Scholar.