page 150 note 1 Puchala, Donald J., International Politics Today (New York, 1972), pp. 6–7Google Scholar.

page 150 note 2 I have discussed this point elsewhere. Kamo, , ‘Theoretical Examination of International Political Integration: A Behavioral Approach’ International Relations (Japan Association of International Relations), 50 (1974), p. 6Google Scholar.

page 151 note 1 This point has been discussed, for instance, by Donald J. Puchala who introduced the “concordance system” into the dynamics of integration. See his, ‘Of Blind Men, Elephants and International Integration’, Journal of Common Market Studies, x (1972), pp. 267–284Google Scholar.

page 151 note 2 Galtung, Johan, The European Community: A Superpower in the Making (London, 1973)Google Scholar. My critique of Galtung's theory of EEC political dynamics appeared in International Relations (Japan Association of International Relations), 54 (1975).

page 151 note 3 Because of this expansion, the change in the image of the EEC may be expressed as that from a “fettered giant” to a “liberated giant”.

page 152 note 1 On this point, for instance: Haas, Ernst B., The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social, and Economic Forces 1950–1957 (Stanford, Calif., 1958), p. 16Google Scholar.

page 153 note 1 There is ample evidence of the fact that the EEC Commission as a transnational actor is playing an important part in the politics of integration. The EEC Commission is obviously a significant actor in that it will have the unique role of harmonizing supranationalism with intergovernmentalism in the politics of integration. This point is, for instance, demonstrated in depth by: Report of a Federal Trust Study Group, ‘The International Structure of the European Communities’, Journal of Common Market Studies, iv (1974), pp. 373–409Google Scholar.

page 153 note 2 Taylor, Paul, ‘The Politics of European Communities: The Confederal Phase’, World Politics, xxvii (1975), pp. 343–346Google Scholar.

page 154 note 1 Of course, system theorists have paid attentions to aspects of the international system change. However, their analytical foci have always been based on equilibrium or on stability. Without assuming that power politics is a given factor in leading stability (or equilibrium), the system theory cannot become meaningful.

page 154 note 2 It is apparent that peaceful means are the most important process variable in integration o t neo-functionalists. On this point, for instance see Puchala, , ‘The Pattern of Contemporary Regional Integration’, International Studies Quarterly, xii (1968), esp. p. 41Google Scholar.

page 154 note 3 Deutsch, Karl W. et al., Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the light of Historical Experience (Princeton, N.J., 1957)Google Scholar.

page 155 note 1 This point has been argued particularly by theorists of interdependence. Morse, Edward L., ‘Crisis Diplomacy, Interdependence, and Politics of International Economic Relations’, Theory and Policy in International Relations, Tanter, Raymond and Ullman, Richard H. (eds.) (Princeton, 1972), pp. 123–150Google Scholar. esp. pp. 138–143.

page 155 note 2 One can assume that while the dynamics of ‘non-zero-sum’ operates in the theory of nuclear deterrence, the dynamics of ‘zero-sum’ is always dominant in the arms race. The reason the SALT is often close to breaking down lies in the fact negotiators over arms control cannot be dissociated from the predominant concern of policy makers with the arms race. This difficulty in the SALT negotiations is illustrated by: Nitze, Paul H., ‘The Strategic Balance between Hope and Skepticism’, Foreign Policy, 17 (1974–1975), pp. 136–156CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

page 156 note 1 Lindberg, Leon N. and Scheingold, Stuart A., Europe's Would-Be Polity: Patterns of Change in the European Community (New Jersey, 1970), esp. p. 104Google Scholar.

page 156 note 2 Leon N. Lindberg and Stuart A. Scheingold, op. cit. esp. p. 12.

page 156 note 3 A critical point of neo-functionalism obviously lies in the automaticity of spill-over effects in integration. The emphasis on automaticity will lead to the logic of apolitical dynamics. Cantori, Louis J. and Spiegel, Steven L., ‘The Analysis of Regional International Politics: The Integration versus the Empirical Systems Approach’, International Organization, xxii (1973), esp. p. 474Google Scholar, p. 485.

page 157 note 1 Hallstein, Walter, United Europe: Change and Opportunity (Cambridge, Mass.,), 1962CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Of course, it is a question whether the Hallstein type of neo-functionalist policies have been coherently pursued in the later politics of the EEC. An argument will be made that while the neo-functionalist approach was dominant in the middle of the 1960s under the Hallstein leadership, its policy of supranationalism has increasingly lost its original enthusiasm in the 1970s. One reason for this is that the bureaucratic type of policy orientation has been prevalent in the EEC Commission. Rodens, Franz, Jean Rey: Ein Pragmatische Politiker (August Lutzeger, Fredenstadt, 1968).Google Scholar

page 157 note 2 See, Newhouse, John, Collision in Brussels; The Common Market Crisis of 30 June, (London, 1967)Google Scholar, esp. Chap. V, Chap. VI.

page 158 note 1 Concerning “transnational” terms, see: for instance, Keohane, Robert O. and Nye, Joseph S. (eds.), Transnational Relations and World Politics, (Cambridge, Mass. 1972), esp. pp. ix–xxixCrossRefGoogle Scholar. Transnationalism is extremely important as a demonstration of the Commission's behavior in undermining political conflicts with the EEC system. For it reflects an activity as well as the awareness of the enhancing of purely governmental interactions by nongovernmental interactions. As a proposition, transnational actors are quite free from governmental policy directives in their behavior; therefore, they are essentially autonomous or quasi-autonomous actors based on their own goals. As is shown in the behavior of the Commission, transnational actors are likely to pursue other than ‘national interests by which governmental actors’ policy motivations are sometimes characterized.

page 159 note 1 This paper cannot touch on this point in depth. However, an attempt to operationalize the concept will appear in the Appendix.

page 159 note 2 In regard to this point, for instance: Russett, Bruce M., ‘Transactions, Community, and International Political Integration’, Journal of Common Market Studies, ix (1971), esp. p. 243Google Scholar.

page 160 note 1 So far as interactions between the integrated and outer systems are concerned, however, Professor Kaiser has shed much light on this point. Kaiser, Karl, EWG und Freihandelzone: England und Der Kontinent in Der Europaischen Integration (A. W. Sythoff-Leiden, 1963)Google Scholar; Kaiser, , Europe and the United States: Thefuture of the relationship (Washington D.C., 1973)Google Scholar.

page 160 note 2 Puchala, Donald J., ‘Internal Order and Peace: An Integrated Europe in World Affairs’ (I.P.S.A., IXth World Conference, Montreal 19–25), viii (1973)Google Scholar.

page 161 note 1 There is ample evidence of this. The random behavior of the EEC member countries was apparent especially in relationships with the United States at the time of the oil crisis. Because of this randomness, US-European diplomatic relations were often in disharmony. Kaiser, Karl, ‘Europe and America: A Critical Phase’, Foreign Affairs, 52 (1974), pp. 725–741CrossRefGoogle ScholarWhitney, Craig R., ‘Brandt Aids Divided on Leaning to U.S. or Conciliating France’, The New York Times, 21 February, 1974Google Scholar; Sulzberger, C. L., ‘Another Decline of the West’, The New York Times, 13 April, 1974Google Scholar.

page 161 note 2 Puchala, ‘Internal Order and Peace: An Integrated Europe in World Affairs’, op. cit PP. 3–5.

page 162 note 1 Dahrendorf, Ralf, ‘Possibilities and Limits of a European Communities Foreign Policy’, World Today (April 1971), p. 152Google Scholar. Professor Dahrendorf's argument against the establishment of “supranational” European Community appeared in the West German weekly Die Zeit under a pseudonym. According to Dahrendorf, ‘European unification can proceed only when there is recognition that the locus of power is in the states’. ‘Ein neues Ziel für Europa’, Zeit Nr. 29-Seite 3, 20 July, 1971.

page 162 note 2 Data on this power map come from: World Atlas (1978); Johan Galtung, The European Community, op. cit. Chap. IV.; Feld, Werner J., The European Community in World Affairs: Economic Power and Political Influence (Alfred Publishing Co., Inc., 1976), pp. 6–7Google Scholar.

page 162 note 3 Concerning the EEC's growing economic activities with political significance, see: Henig, Stanley, External Relations of the European Community: Associations and Trade Agreements (London, 1971)Google Scholar; Werner J. Feld, The European Community in World Affairs, op. cit.

page 163 note 1 Lindberg and Scheingold, Europe's Would-Be Polity, op. cit. p. 74ff. Based on this study, I attempted to demonstrate the relative low stages of the EEC community type of decision-making system. According to my own quantitative analysis, low scores in the community type of decision-making system are ranked in order: 1) political-institutional, 2) external relations, 3) social cultural, and 4) economic issue areas. Kamo, ‘A Revised Quantitative Analysis of European Integration’, an unpublished paper (1972).

page 164 note 1 One of the latest exceptions is found in the case of oil-producing countries. Apparently, countries of OPEC, OAPEG have increased their negotiating power over oil price-making against oil consuming industrialized states. Related to this point, for instance, see: Hansen, Roger D., ‘The Political Economy of North-South Relations: How much change?’, International Organization, xxix (1975), pp. 921–947CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

page 164 note 2 In regard to the idea of differentiation of power terms, see: Keohane, Robert O. and Nye, Joseph S., Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition (Boston and Toronto, 1977), esp. pp. 11–19Google Scholar.

page 165 note 1 Galtung, The European Community, op. cit. esp. Chap. V.

page 165 note 2 Ibid., pp. 70–71.

page 166 note 1 Mack, Andrew, ‘Theories of Imperialism: The European Perspective’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, xii (1974), pp. 526–527Google Scholar. Mack's criticism is particularly interesting in suggesting that a vertical division of labour has not necessarily led to an economically asymmetrical development between the EEC and its partner countries.

page 166 note 2 The Lome Convention is an obvious departure from a Yaounde type of asymmetrical transaction in terms of policy priorities. On this point, for instance, see Bulletin of European Communities, no. 1 (1975), pp. 6–9Google Scholar.