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Unequal power and the institutional design of global governance: the case of arms control

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 October 2013

CAROLINE FEHL
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Abstract

IR scholars have recently paid increasing attention to unequal institutional orders in world politics, arguing that global governance institutions are deeply shaped by power inequalities among states. Yet, the literature still suffers from conceptual limitations and from a shortage of empirical work. The article addresses these shortcomings through a study of the historical evolution of global arms control institutions since 1945. It shows that in this important policy area, the global institutional order has not been marked by a recent trend toward deeper inequality, as many writings on unequal institutions suggest. Instead, the analysis reveals a pattern of institutional mutation whereby specific forms of institutional inequality are recurrently replaced and supplemented by new forms. This process, the article argues, is driven by states' efforts to adapt the regime to a changing material and normative environment within the constraints of past institutional legacies.

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Articles
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Review of International Studies , Volume 40 , Issue 3 , July 2014 , pp. 505 - 531
Copyright
Copyright © British International Studies Association 2013 

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References

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