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Short circuits: society and tradition in international relations theory*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  26 October 2009

Extract

In a period when international relations theory has painfully awakened from its dreams of a decontextualized account of international reality, some theorists of international relations are likely to do what some political scientists already have done: turn to disciplinary history in search of remedies against what they take to be a threatening disciplinary anarchy:

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Research Article
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Copyright © British International Studies Association 1996

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References

1 Dryzek, J. S. and Leonard, S. T., ‘History and Discipline in Political Science’, American Political Science Review, 82 (1988), pp. 1245–60, p. 1249CrossRefGoogle Scholar. These authors draw heavily upon ideas developed by Imre Lakatos and Alasdair Maclntyre. See Lakatos, I., The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes (Cambridge, 1978)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Maclntyre, A., ‘Epistemological Crises, Dramatic Narratives, and the Philosophy of Science’, The Monist, 60 (1977), pp. 468–9.Google Scholar

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57 Wight, International Theory, p. 37.

58 Bull, ‘Importance of Grotius’, pp. 84, 87.

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