¹ Haggard, Stephan and Simmons, Beth, ‘Theories of International Regimes’, International Organization, 41 (1987), p. 492.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

² Young, Oran R., International Cooperation: Building Regimes for Natural Resources and the Environment (Ithaca, 1989), p. 207.Google Scholar

³ For a recent discussion of this perspective, see Grieco, Joseph M., ‘Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism’, International Organization, 42 (1988), pp. 485–507.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁴ Young, Oran R., ‘International Regimes: Toward a New Theory of Institutions’. World Politics, 39 (1986), pp. 104–22.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁵ Young, International Cooperation, p. 209.

⁶ Haas, Ernst B., ‘Why Collaborate: Issue Linkage and International Regimes’. World Politics, 32 (1980), p. 385.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁷ Joyner, Christopher C., ‘Anglo-Argentine Rivalry After the Falklands: On the Road to Antarctica?’ in Coll, Alberto R. and Arend, Anthony C. (eds.) The Falklands War: Lessons for Strategy, Diplomacy and International Law. (Winchester, 1985), p. 208.Google Scholar

⁸ A recent effort to define and apply a conceptualization of ‘national interest’ in order to explain state behaviour is Stephen Krasner’s Defending the National Interest: Raw Materials Investments and U.S. Foreign Policy (Princeton, 1978)Google Scholar. In this case, despite careful empirical work, ‘national interest’ is so broadly defined that anything goes as long as the ‘interest’ identified is consistent and continuous over time.

⁹ Young, , ‘International Regimes’, p. 107.Google Scholar

¹⁰ Young, , ‘International Regimes’, pp. 21–22.Google Scholar

¹¹ Krasner, Stephen D., ‘Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables’, International Regimes (Ithaca, New York, 1983), p. 2.Google Scholar

¹² Young, Oran R., Resource Management at the International Level: The Case of the North Pacific (New York, 1977), p. 44.Google Scholar

¹³ Until 1982, with the entry into force of the Convention on the Conservation of Marine and Living Resources (CCAMLR), this was the case with the Antarctic Treaty system. As a consequence of this convention, the first formal organizations were established to implement and enforce agreed use on living resources.

¹⁴ Young, Resource Management, p. 5.

¹⁵ Kratochwil, Friedrich V., Rules, Norms, and Decisions; On the Conditions of Practical and Legal Reasoning in International Relations and Domestic Affairs (Cambridge, 1989), p. 48.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹⁶ Kratochwil, , Rules, Norms, and Decisions, p. 181.Google Scholar

¹⁷ Kratochwil, , Rules, Norms, and Decisions, p. 35.Google Scholar

¹⁸ Kratochwil, , Rules, Norms, and Decisions, p. 63.Google Scholar

¹⁹ Kratochwil, , Rules, Norms, and Decisions, p. 10.Google Scholar

²⁰ Kratochwil, Friedrich, ‘Rules, Norms, Values, and the Limits of “Rationality”’, Archiv fur Rechts-und Sozialphilosophie, 73 (1987), p. 309.Google Scholar

²¹ Kratochwil, , ‘Rules, Norms, Values’, p. 320.Google Scholar

²² Kratochwil, , ‘Rules, Norms, Values’, p. 310.Google Scholar

²³ Kratochwil, Friedrich, ‘The Force of Prescriptions’, International Organization, 38 (1983), p. 698.Google Scholar

²⁴ Kratochwil, , Rules, Norms, and Decisions, p. 11.Google Scholar

²⁵ Nardin, Terry, Law, Morality, and the Relations of States (Princeton, 1983), p. 4.Google Scholar

²⁶ Kratochwil, , ‘Rules, Norms, Values’, p. 305.Google Scholar

²⁷ Keohane, Robert O., ‘The Theory of Hegemonic Stability and Changes in International Economic Regimes. 1967–77’, in Holsti, O., Siverson, R., and George, A. (eds.), Change in the International System (Boulder, 1980), p. 132.Google Scholar

²⁸ See, in particular, the excellent analysis by Duncan Snidal, ‘The Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory’, International Organization, 39 (1985), pp. 579–614.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

²⁹ This point is made by Oran Young, ‘International Regimes’, p. 107.

³⁰ Kratochwil, Rules, Norms, and Decisions, p. 61.

³¹ Kratochwil, in making this point, also notes that this approach treats rule-following as a ‘passive process’. Yet the activities of agents can and do create and recreate the norms and rules under which they operate. Rules, Norms, and Decisions, p. 61.

³² As noted by Young, analysts of regimes usually fail to discriminate between different types of regimes that may result in incorrect conclusions about the processes responsible for regime formation and the consequences associated with a specific ‘order’. Young identifies three categories of regimes: spontaneous, negotiated and imposed. Oran Young, ‘Regime Dynamics: The Rise and Fall of International Regimes’, in Krasner, Stephen D. (ed.), International Regimes (Ithaca, 1983).Google Scholar

³³ The seven claimant states are Argentina, Australia, Chile, France, New Zealand, Norway and Great Britain.

³⁴ For example, Peter Beck reports that Anglo-Argentine ‘rivalry provided one of the key background influences to the conclusion of the Antarctic Treaty, which was designed primarily to contain such sovereignty problems’. Beck, Peter, The International Politics of Antarctica (New York, 1986), p. 33.Google Scholar

³⁵ Whether there are, in fact, deposits large enough to warrant exploitation remains unknown.

³⁶ Auburn, F. M., Antarctic Law and Politics (Bloomington, 1982), p. 109.Google Scholar

³⁷ The status of this convention is, as of this writing, uncertain. During the ratification process, the governments of Australia and France refused to sign the agreement, apparently because of fears concerning the adequacy of conservation measures. (Some commentators have suggested that the refusal to sign has less to do with environmental concerns and more to do with domestic political concerns. See reports of 8 June, 1989 and 22 March, 1990 in the Far Eastern Economic Review.) As claimants, these two Consultative Party members must sign if the convention is to go into effect. A special meeting was to have been convened in 1990 to address their concerns.

³⁸ Coll, Alberto R., ‘Philosophical and Legal Dimensions of the Use of Force in the Falklands Wars’, in Coll, and Arend, (eds.), The Falklands War: Lessons for Strategy, Diplomacy and International Law, p. 39.Google Scholar

³⁹ A practical association is ‘a relationship among those who are engaged in the pursuit of different and possibly incompatible purposes, and who are associated with one another, if at all, only in respecting certain restrictions on how each may pursue his own purposes’. Nardin, Terry, Law, Morality, and the Relations of States, p. 9Google Scholar. Purposive and practical associations are not mutually exclusive, and elements of both may be found in any ‘association’.

⁴⁰ The actual legal standing of UN resolutions, however, is a subject of continuing controversy.

⁴¹ Disagreements, which are not limited to politicians, also extend to international courts and international lawyers. James Gravelle, in his analysis of the Falklands/Malvinas sovereignty dispute, identifies twelve different ‘modes’ recognized in international law for territorial claims: discovery, occupation, accretion, erosion, avulsion, cession, conquest, prescription, abandonment, revolution, succession and annexation. Gravelle, Major James Francis‘The Falkland (Malvinas) Islands: An International Law Analysis of the Dispute Between Argentina and Great Britain’, Military Law Review, 107 (1985), p. 19.Google Scholar Further complicating the assignment of title, the relative weight accorded any of these modes by international courts and lawyers has varied over time.

⁴² Nardin, Law, Morality, and the Relations of States, p. 167.

⁴³ There was a period of time, however, during the Labour Government of the 1960s, when a commitment to anti-colonialism may have led to British willingness to cede sovereignty to Argentina. See Charlton, Michael, The Little Platoon: Diplomacy and the Falklands Dispute (Oxford, 1989), pp. 8–9.Google Scholar

⁴⁴ The intent of U.N. Resolution 1514, passed in 1960, was to end colonialism. A ‘Special committee of 24’ was established to encourage and oversee the decolonization process. beck, Peter, The Falkland Islands as an International Problem (New York, 1988), pp. 55, 96.Google Scholar

⁴⁵ Nardin, Law, Mortality, and the Relations of States, p. 167.

⁴⁶ American Admiral Harry Train, in ‘debriefing’ Argentine Admiral Anaya, reports that Anaya thought ‘he was just “giving a nudge to diplomacy” by landing five hundred troops in Port Stanley’. Quoted by Charlton, The Little Platoon, p. 119.

⁴⁷ See Raiffa, Howard, The Art and Science of Negotiation (Cambridge, 1982).Google Scholar

⁴⁸ Sebenius, James K., ‘Negotiation Arithmetic: Adding and Subtracting Issues and Parties’, International Organization, 37 (1983), p. 312.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁴⁹ Sebenius, ‘Negotiation Arithmetic’, p. 309.

⁵⁰ In some respects, the question of the effects of a two-party versus n-party setting is analogous to the continuing debate over the relative merits of bipolar versus multipolar balance of power systems; here the issue is the relative stability and peace-inducing effects of the two systems.

⁵¹ Peterson, M. J., Managing the Frozen South: the Creation and Evolution of the Antarctic Treaty System (Berkeley, 1988), p. 50.Google Scholar

⁵² Peterson, Managing the Frozen South, p. 54.

⁵³ Peter Beck contends that ‘the IGY indicated a way forward from the existing impasse on sovereignty, and several governments proved anxious to perpetuate the stable and amiable relationship characteristic of this episode’. Beck, Peter, The International Politics of Antarctica, p. 61.Google Scholar

⁵⁴ See Peterson, Managing the Frozen South, p. 88.

⁵⁵ Peterson, Managing the Frozen South, p. 54.

⁵⁶ Notably, a Chilean official first suggested the Article IV solution.

⁵⁷ See Luce, Duncan R., and Raiffa, Howard, Games and Decisions (New York, 1957).Google Scholar

⁵⁸ Kratochwil, Friedrich, Rohrlich, Raul and Mahajan, Harpreett, Peace and Disputed Sovereignty (New York, 1985), pp. 25, 30.Google Scholar

⁵⁹ This point has been made by several analysts. See Beck, , The Falkland IslandsGoogle Scholar, Dillon, G. M., The Falklands, Politics and War (London, 1989)CrossRefGoogle Scholar, Gamba, Virginia, The Falklands/Malvinas War (Boston, 1987Google Scholar), and Gustafson, Lowell S., The Sovereignty Dispute over the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands (New York, 1988).Google Scholar

⁶⁰ G. M. Dillon, The Falklands, p. 1. This interpretation received support from Lord Alun Chalfont, Foreign Office Minister in the late 1960s who stated in an interview: ‘The idea was that, sooner or later, we would have to discuss with Argentina the question of sovereignty. It was also accepted that sooner or later, sovereignty would have to be transferred to Argentina’. Quoted by Charlton, The Little Platoon, p. 19.

⁶¹ Dillon, The Falklands, p. viii.

⁶² See Peter Beck, The International Politics of Antarctica, Michael Charlton, The Little Platoon, and G. M. Dillon, The Falklands for detailed discussions of this issue.

⁶³ Putnam, Robert D., ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games’. International Organization, 42 (1988), p. 434.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁶⁴ Putnam, ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Polities’, p. 436.

⁶⁵ Putnam, ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Polities’, p. 436.

⁶⁶ An earlier exercise of brinksmanship apparently succeeded. According to Beck, in 1976 an Argentine challenge to a British ship, done to ‘record its claim to the islands and to persuade Britain to negotiate about their future’, led the British Government to engage in serious negotiations. Beck, , The Falkland Islands, p. 4.Google Scholar

⁶⁷ Dillon, , The Falklands, p. 23.Google Scholar

⁶⁸ Because the Thatcher Government took no official position, no discussions were held in 1979.

⁶⁹ Dillon, , The Falklands, p. 27.Google Scholar

⁷⁰ See Beck, , The Falkland Islands, p. 7Google Scholar and Gamba, , The Falklands/Malvinas War, p. 113Google Scholar. Evidence of the inactivity and lack of interest of the Thatcher Government with respect to the Falklands is well captured in the official Frank Report. ‘Government policy towards Argentina and the Falkland Islands was never formally discussed outside the Foreign and Commonwealth after January 1981. Thereafter, the time was never judged to be ripe . . . There was no meeting of the Defence Committee to discuss the Falklands until 1 April 1982; and there was no reference to the Falklands in Cabinet, even after the New York talks of 26 and 27 February, until Lord Carrington reported on events in South Georgia on 25 March 1982’. Falkland Islands Review. A Report of A Committee of Privy Counsellors (Chairman: The Rt Hon. The Lord Franks) (London, 1983), p. 79.Google Scholar

⁷¹ Several of Charlton's interviewees lamented the lack of effort expended in educating the Islanders into the realities of their situation. For example: ‘What I said in my reports, which I still feel was the trouble with the Falkland Islanders, was this: the real alternatives which lay before them were never really put to them . . . The difficulty was that the Falkland Islanders did not realize that there was no way in which they could carry on as they had in the 1960s and ’70s, because things were going to change’. Sir Williams, Anthony, quoted by Charlton, , The Little Platoon, p. 131.Google Scholar

⁷² Dillon, , The Falklands, p. 61.Google Scholar

⁷³ Dillon reports that at the time of Nicholas Ridley's visit to the Falklands in 1980, the manager of the Island's radio station estimated that 50 percent of the residents liked the idea of lease-back (Dillon, , The Falklands, p. 71Google Scholar). Beck also cites reports that agree with Dillon's assessment, that a percentage of the Islanders expressed to Ridley their sympathy for leaseback. Beck, Peter, The Falkland Islands, p. 121.Google Scholar

⁷⁴ The White Paper produced by the Home Office in 1980 on the reformed British Nationality Bill provides further evidence of disengagement, even from the Islanders. One MP, in reaction to the White Paper, remarked that it was ‘supremely ironic that the Government, who claim to be so concerned about the interests of the Falkland Islanders have devalued their nationality, made them second-class citizens . . .’ Quoted by Gustafson, , The Sovereignty Dispute, p. 46Google Scholar. Only 400 Islanders would have retained full citizenship. Kinney, Douglas, National Interest I National Honor (New York, 1989), p. 60.Google Scholar

⁷⁵ Hayton, Robert D., ‘The “American” Antarctic’, American Journal of International Law, 50 (1956), p. 588.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁷⁶ Pittman, Howard T., ‘Geopolitics and Foreign Policy in Argentina, Brazil, and Chile’, in Ferris, Elizabeth G. and Lincoln, Jennie K. (eds.), Latin American Foreign Policies: Global and Regional Dimensions (Boulder, 1981), p. 170.Google Scholar

⁷⁷ In 1957, the Argentine Government issued a decree to establish the ‘Falklands (and Dependencies) as part of the National Territory of Tierra del Fuego, Antarctica and the South Atlantic Islands’. Beck, Peter, The Falkland Islands, p. 95.Google Scholar

⁷⁸ See Child, John, ‘Geopolitical Thinking in Latin America’, Latin American Research Review, 14 (1979), pp. 89–111Google Scholar, and Child, Jack, Geopolitics and Conflict in South America: Quarrels Among Neighbors (New York, 1985).Google Scholar

⁷⁹ Child, , Geopolitics and Conflict, p. 141.Google Scholar

⁸⁰ Child, , Geopolitics and Conflict, pp. 141–42.Google Scholar

⁸¹ Reported by Gustafson, , The Sovereignty Dispute, p. 145.Google Scholar

⁸² Gamba, , The Falklands I Malvinas War, p. 110. It is important to keep in mind that Chile is a rival claimant in the Antarctic.Google Scholar

⁸³ Moro, Ruben O., The History of the South Atlantic Conflict: The War for the Malvinas (New York, 1989), p. 1.Google Scholar

⁸⁴ Dillon, , The Falklands, p. 15. Dillon is drawing upon the Franks Report.Google Scholar

⁸⁵ Dillon, , The Falklands, p. 46.Google Scholar

⁸⁶ Gustafson, , The Sovereignty Dispute, p. 147.Google Scholar

⁸⁷ Gamba, , The Falklands I Malvinas War, p. 134.Google Scholar

⁸⁸ Evidence suggests that the Argentine government miscalculated both American and British responses. Based on earlier British decisions with respect to the Falklands, Argentine officials quite reasonably assumed that there would be no military reaction. In addition, improving relations with the United States led the military leadership to expect at the worst American neutrality in the face of an Argentine invasion. (For an excellent discussion of these and related issues, see Coll, and Arend, (eds.), The Falklands War: Lessons for Strategy, Diplomacy and International Law.)Google Scholar

⁸⁹ Hansard, , (Lords) v 429, p. 37.Google Scholar

⁹⁰ Hansard, , (Lords) v 429, p. 294.Google Scholar

⁹¹ When asked why not just give up the Falklands in light of economic and defence realities, Julian Amery, Minister of State in the British Foreign Office in the mid-1970s, replied: ‘Had we given up the Falklands . . . we would have lost the card of entry into the Antarctic. I was pretty sure . . . that Parliament would not have accepted that, and I was proved right . . . But there was also the strong feeling on the Conservative benches that the Antarctic could be important, that we would be foolish to throw away that card of entry’. Quoted by Charlton, , The Little Platoon, p. 35.Google Scholar

⁹² Frank, Thomas M., ‘The Strategic Role of Legal Principles’, in Coll, and Arend, (eds.), The Falklands War: Lessons for Strategy, Diplomacy and International Law, pp. 31–32.Google Scholar

⁹³ Frank, , ‘The Strategic Role of Legal Principles’, p. 25Google Scholar. Sir Parsons, Anthony, British representative to the UN at the time of the invasion, reports that while arguing the British case, he avoided the issue of sovereignty and instead focused on the ‘fact that there had been an unprovoked act of aggression’Google Scholar. This approach, he believes, led Third World states, themselves the victim of aggression, to support Resolution 502 calling for Argentine withdrawal. Quoted by Charlton, , The Little Platoon, p. 199.Google Scholar

⁹⁴ Argentine Rear-Admiral Bussar stated that seeking UN Security Council backing for their position had been discussed but rejected due to British veto power. Quoted by Charlton, , The Little Platoon, p. 115.Google Scholar

⁹⁵ Frank, , ‘The Strategic Role of Legal Principles,’ p. 32.Google Scholar

⁹⁶ This reasoning would seem to hold with particular force to the recent invasion of Kuwait by Iraq's Saddam Hussein.

⁹⁷ Nardin, , Law, Morality and the Relations of States, pp. 107, 110.Google Scholar

⁹⁸ Kratochwil, , Rules, Norms, and Decisions, p. 181.Google Scholar

⁹⁹ Kratochwil, , Rules, Norms, and Decisions, p. 260.Google Scholar

¹⁰⁰ Kratochwil, , Rules, Norms, and Decisions, p. 63Google Scholar. I should reiterate the point made earlier that what is ‘rational’ is itself a consequence of the situation within which one finds oneself. Socialization into a given setting will then produce calculations relevant and appropriate for that setting.

¹⁰¹ Quoted by Heymann, Philip, ‘The Problem of Coordination: Bargaining and Rules’, Harvard Law Review, 86 (1983), p. 827.Google Scholar

¹⁰² Hansard, , (Commons) v 21 p. 483.Google Scholar

¹⁰³ Beck, Peter argues that not only has the Treaty managed to contain Argentine–British rivalry, but it has also acted as an effective buffer in U.S.–Soviet disputes. Peter Beck, The International Politics of Antarctica, p. 83.Google Scholar

¹⁰⁴ Beck, , The International Politics of Antarctica, p. 84.Google Scholar

¹⁰⁵ Quoted by Beck, , The International Politics of Antarctica, p. 177.Google Scholar

¹⁰⁶ Beck, , The International Politics of Antarctica, p. 177.Google Scholar

¹⁰⁷ For a more detailed discussion of the values underlying the Antarctic Treaty, Westermeyer, William ‘Resource Allocation in Antarctica: A Review’, Marine Policy, 6 (1982), pp. 303–25.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹⁰⁸ Child, Jack, Antarctica and South American Geopolitics: Frozen Lebensraurn (New York, 1988), p. 93Google Scholar. A similar attitude is reflected in an FCO paper published in 1983. ‘As our sovereignty over BAT [British Antarctic Territories] is not recognized by many of our Treaty partners, and is contested by Argentina and Chile, we could expect difficulty in trying to be able to go it alone in Antarctica or to control and benefit from mineral activities there in the way we do domestically’. Quoted by Beck, , ‘British Relations with Latin America: The Antarctic Dimension’, in Bulmer-Thomas, Victor (ed.), Britain and Latin America: A Changing Relationship (Cambridge, 1989), pp. 174–5.Google Scholar

¹⁰⁹ Beck, , ‘British Relations with Latin America’, p. 171.Google Scholar

¹¹⁰ Hansard, , (Lords) v 429, p. 342.Google Scholar

¹¹¹ See Guyer, Robert E., ‘Antarctica's Roles in International Relations’, in Vincuna, Francisco Orrego (ed.) Antarctic Resources Policy: Scientific, Legal and Political Issues (Cambridge, 1983).Google Scholar

¹¹² Child, Jack, in a recent paper, reports that in Argentina ‘There seems to be a growing realization that making good on Antarctic sovereignty claim is not very realistic and may alienate a number of important allies whose support is needed on the Malvinas issue. Thus, there is a cautious but intriguing discussion regarding the sharing of Antarctic sovereignty with other Latin American nations under Argentine leadership.’Google Scholar Quoted by Beck, Peter, ‘British Relations with Latin America’, pp. 170–1Google Scholar. The possibility of other Latin American countries accepting Argentine leadership is unknown although probably unlikely. In any event, the dispute with the British would remain.

¹¹³ Quoted by Beck, , ‘British Relation with Latin America’, p. 180.Google Scholar

¹¹⁴ For recent discussions of problems associated with the Antarctic Treaty system, see Auburn, , Antarctic Law and Politics (Bloomington, 1982Google Scholar), Parsons, Anthony, Antarctica: The Next Decade (Cambridge, 1987CrossRefGoogle Scholar), Peterson, , Managing the Frozen SouthGoogle Scholar; Quigg, Philip W., A Pole Apart: The Emerging Issue of Antarctica (New York, 1983)Google Scholar; and Shapley, Deborah, The Seventh Continent: Antarctica in a Resource Age (Washington, D.C., 1985).Google Scholar

¹¹⁵ State self-interest is, for example, being played out In the complex negotiations associated with the implementation of the marine resources convention where Japan and the Soviet Union—the principal fishing states—have been less than cooperative regarding needed data. See Howard, Matthew, ‘The Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources: A Five-Year Review’, International & Comparative Law Quarterly, 38 (1989), pp. 104–49.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹¹⁶ Child, , Antarctica and South American, pp. 94–95.Google Scholar

¹¹⁷ There is the intriguing question of the extent to which, if at all, the actions of Consultative Party members have created norms accepted into customary international law but no consensus on this point. In his detailed study of the negotiations on the minerals agreement, Francisco Orrego Vicuna concludes: ‘[T]he basis norms of the Treaty . . . are indubitably of a ‘fundamentally norm-creating character’ such as may serve as a basis for the establishment of a general rule of law. This relates both to norms that create rights and to norms that can be regarded as establishing obligations’. Vicuna, Francisco Orrego, Antarctic Mineral Exploitation: The Emerging Legal Framework (Cambridge, 1988), p. 427.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹¹⁸ On the difficulties associated with evaluating regime importance, see Young, , International Cooperation, pp. 206–9.Google Scholar

¹¹⁹ Kratochwil, , Rules, Norms, and Decisions, p. 70.Google Scholar