Hostname: page-component-586b7cd67f-r5fsc Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-25T13:38:16.309Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Nuclear strategy and political theory: a critical assessment

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 1985

Philip K. Lawrence
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Extract

In recent years the collapse of détente and the general deterioration in East-West relations have heightened fears that human evolution will terminate abruptly in a nuclear catastrophe. This foreboding is manifested in many facets of Western life: in the speeches of politicians; in popular culture; in mass movements; and in the working practices and consciousness of academics. At such times I believe that those of us who are specialists in areas outside strategic studies become inclined to take an interest in ‘the great debate’. In some respects this may be in order to seek reassurance. After all, if the ‘experts’ seem calm in these inauspicious times perhaps we can all relax again and put the ‘nuclear genie back in the bottle’. Unfortunately, even if we discovered the psychological solace we had been seeking it would not be satisfactory to hand the nuclear debate back to the ‘experts’. There are solid academic, as well as practical reasons why strategic studies should not remain the exclusive concern of the specialist strategic studies community.

Type
Research Article
Information
Review of International Studies , Volume 11 , Issue 2 , April 1985 , pp. 105 - 121
Copyright
Copyright © British International Studies Association 1985

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

1. The title of a famous work on nuclear strategy by the sociologist Raymond Aron. See R. Aron, The Great Debate, 1965.

2. An expression used by George Quester. See Quester, G., Nuclear Diplomacy: the First 25 Years, 1970, p. 205.Google Scholar

3. For an account of the conflicting orientations of political philosophy and political science see Taylor, Charles, ‘Neutrality in Political Science’ in Ryan, A. (ed.), The Philosophy of Social Explanation, 1975.Google Scholar

4. This mutual distaste is evident in Colin S. Gray's recent work Strategic Studies, 1982. Gray, in fact, distinguishes between ‘friendly’ and ‘unfriendly’ critics of strategic studies. Amongst the latter are, in his view, Philip Green and Anatol Rapaport. Although these two writers are not castigated by Gray in personal terms they are tacitly insulted by being associated with positions that are clearly naive and foolish. See ch. 4 especially.

5. Ibid. Indeed, a constant theme in Gray's book.

6. Weizacher, C. von, ‘The Ethical Problem of Modern Strategy’ in Buchan, A. (ed.), Problems of Modern Strategy, 1970, p. 125.Google Scholar

7. For a discussion of elements of American neo-conservative philosophy see Halliday, Fred, The Making of the 2nd Cold War, 1983Google Scholar, esp. ch. 5.

8. See Keeny, S. M. and Panofsky, W. K. H., ‘Mad versus Nuts’, Foreign Affairs, winter 1981/1982.Google Scholar

9. Ibid., p. 293.

10. See Gray, Colin S., and Payne, Keith, ‘Victory is Possible’, Foreign Policy, 39, summer 1980.Google Scholar

11. Ibid.

12. Pipes, R., ‘Why the Soviet Union Thinks It Could Fight and Win a Nuclear War’, Commentary, July 1977, pp. 21–35.Google Scholar

13. Her work is cited in F. Halliday, op. cit., p. 115.

14. See Simes, Dimitri K., ‘The Anti Soviet brigade’, Foreign Policy, 37, winter 1979/1980, p. 34.Google Scholar

15. C. S. Gray, Strategic Studies, op. cit.

16. For an assessment of the scientific and rational nature of McNamara's strategy see Kaufman, W., The McNamara Strategy, 1964.Google Scholar

17. Quoted in Booth, K., ‘The Evolution of Strategic Thinking’ in Bayliss, J.et al, Contemporary Strategy, 1976, p. 33.Google Scholar

18. Gray,op.cit.,pp.7–8.

19. Ibid.,p. 13.

20. See John Garnett, ‘Strategi c Studies and its Assumptions’ in J. Bayliss, op. cit., p. 6.

21. Gray acknowledges this and regards the situation as quite acceptable. See C. Gray, op. cit., pp. 1–2.

22. See Ibid., p. 22, and J. Garnett, op. cit., p. 5.

23. This is discussed effectively in R. Bernstein, The Restructuring of Social and Political Theory, 1976, pp.48–51.

24. Ibid., p. 50.

25. Prins, Quotcdin G.(ed.), Defended to Death, 1983, p. 63.Google Scholar

26. J. Garnett, op.cit., p. 13.

27. C. S. Gray, op.cit., p.28.

28. For arguments which support a structural, although non-conspiratorial view of this process, see F. Halliday, op. cit., ch. 5. Also Mary Kaldor, TheBaroqueArsenal, 1982 and G. Prins, op. cit., ch.5.

29. See Prins, op. cit., for his account of the relationship between MIRV research and development and counter-force theory.

30. Keenyand Panofsky, op. cit., p. 285.

31. Team B in fact comprised three alternative intelligence estimate groups set up by George Bush in 1975/76. Paul Nitze and Richard Perle were involved in the study of Soviet objectives.

32. The American Security Council, an independent lobby group set up in 1960.

33. The Committee on the Present Danger first appeared in the 1940s. It was re-established in 1974 comprising 141 anti-détente Republicans and Democrats.

34. An offshoot of the ASC set up in 1970.

35. C. S. Gray, op. cit., Preface.

36. Ibid.

37. Ibid., p. 33.

38. D. K. Simes, op.cit.

39. Ibid., pp. 29–30.

40. C. Gray, op. cit., p.102.

41. Ibid., p. 9.

42. See Ibid., p. 15.

43. First in the official sense that it was NATO's original strategic nuclear doctrine.

44. Of course the Soviet Union possessed the bomb in the early 1950s, but had no means to deliver it against the United States.

45. I have taken this understanding of massive retaliation from M. Howard. See his ‘The Classical Strategists’ in A. Buchan(ed.), op. cit., p. 58.

46. Brodie, B., Strategy in the Missile Age, 1959.Google Scholar

47. Kaufman, W., Military Policy and National Security, 1956.Google Scholar

48. Kissinger, H., Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, 1957.Google Scholar

49. Ibid., p. 114.

50. See Hoffman, S., Gulliver's Troubles, 1968, p. 395.Google Scholar

51. R. Pipes, op. cit., p. 21.

52. Ibid., p. 25.

53. G. Quester, op. cit.

54. See Rummell, R. J., Peace Endangered, 1976Google Scholar. Rummell links the process of détente to a decline in US military strength and the subsequent emergence of a Soviet first strike potential.

55. C. S. Gray, op. cit., p. 21.

56. Ibid., p. 49.

57. D. K. Simes, op.cit., pp. 31–3.

58. See G. Prins, op. cit., p. 89.

59. Ibid., p. 89.

60. Ibid., p. 89.

61. Ibid., p. 89.

62. Ibid., p. 91.

63. See Cox, A. M., ‘The CIA's tragic error’, New York Review of Books, 6 11 1980Google Scholar. In fact the CIA's figure for USSR expenditure in 1980 is $185 bn. SIPRI's figure is $107 bn.

64. Keeny and Panofsky, op. cit., p. 287.

65. See Legwold, R., ‘Containment without Confrontation’, Foreign Policy, 40, Fall 1980, pp. 73–5.Google Scholar

66. Halliday, op. cit., p. 115.

67. Ibid., p. 115.

68. D. Simes, op.cit., pp. 34–8.

69. Pipes, op. cit., Gray, StrategicStudies, op. cit., and Rummell, op. cit., adopt this view.

70. This is a common theme in Gray, op. cit.

71. Quoted in Robert Scheer, With Enough Shovels: Reagan, Bush and Nuclear War, London, 1983, p. 13. The idea is also discussed in Mandelbaum, M., TheNuclearRevolution, Cambridge, 1981Google Scholar. Mandelbaum has categorized this as a form of ‘strategic mercantilism’.

72. Gray, op. cit., p. 27.

73. Ibid., pp. 6–8.

74. This concept is a key element in Kant's philosophy and refers to the assumption that in order for the external world to be a plausible object for human cognition it must, of necessity, comprise certain features which can be known a priori.

75. In John Garnett's view this is perhaps the most pervasive concept in strategic studies. See J. Garnett, op. cit., p. 9.

76. See, for example, R. Rummell, op. cit., ch. 13.

77. Pipes, op.cit., p. 26.

78. Rummell, op. cit., p. 155.

79. Gray and Payne, op. cit., p. 21.

80. Ibid.

81. A major theme in Bell's critique of cultural modernism. See Bell, D., The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism, 1976.Google Scholar

82. Grayand Payne, Ibid., p. 25.

83. C. Gray, op. cit.

84. Ibid., p. 91.

85. For an analysis of the psychological effects of the growing fear of nuclear war see Lifton, R. J. and Falk, R., Indefensible Weapons, 1982.Google Scholar

86. This is discussed in Prins, op. cit., p. 141.

87. McNamara's testimony to the House Committee cited in R. Aron, op. cit., p. 74.

88. Quoted J. Garnett, op.cit., p. 3.

89. Quoted in Prins, op. cit., p. 140.