Hostname: page-component-586b7cd67f-dsjbd Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-25T13:42:45.170Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

A note on the origin of the word ‘International’

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  26 October 2009

Hidemi Suganami
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Extract

According to Professor Northedge,

It is well known that the expression ‘international’ came into use through the famous mistake made by Jeremy Bentham when he coined it to describe the system of law between sovereign states as a translation of the term ius gentium, which the Romans used to refer to the corpus of rules, controlled, of course, by Rome itself, between themselves and the tribes of Italy and later the various parts of the Roman Empire.

Type
Research Article
Information
Review of International Studies , Volume 4 , Issue 3 , October 1978 , pp. 226 - 232
Copyright
Copyright © British International Studies Association 1978

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

1 Northedge, F. S., The International Political System (London, 1976), pp. 14–15.Google Scholar

page 226 note 2 Bentham, J., An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, ed by Burns, J. H. and Hart, H. L. A. (London, 1970)Google Scholar. The first edition was printed in 1780.

page 226 note 3 Hart, H. L. A., The Concept ofLaw (Oxford, 1961), p. 231.Google Scholar

page 226 note 4 Bull, H., The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (London, 1977), p. 135.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

page 227 note 1 See Kunkel, W., An Introduction to Roman Legal and Constitutional History tr. by J. M. Kelly (Oxford, 1966)Google Scholar, Chap V(i) and Jolowicz, H. F. and Nicholas, B., Historical Introduction to the Study of Roman Law (Cambridge, 1972)Google Scholar, Chap. 6.

page 228 note 1 According to Buckland, the expression ius gentium appears first in De Officiis III (xvii 69) of Cicero (106–43 B.C.) but in a phrase which implies that it is older. A Text-Book of Roman Law: From Augustus to Justinian (Cambridge, 1932), p. 53Google Scholar. See also Jolowicz and Nicholas, op. cit. p. 104 and Kunkel, op. cit. p. 73.

page 228 note 2 See.Maine, , Ancient Law: Its Connection with Early History of Society and its Relations to Modern Ideas (London, 1897)Google Scholar, Chap. 3, and compare with Jolowicz and Nicholas, op. cit. Chap. 6, or Kunkel, op. cit. I am indebted to Dr. W. Williams of the Classics Department, Keele University, for guidance on this point.

page 228 note 3 Nussbaum, A., A Concise History of the Law of Nations (New York, 1954), pp. 13–14Google Scholar, and Hinsley, F. H., Sovereignty (London, 1966)Google Scholar, Chap. V, especially pp. 162–3.

page 228 note 4 Nussbaum, op. cit. p. 13.

page 228 note 5 Kunkel, op. cit. p. 73.

page 228 note 6 Professor Northedge may have ius fetiale in mind when he talks of ius gentium. See Hinsley, op. cit. pp. 161–4 and pp. 180–1. Kunkel, however, maintains that law between states did. count as part of the: ius gentium and that this expression is used where historians, (especially Livy) speak of the sacredness of international treaties or of the immunities of ambassadors. Kunkel, op. cit. p. 75.

page 229 note 1 Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, I (xiii 30). This has often been quoted by early writers on international law. See Gentili, Alberico, De lure Belli Libri Tres, 2 vols. (Oxford, 1933)Google Scholar, ii, Bk. 1, Chap. I, p. 8. See also Grotius, Hugo, De Jure Belli ac Pads Libri Tres 2 vols. (Oxford, 1913–1925)Google Scholar, ii, Bk 1, Chap. I, XII, p. 43. Grotius is known for emphasizing the necessity to distinguish between the law of nations and the law of nature (see Prolegomena 40–1). Thus, he says, for instance, that the use of poison in war is permissibly by the law of nature, but is forbidden by the law of nations (Bk. III Chap. IV, XV). However, in general, the distinction is obscured by the fact that Grotius in principle agrees with the view that the law common to all nations must be the law of nature (Bk. I, Chap. I. XII). As regards the relation of ius gentium and ius naturale, see Buckland, op. cit. pp. 53–4.

page 229 note 2 Brierly, J. L., The Law of Nations; An Introduction to the International Law of Peace, 6th ed., revised by C. H. M. Waldock (Oxford, 1963), p. 19.Google Scholar

page 229 note 3 Brierly, op. cit. p. 20. See also Lauterpacht, H., Private Law Sources and Analogies of International Law {with special reference to international arbitration) (London, 1927).Google Scholar

page 229 note 4 Zouche, Richard, Iuris et Iudici Fecialis, sive Iuris inter Gentes, et Questionem de eodem Explicatio, 2 vols. (Washington, D.C., 1911)Google Scholar, ii, Part I, Section I, p. 1.

page 229 note 5 Bentham, op. cit. p.,296, note x. According to the editors' note, Henri-François D'Agusseau was Chancellor of France under Louis XIV.

page 230 note 1 See Gentili, op. cit. ii, Introduction, p. 23a, especially note 4. and also Van Der Molen, G.H.J., Alberico Gentili and the Development of International Law: His Work and Times (Leyden, 1968), pp. 114–15.Google Scholar

page 230 note 2 This title reflects Vattel's view that the ‘law of nature’ applies to sovereigns because they live in the ‘state of nature', but that the law ought to be applied to them in accordance with their nature. Le Droit des Gens, 3 vols. (Washington, D.G., 1916)Google Scholar, iii, Preface. The idea that the ‘law of nature’ applies to sovereigns because they live in the ‘state of nature’ is attributed to Grotuis by Vattel, but this idea of the ‘state of nature’ does not play a significant role in the former's writing. In Grotius's theory, the ‘law of nature’ applies to international relations because ‘human nature’ dictates so, and not because sovereigns live in the ‘state of nature’. This new theoretical element in justifying the application of the ‘law of nature’ to international relations in Vattel's writing seems to derive from Hobbes (1588–1679), via Pufendorf (1632–1694) and Wolff (1679–1754).

page 230 note 3 Maine, op. cit. p. 99.

page 230 note 4 Suarez, , Selections from Three Works, 2 vols. (Oxford, 1944)Google Scholar, ii, On Laws and God the Law-giver, Bk. II, Chap. XIX, pp. 347ff.

page 230 note 5 For instance, he uses the term ius gentium in the first sense in Bk. I, Chap. I, XIV, I of his Dejure Belli ac Pads, but in its Prolegomena 17–18, he is most certainly using the term in the second sense.

page 231 note 1 Bentham, op. cit. p. 296, note x.

page 231 note 2 Bentham, op. cit. p. 296.

page 231 note 3 Ibid. Note in this connection the recent appearance of the expression transnational. See, in this regard, Jessup, P. G., Transnational Law (New Haven, 1956), pp. 1–2Google Scholar, especially note 3.

page 232 note 1 I owe this idea and the information given in note 27 below to Mr. M. Donelan of the London School of Economics and Political Science.

page 232 note 2 Bentham op. cit. p. 296, note x.

page 232 note 3 ‘Panopticon’ is another of Bentham's coinages, although this word, despite its entry into the O.E.D., has not achieved as spectacular a success as his ‘international’: the word was given t o a proposed form of prison of circular shape having cells built round and fully exposed towards a central ‘well’, from which the wardens could at all times observe the prisoners. The O.E.D. refers to Bentham also as the first recorded user of the word ‘deontology', the science of moral obligations, but he does not claim to have invented it in the passage quoted there. ‘Codification’ is yet another word which he invented. Bentham seems to have liked neologism, or, at any rate, did not hesitate to resort to an invention when the existing vocabulary did not satisfy his demand for accuracy or imagination.