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Leadership in international organizations: systemic, organizational and personality factors

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  26 October 2009

Extract

The study of international organization has frequently involved a discussion of the skills necessary for effective leadership. Such an orientation flows from the notion that effective leadership may be ‘the most critical single determinant of the growth in scope and authority of international organization’. Thus there has long been a bias toward the study of dynamic executive heads, those who are either international organization founders or at least leaders during periods of rapid organizational growth. Indeed the characteristics of such leaders (often referred to as the skills of institutionalization and identified with the names of Haas and Cox) are frequently taken to be the characteristics of the ideal executive head.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © British International Studies Association 1987

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References

1. Cox, Robert W., ‘The Executive Head: An Essay on Leadership in International Organizations’, International Organization, 23 (Spring 1969), p. 205CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Haas, Ernst B., Beyond the Nation-State: Functionalism and International Organization (Stanford, 1964)Google Scholar.

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3. The notion of hegemonic ideologies as they relate to intergovernmental organizations is suggestively discussed in Cox, Robert W., ‘Production and Hegemony: Toward a Political Economy of World Order’, in Jacobson, Harold K. and Sidjanski, Dusan (eds.), Emerging International Economic Order: Dynamic Processes, Constraints and Opportunities (Beverly Hills, 1982), p. 45Google Scholar.

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9. These included people who thought the Bank Group presidency was merely a convenient place for President Johnson to ‘retire’ a tired and increasingly dissatisfied and disaffected bureaucrat. ‘Robert McNamara, Banker’, The Economist, 227 (8 June 1968), p. 70Google Scholar.

10. One of George Woods' final formal acts as World Bank President had been to suggest that an international group of ‘stature and experience’ study the consequences and results of twenty years of development assistance. It was Woods' objective that this group would make a series of recommendations for the future of multilateral aid which would replace the prevailing mood of public disillusionment with a commitment to expanded financial support, including that for the World Bank Group. Johnson, Harry G., ‘Pearson's ‘Grand Assize’ Fails: A Bleak Future for Foreign Aid’, Round Table, 237 (January 1970), pp. 1725CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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25. Ibid., p. 86.

26. See, e.g., his Annual Address to the Board of Governors, 23 September 1977. Such speeches resulted from McNamara's globe-hopping and his consequent realization that the Bank's capital investment projects of earlier eras had had little effect on the rural areas. It was also an idea sustained by many of the Third World personnel he had brought into the Bank's upper echelon of decision-making. Clark, William, ‘Robert McNamara at the World Bank’, Foreign Affairs, 60 (Fall 1981), p. 169CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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29. Thus there was an emphasis on rural development as contrasted to industrialization. While rural development was somewhat economically unfashionable at the time, it became acceptable by being ‘marketed’ as an alternative method for enhancing economic prosperity and developmentthe Bank and Wall Street constituents’ code words—and not in terms of world welfarism. Takahashi, Comparative Analysis, p. 255.

30. Ernst B. Haas, Beyond the Nation-State, p. 119. Libby, who seems to expect and desire a much less assertive role for an organizational ideology describes it as a kind of insurance policy in two respects: (a) as a ‘strategic device’ for mollifying potential sources of environmental opposition to the Bank; and (b) as a mirror of the Bank Group's important clients and constituents. Accordingly, Libby explains McNamara's statements as reflecting the importance of ‘newly acquired clients and constituents’. That seems to understate his missionary zeal. Libby, Ideology, pp. 7–8.

31. Mason and Asher, World Bank, p. 698.

32. Cox, ‘Executive Head’, pp. 205–30. Where McNamara seems to have deviated most obviously from Cox's recipe for effective leadership is in terms of not ‘building a bureaucracy committed to the ideology and having a sense of its own independent international role’. At the outset, at least, the fact that McNamara inherited a staff without his commitment to the social sector led to a strategy of massive bureaucratic expansion. The lack of an independent role for the bureaucracy may have been a consequence of his ‘autocratic’ personality or at least his view of proper management techniques. On this last point, see Roherty, James H., ‘The Office of the Secretary of Defense: The Laird and McNamara Styles’, in Endicott, John E. and Stafford, Roy W. Jr. (eds.), American Defense Policy (Baltimore, 1977), p. 289Google Scholar.

33. Haas, Beyond the Nation-State, p. 445.

34. Reid, ‘McNamara's World Bank’, p. 804.

35. Chenery's work had argued that growth and equity could be achieved simultaneously. See e.g., Chenery, Hollis, Ahlurvalia, Montek S., Bill, C. L. B. and others, Redistribution with Growth (London, 1974), p. xvGoogle Scholar.

36. Ho, ‘End of the McNamara Era’, p. 106. Reid notes, with obvious disapproval, the reversal of the trend of the five years prior to McNamara's arrival. The percentage of principal officers in the Bank and IDA who were American rose to 45% during McNamara's first five years, whereas it had declined from 55% to 40% in the previous comparable period. Reid, ‘McNamara's World Bank’, pp. 808–9.

37. On the whole question of staff commitment, see: Ascher, William, ‘New Development Approaches and the Adaptability of International Agencies: The Case of the World Bank’, International Organization, 37 (Summer 1983), pp. 415–39CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

38. Van de Laar, World Bank, pp. 222–3. Srodes, James, ‘McNamara and Company Under Fire’, Far Eastern Economic Review, 94 (10 December 1976), p. 45Google Scholar. The US Department of the Treasury's own, somewhat ambiguous verdict, on this point, is interesting: ‘…while available empirical evidence indicates otherwise, there are some indications that World Bank emphasis on lending targets has had an adverse impact on loan quality. It also appears that this emphasis on lending targets has on balance eroded the Bank's ability to encourage appropriate economic policies in recipient countries.’ US Department of the Treasury, United States Participation in Multilateral Development Banks in the 1980s (Washington, DC, Department of Treasury, February 1982), p. 173Google Scholar.

39. Ho, ‘End of McNamara Era’, p. 108.

40. Libby, ‘Ideology’, p. 194.

41. Van de Laar, World Bank, p. 125.

42. ‘Robert McNamara, Banker’, The Economist, 227 (8 June 1968), p. 70Google Scholar.

43. One such critic thought he was attacking McNamara when he suggested that he considered himself an internationalist, a citizen of the world, immune from US rules. See Brophy, Ben, ‘The View from Capitol Hill’ Forbes, 125 (26 May 1980), p. 128Google Scholar. McNamara might have taken this as a compliment to his fidelity to the Bank's Articles of Agreement's conception of an international civil servant.

On the notion of an ideal international civil servant, see: Graham, Norman A. and Jordan, Robert S. (eds.), The International Civil Service: Changing Role and Concepts (New York, 1980), pp. 13Google Scholar.

44. Mason and Asher, World Bank, pp. 100 and 134–5.

45. Clark, William, ‘Robert McNamara at the World Bank’, Foreign Affairs, 60 (Fall 1981), p. 169CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

46. Phone Interview with Robert S. McNamara, 7 September 1983.

47. ‘A Plea for Aid to 800 Million on Margin of Life’, U.S. News & World Report, 89 (27 December 1980), pp. 3940Google Scholar.

48. Maddux, Development Philosophy, p. 46.

49. His personal commitment to achieving progress on this issue was manifest in 1969 when he chose to give a speech solely on population control at the University of Notre Dame in the hope of generating maximum interest and attention, including a front page story in The New York Times. Madison, ‘Days of McNamara’, p. 1450.

50. Ping, Ho Kwon, ‘End of the McNamara Era … But the Vietnam Legacy Continues to Haunt Him’, Far Eastern Economic Review 109 (19 September 1980), p. 108Google Scholar.

51. Reid, Escott, ‘MeNamara's World Bank’, Foreign Affairs, 51 (July 1973), p. 810CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

52. Mason and Asher, World Bank, p. 95.

53. Scheibla, Shirley Hobbs, ‘MeNamara's Bank Sours: Directors, Staff Critical of World Bank Operations’, Barron's (3 December 1979), p. 26Google Scholar.

54. Srodes, James, ‘An Early Exit for McNamara’, Far Eastern Economic Review, 108 (13 June 1980), p. 118Google Scholar.

55. Scheibla, ‘McNamara Bank Sours’, p. 9.

56. Credit has been given to George Shultz for getting Reagan's approval. James, Lewis, ‘Clausen Will Help Those Who Help Themselves’, Euromoney (December 1980), p. 30Google Scholar. Reich, Cary, ‘Unmasking Tom Clausen’, Institutional Investor, 15, No. 1 (1981), pp. 6365Google Scholar. Current Biography, 1981, p. 61.

57. Clausen as quoted in: Nowicki, ‘A. W. Clausen’, p. 18. Interview with A. W. Clausen, 22 March 1985.

58. Edwards, John, ‘The New Hand at the Bank Till’, Far Eastern Economic Review, 115 (14 November 1982), p. 73Google Scholar.

59. SALs are loans to countries suffering from structural imbalances, which agree to undertake well-defined adjustment programmes in accordance with the suggestions of the Bank. The specific goal of such loans is to help developing countries reduce their current account deficits.

60. Please, Stanley, The Hobbled Giant: Essays on the World Bank (Boulder, 1984), p. 24Google Scholar.

61. Interview with Ernest Stern, Senior Vice President for Operations of the World Bank, 22 March 1985.

62. The Bank's 1985 budget supplement included funds for additional professional assistance. Nowicki, Margaret A., ‘A. W. Clausen: President, The World Bank’, Africa Report, 30 (May/June 1985), pp. 1415Google Scholar.

63. Indeed, the idea of structural adjustment loans had origins in the twilight years of the McNamara Bank, but they only came to fruition under Clausen. On their origins, see: Hassan, Selim M., Development Assistance & The Performance of Aid Agencies: Studies in the.Performance ofDAC, OPEC, the Regional Development Banks and the World Bank Group (London, Macmillan, 1983), pp. 508–9Google Scholar.

64. Quoted in Nowicki, ‘A. W. Clausen’, p. 17. While perhaps not controversial, the earliest of these loans, at least according to one observer, were not effective either. Please, Hobbled Giant, p. 25.

65. The only element of macroeconomic planning specifically excluded from its purview by The Bank is that related to foreign exchange rates. Interview with Moeen Qurshi, Vice-President for Finance, 22 March 1985. The inevitability of this overlap seems to result, in part, from one of the original motivations behind SAL's, namely the realization of the intimate connection between balance of payment adjustment and economic growth. Interview with Clausen.

66. Interview with Clausen.

67. Reich, ‘Unmasking Tom Clausen’, p. 57.

68. Immel, Richard I., ‘Rousing a Giant: Clausen Bids to Change Regional Image Held by Bank of America’, Wall Street Journal, 193 (22 March 1979), p. 33Google Scholar.

69. See, e.g., Farnsworth, Clyde, ‘Diplomatic World Bank Chief’, The New York Times (12 April 1983), p. D8Google Scholar.

70. Interview with Qurshi.

71. ‘Conversation’, p. 7 and interview with Clausen.

72. Reich, ‘Unmasking Tom Clausen’, p. 63.

73. Carter was looking for credibility within the private banking community and particularly for someone with credentials acceptable to the US Congress. In choosing Clausen, he appeared to have obtained just such a person. Indeed the appointment was described as ‘music to the ears’ of Republican Representatives such as Jerry Lewis and Bill Young, who along with Clarence Young and Senator Jesse Helms had ‘waged an unrelenting battle in and outside the United States Congress to bring what they see as profligate and unprincipled multilateral development institutions to heel’. James, ‘Clausen Will Help’, p. 30. Rowley, Anthony, ‘Clausen and a More Worldly Bank’, Far Eastern Economic Review, 116 (26 March-1 April 1982), p. 131Google Scholar.

74. ‘A Conversation with Mr Clausen’, Finance and Development, 19 (December 1982), p. 9Google Scholar.

75. Pine, Art, ‘Clausen Holds World Bank's Course’, Wall Street Journal, 110 (13 May 1982), p. 31Google Scholar.

76. Clausen has estimated that some 60% of his time had been spent on trying to correct people's perceptions of the Bank and of IDA. Interview with Clausen.

77. Interview with Clausen. See also: Clausen, A. W., ‘A Concluding Perspective’, in Fried, Edward R. and Owen, Henry D. (eds.), The Future of the World Bank (Washington, 1982), p. 76Google Scholar. Former Bank official Mahbub ul Haq offers an interesting perspective on Clausen's activities in this regard:

The bilateral pressures on the Bank could greatly compromise the international character of the institution. To suggest that the Bank is not an international Robin Hood or a United Way … is to address straw men. The role of the IDA is to protect the developing countries against the market, especially those who do not have much of a chance to get capital directly from it.

As quoted in Pratt, R. Cranford, ‘The Globai Impact of the World Bank’, in Torrie, Jill (ed.), Banking on Poverty: The Global Impact of the IMF and World Bank (Toronto, 1983), p. 62Google Scholar. In this context, see also: Payer, Cheryl, ‘Reagan and the World Bank: Cutting Off Your Own Best Friend’, The Nation (11 September 1982), p. 207Google Scholar.

78. Rowley, ‘Clausen’, p. 132. Critics, like ul Haq, who left the Bank to return to his native Pakistan, feared that the Bank now lacked a long-term strategy or the means to develop one.

79. Rowley, ‘Clausen’, p. 131.

80. Pine, ‘Clausen Holds’, p. 31.

81. The long-term market was drying up, especially as the Swiss and West German markets had become glutted with the Bank's ‘paper’ and the Bank had been told it had to turn elsewhere. As a result, it was necessary to turn to the much more expensive short-term market, especially the American market.

82. Hoopengardner, Thomas and Garcia-Thoumi, Ines, ‘The World Bank in a Changing Financial Environment’, Finance & Development, 21 (June 1984), p. 12Google Scholar.

83. Reich, ‘Unmasking Tom Clausen’, p. 60.

84. ‘Listening and Responding to Employees’ Concerns: Through Six Supportive Programs, Everyone at the Bank of America Has a Voice and a Way to Get Help: An Interview with Clausen’, A. W., Harvard Business Review, 58 (January/February 1980), p. 101Google Scholar.

85. Of course, Clausen was helped considerably in this regard by the global recovery of the late 70s and early 80s, which lowered interest rates rather generally.

86. Manning, Robert, ‘Embarrassing Riches’, Far Eastern Economic Review (14 March 1985), p. 58Google Scholar.

87. Ram, Mohan, ‘Their Soft Options’, Far Eastern Economic Review, 115 (5 February 1982), pp. 98–9Google Scholar.

88. Manning, ‘Embarrassing Riches’, p. 58.

89. Rowley, ‘Clausen’, pp. 131, 136, 137.

90. Ibid., p. 139.

91. Interview with Clausen.

92. For example, it was widely publicized that of 47 KGB officers expelled from France in the spring of 1982 by French President Mitterrand, 12 of them were employed by Unesco. Gordon Crovitz, ‘The Decline and Fall of Unesco: A Report from Paris’, Encounter, 63 (December 1984), p. 15. See also: US Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. Withdrawal from Unesco: Report of a Staff Study Mission, February 10–23, 1984, 98th Congress, 2nd Session (April 1984), p. 65.

93. Massing, Michael, ‘Unesco Under Fire’, Atlantic Monthly (July 1984), pp. 92Google Scholar, 94. It should be mentioned in this context that M'Bow has been credited with killing both a 1976 and a 1978 Soviet initiative in the mass media field. Roger A. Coate, ‘Changing Patterns of Conflict: The US and Unesco’, paper presented at the 1985 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, New Orleans, Louisiana, 29 August–1 September 1985, p. 27.

94. Finkelstein, Lawrence S., ‘The Political Role of the Director-General of Unesco’, paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association/West, Denver, Colorado, 25 October 1985, p. 21Google Scholar.

95. Coate, ‘Changing Patterns’, pp. 29, 33–4.

96. Lovejoy, Reflections on International Administration, p. 119.

97. Laves, Walter H. C. and Thomson, Charles A., Unesco: Purpose, Progress, Prospects (Bloomington, 1957), p. 294Google Scholar.

98. Presciently, Hoggart noted that for the near future at least, administrative skills would be particularly highly prized. Hoggart, Richard, An Idea and its Servants: Unesco from Within (New York, Oxford University Press, 1978), p. 157Google Scholar.

99. Buehrig, Edward S., ‘The Tribulations of Unesco’, International Organization, 30 (Autumn 1976), p. 683CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

100. See Michael G. Schechter, ‘The International Relations of Intergovernmental Organizations: The Case of the World Bank and Unesco's Cooperative Program in Education’, unpublished manuscript dated May 1984.

101. Interviews with members of the Unesco staff, March-April 1983.

102. He is probably even involved in the choice of the President of the General Conference. Finkelstein, ‘Political Role’, p. 9.

103. Sewell, James P., Unesco and World Politics: Engaging in International Relations (Princeton, 1975), pp. 1821Google Scholar.

104. Gauhar, Altaf, ‘Amadou Mahtar M'Bow’, Third World Quarterly, 6 (April 1984), p. 270.Google Scholar

105. Although the Permanent Delegates from member countries are always on hand, they have yet to find an effective role, except in isolated cases.

106. Hoggart, An Idea, pp. 139–42. An example of this point is seen in the comments of Baroness Young, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs:

I do not feel able to comment in detail on unsubstantiated press criticism of (M'Bow). As regards our own attitude, our general unease and dissatisfaction with Unesco's performance in recent years must to some extent reflect upon its chief executive.

Great Britain, Parliament, House of Lords, Parliamentary Debates, 447 (25 January 1985), p. 326Google Scholar.

107. Lewis, Flora, ‘Airing Unesco's Closets’, The New York Times (I March 1984), p. 27Google Scholar.

108. Quoted in Robertson, Norm, ‘Unesco Director Deplores Rifts’, The New York Times, 22 November 1974, p. 6Google Scholar:1.

109. Robertson, Norm, ‘Unesco is Facing Bitter Backlash’, The New York Times, 8 December 1974, p. 5Google Scholar:1.

110. Forsythe, David P., ‘The Politics of Culture: The United States and Unesco’, International Studies Notes, 9 (Fall 1982), p. 2Google Scholar.

111. Finkelstein has spoken of his ‘close connections’ with Islamic member states, owing to his Muslim religion. Finkelstein, ‘Political Role’, p. 17.

112. For example, his innovative proposal for a ‘review and conciliation’ committee (officially known as the Drafting and Negotiating Group) to decide whether politically volatile issues should be debated before The General Conference was an interesting procedural solution to cope with a teeming substantive situation. Coate, ‘Changing Patterns’, p. 20. Similarly M'Bow is often praised for his ability to make almost all decisions within Unesco consensual ones. In the 1984 session, of 134 draft resolutions, only 2 were put to a vote. Those dealt with budgetary ceilings and the location of the next meeting. ‘On balance’ this ‘worked in the interest of the Western minority’. Young, Parliamentary Debates, p. 326. Gauhar, ‘Amadou Mahtar M'Bow’, pp. 265–6.

113. Interestingly, the Soviets remained silent in terms of American complaints about M'Bow and Unesco, presumably because not to do so would have required them to acknowledge the size of the American financial contribution to the Organization and would have detracted from the Soviet contention that America's criticism and subsequent threatened withdrawal from the Organization was for reasons of ‘thwarted ambition’. Schmemann, Serge, ‘Andropov Expresses Support for Unesco’, The New York Times, 1 February 1984, p. 7Google Scholar.

114. Much of the credit for American outrage at the NWICO belongs to the unique (and some would say one-sided) media publicity given to this alleged threat to freedom of speech and press. This theme is developed in Coate, ‘Changing Patterns of Conflict’, pp. 22–7.

115. Altaf Gauhar, ‘Reverse Charges’, p. 35.

116. Interviews at Unesco.

117. He also entered into a series of exchanges in Le Monde about” the critical comments about Unesco made in the American and British press. ‘Unesco: Bloody but M'Bowed’, The Economist, 294 (5 January 1985), pp. 2930Google Scholar.

118. Former Australian delegate to Unesco, Owen Harries, spoke of the change under M'Bow as being ‘so ideological that a qualitative change’ had occurred in the degree of its politicization. However Harries takes care to see the era of ‘near total politicization’ as coming around the time that Unesco's Third World majority began harassing Israel, which ‘also coincided’ with M'Bow's election as Director-General. Lewis, Paul, ‘Since '45, Unesco Has Been a Political Battlefield’, The New York Times, 30 December 1983, p. 5Google Scholar.

119. M'Bow, ‘Reply to the General Policy Debate (Belgrade, 9 October 1980)’, reproduced in Building the Future: Unesco and the Solidarity of Nations (Paris, 1981), p. 116Google Scholar.

120. Altaf Gauhar, ‘Reverse Charges’, South (March 1974), p. 35. He could just as easily have reminded the Americans of how they politicized (and used) the Organization during the Korean conflict.

121. M'Bow, ‘Reply to the General Policy Debate’, p. 116.

122. US Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. Withdrawal, p. 18.

123. Bethell, ‘Lost Civilization’, p. 22.

124. See US Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, US Withdrawal, p. 18. Rodolpho was replaced by a woman from Zaire whose rewriting of the division's programmes led to the resignation of the Swiss head of the division of human rights and peace.

125. ‘Even Worse at Unesco’, The Economist (27 August 1983), p. 23Google Scholar; Interviews at Unesco; see also: US Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. Withdrawal, pp. 32, 157.

126. Crovitz, Gordon, ‘Boss M'Bow’, Connoisseur (May 1984), p. 119Google Scholar.

127. Ibid., pp. 119–21.

128. US Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. Withdrawal, p. 33.

129. Lewis, Paul‘Unesco's Head Warns U.S. on Its Dues’, The New York Times, 23 May 1984, p. 3Google Scholar.

130. M'Bow, ‘Temps’, p. 333.

131. M'Bow, ‘Introduction by the Director-General to the Draft Programme and Budget for 1981–1983’, (Extracts) in Building the Future: Unesco and the Solidarity of Nations (Paris, 1981), pp. 230–1Google Scholar.

132. M'Bow, ‘Reply to the General Policy Debate’, pp. 112–13.

133. Interviews with officials at Unesco. For M'Bow's explanation for why it would be ‘premature’ to establish priorities, see: M'Bow, ‘Reply to the General Policy Debate’, p. 114.

134. Kirpal, P. N., ‘An Appraisal of Unesco's Work During the Last Twenty Years’, in Twenty Years of Unesco: A Series of Lectures in Commemoration of the 20th Anniversary of Unesco (New Delhi, 1967), p. 76Google Scholar.

135. Bethell, Tom, ‘The Lost Civilization of Unesco’, Policy Review, 24 (Spring 1983), p. 22Google Scholar.

136. Kalfon, Pierre,‘Amadou Mahtar M'Bow: A Profile of the Sixth Director-General of Unesco’, Unesco Courrier, 28 (February 1975), pp. 1518Google Scholar.

137. Moorman, Paul, ‘Unesco: Midwife of Social Change or Bureaucratic Elephant?’, The Times Education Supplement, 3104 (22 November 1974), p. 17Google Scholar.

138. Interviews at Unesco.

139. The Scandinavian countries, however, scaled back their UNDP contributions when they realized that they were more than that of the US. Interview with F. Bradford Morse at UNDP headquarters, 13 September 1983.

140. Bissell, Richard E., The United Nations Development Program: Failing the World's Poor (Washington, 1985), p. 13Google Scholar.

141. Bradford Morse, Helping the World's Poor: Some Illusions and Some Realities, Fourth Annual Address, Hannah, John A.International Development Lecture Series (East Lansing, Mich., 1977)Google Scholar.

142. Ibid., p. 7. Interestingly, however, conservative critics, like Bissell, have lamented the fact that the UNDP appears reluctant to get deliberately involved in guiding recipients’ economic policies, an interesting contrast to the Bank especially under Clausen. Bissell, United Nations Development Programme, p. 44.

143. Even more explicitly, Morse has ‘fought’ M'Bow's desire to fund projects in Afghanistan (projects which are not very popular within Unesco's headquarters itself to say nothing of the legislative corridors of both organizations’ major financial backer, the United States). Interviews with Morse and at Unesco. See also ‘Even Worse at Unesco’, p. 23.

144. Morse, Helping the World's Poor, p. 7.

145. Morse, Bradford, ‘It Can Be Done!’, Development Forum, 14 (June 1986), pp. 1Google Scholar, 10.

146. Interview with Morse.

147. See, e.g., Bissell, United Nations Development Programme, p. 43. It should be noted, however, that even Bissell acknowledges that Morse took a ‘small step’ in this direction by establishing an ‘understaffed’ office for evaluation. Ibid., p. 46.

148. Bissell, United Nations Development Programme, p. 20.

149. Ibid., p. 21.

150. Ibid., p. 23.

151. Interview with Morse..

152. Interview with Morse.

153. Morse, Helping, p. 11.

154. Interview with Morse. See also: Morse, Helping, pp. 11, 13.