Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 July 1996
Prompted by the integration of Europe, Derrida recently posed the following questions. ‘Indeed, to what concept, to what real individual, to what singular entity should this name be assigned today? Who will draw up its borders?’ While this question speaks of the political entity called Europe, it has much broader resonance. It echoes concerns about identity, boundaries, and the relationship between the inside and the outside of political entities, concerns that have not escaped the attention of critical International Relations scholars. Nor are these necessarily new concerns. The situation in post–World War II Britain prompted the same questions Derrida raises about Europe in 1992. To what real individuals, to what singular entity the terms ‘British’ and ‘Britain’ should be assigned was a question that prompted debate, political violence, and a series of increasingly restrictive and, some would suggest, racist immigration policies. The transformation of Britain from an empire to a nation–state was accompanied by a crisis of identity whereby early postwar proclamations that Britain ‘imposed no colour bar restrictions making it difficult for them when they come here’ and that ‘there must be freedom of movement within the British Empire and the Commonwealth’ were, rather quickly, to give way to exclusionary practices and a retreat to ‘little England’.
1 Derrida, Jacques, The Other Heading—Reflections on Today's Europe (Bloomington, 1992), p. 5Google Scholar.
2 Derrida is, of course, not the only one to have raised these questions. See also Smith, Anthony D., ‘National Identity and the Idea of European Unity’, International Affairs, 68:1 1992), pp. 55–76CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and Ole Waever, et al., Identity, Migration, and the New Security Agenda in Europe London, 1993)Google Scholar.
3 Quotes are from Sir David Maxwell Fyfe, leading Tory opponent of the 1948 British Nationality Act (453 H.C. Deb., 405, 7 July 1948).
4 My thoughts on this have benefited immensely from conversations with Richard Ashley, though I certainly cannot claim here to represent his thoughts accurately and without distortion.
5 Layton–Henry, Zig, The Politics of Race In Britain London, 1984), pp. 25–7Google Scholar, points out that migration from the South occurred earlier in Britain than in Europe. Initially, Britain experienced more hostility to immigrants because they were entitled to full social and welfare benefits and were entitled to participate in the political process. However, as recent evidence suggests, many of the original ‘guest workers’ and their families and subsequent generations have stayed in European countries, raising questions similar to the ones that arose in post–World War II Britain. While being cautious about making generalizations, we can, perhaps, nonetheless gain important insights from this particular case. I discuss this in the conclusion.
6 For literature that highlights this, see Nermin, Abadan–Unat, ‘Summary of Main Results of Conference of OECD Working Party on Migration’, The Future of Migration Paris, 1987)Google Scholar; Brubaker, William Rogers, Immigration and the Politics of Citizenship in Europe and North America London, 1989)Google Scholar; idem, Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany Cambridge, 1992)Google Scholar; Heisler, Martin O., ‘Migration, International Relations and the New Europe: Theoretical Perspectives from Institutional Political Sociology’, International Migration Review, 26:2 1992), pp. 596–622CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Rouse, Roger, ‘Mexican Migration and the Social Space of Postmodernism’, Diaspora (Spring 1991), pp. 8–23Google Scholar. Waever et al., Identity, p. 5, suggest that Europe is undergoing a socio–political revolution involving the migration of peoples and the forging of new social identities that has potentially threatening implications for the process of governance both domestic and international.
7 Indeed much of the literature on nation–building implicitly recognizes this as a perpetual problem in the Third World, in its aim of ‘understanding the current problems of political development in the new nations’. See Pye, Lucian W., Foreword, in Tilly, Charles (ed.), The Formation of National States in Western Europe Princeton, 1975)Google Scholar. The value of studying nation–building in the West during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries has, in large part, been for the purpose of comparing these processes to the tasks faced by countries in the South. See also Bendix, Reinhard, Nation–Building and Citizenship–Studies of our Changing Social Order New York and London, 1964)Google Scholar.
8 Dummett, Ann and Nicol, Andrew, Subjects, Citizens, Aliens and Others: Nationality and Immigration London, 1990), p. 53Google Scholar.
9 See Layton–Henry, Politics of Race, pp. 33–5.
10 Blank, Stephen, ‘Britain: The Politics of Foreign Economic Policy, Economic Policy, the Domestic Economy, and the Problem of Pluralistic Stagnation’, in Katzenstein, Peter J. (ed.), Between Power and Plenty: Foreign Economic Policies of Advanced Industrialized States Madison, WI, 1978); Joseph Frankel, British Foreign Policy 1945–1973 London, 1975), pp. 96Google Scholar, 157, 222.
11 Chuter Ede, 653 H.C. Deb., 273, 6 February 1962.
12 Layton–Henry, Politics of Race, p. 33.
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14 Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780, pp. 5–6, 8.
15 Waever et al., Identity.
16 Bhabha, Homi K., ‘DissemiNation: Time, Narrative, and the Margins of the Modern Nation’, in Bhabha, Homi K. (ed.), Nation and Narration London, 1990), pp. 297–8Google Scholar.
17 R. B. J. Walker has written extensively about the problematic nature of the inside/outside dichotomy. See especially Walker, , Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory Cambridge, 1993)Google Scholar, ch. 8.
18 Ibid., pp. 179–80.
19 Laclau, Ernesto and Mouffe, Chantal, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy—Towards a Radical Democratic Politics London and New York, 1985), p. 96Google Scholar.
20 Ibid., ch. 3.
21 Waever et al., Identity, ch. 2.
22 Anderson, Imagined Communities. Conceptualizing the nation as a discourse is consistent with Hobsbawm's proposal (Nations and Nationalism since 1780, p. 8) that agnosticism is the best initial posture for students of national identity. See also Smith, Anthony D., ‘The Nation: Invested, Imagined, Reconstructed?’, Millennium 20:3 (1991), pp. 353–68CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Smith critiques Anderson's understanding on the grounds that it cannot give us a causal explanation for the rise, timing, and scope of a given nation nor does it address the question, ‘Who is the nation?’. While this study does not seek to give a causal explanation, it does seek to address the question, ‘Who is the nation? ’, in the case of Britain. I do not provide a definitive answer to this question, because the theoretical framework taken here suggests that there is no definitive answer. The issue is, rather, the practices that are implicated in the production of ostensibly definitive answers regarding the identity of the nation.
23 Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780, pp. 8–11; Smith, ‘National Identity’.
24 It might be helpful here to give a brief illustration of a ‘nodal point’. We can, for example, imagine a discourse on democracy in which capitalist market principles serve as nodal points. In such a discourse the meaning of democracy becomes fixed around these nodal points so that democracy and capitalism are inextricably linked and we cannot imagine democracy where these principles are absent.
25 See Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, pp. 48–9.
26 See Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780, p. 10.
27 See Breuilly, John, Nationalism and the State New York, 1982), p. 374Google Scholar.
28 Smith, ‘The Nation’, p. 240. Smith also suggests that ‘in many parts of Africa and Asia, it is the state itself, through its economic policies, its political patronage and mass education systems, that seeks, with varying success, to create and narrate the emergent nation’. I would not argue with this, but would add that it is not only in Africa and Asia that this takes place.
29 Poggi, Gianfranco, The State: Its Nature, Development and Prospects Cambridge, 1990), p. 30Google Scholar.
30 Gilroy, Paul, There Ain't No Black in the Union Jack—The Cultural Politics of Race and Nation Chicago, 1987), p. 74Google Scholar; Gramsci, Antonio, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, ed. a nd tr. Hoare, Quinton and Smith, Geoffrey Nowell (New York, 1987), p. 246Google Scholar.
31 See Martin O. Heisler and Zig Layton–Henry, ‘Migration and the Links Between Social and Societal Security’, in Waever et al., Identity, pp. 148–66. They suggest that this issue is one of current relevance to Europe and North America. States are not losing the ability to control their borders in a physical sense. The important issues revolve around the social and moral costs of doing so.
32 Foucault, Michel, History of Sexuality, vol. 1 (New York, 1980), p. 144Google Scholar.
33 Jacobovits, Rabbi, ‘Discovering a New National Purpose’, The Times, 17 January 1968, p. 11Google Scholar.
34 Frankel, British Foreign Policy, pp. 221–2; Layton–Henry, Politics of Race, pp. 7–9.
35 Freeman, Gary P., Immigrant Labor and Racial Conflict in Industrial Societies. The French and British Experiences 1945–1975 Princeton, 1979), p. 290Google Scholar.
36 Former colonies provided much of the post–World War II immigration into Western industrialized countries. This was especially the case with the Netherlands, France, and Britain. See Hammar, Tomas, European Immigration Policy Cambridge, 1985), p. 5CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Kindleberger, Charles P., Europe's Postwar Growth—The Role of Labor Supply Cambridge, 1967), p. 172CrossRefGoogle Scholar, also suggests a ‘special relation’ between these countries and their former colonies, in which labour from former colonies was a major factor shaping postwar economic growth in Europe.
37 Winston Churchill, 1954. Quoted in Layton–Henry, Politics of Race, p. 32.
38 See Gordon, Paul, Policing Immigration London, 1985), p. 14Google Scholar. It should, however, be noted that Britain did not actively recruit ‘New Commonwealth’ immigrants for the purpose of providing labour, though they ended up providing needed labour nonetheless. Freeman, Immigrant Labor, ch. 6, points out that, while some (notably The Economist and the Liberal Party) favoured open immigration for economic reasons, in general the immigration issue in Britain was not discussed in economic terms at all. ‘In general, neither the leaders of the Tory or Labour parties showed any appreciation or interest in the economic side of immigration’ (p. 183).
39 Ibid., pp. 37, 46; Bevan, Vaughan, The Development of British Immigration Law London, 1986), p. 77Google Scholar.
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41 Frankel, British Foreign Policy, p. 225; Strachey, John, The End of Empire New York, 1959), p. 204Google Scholar.
42 649 H.C. Deb., 706, 16 November 1961.
43 Ibid., 709.
44 Nigel Fisher, ibid., 780.
45 Gordon, Policing Immigration, p. 16; Freeman, Immigrant Labor, p. 55; Bevan, Development of British Immigration Law, p. 79; 1965 White Paper, Command Paper 2739, Immigration from the Commonwealth.
46 Bevan, Development of British Immigration Law, pp. 80 – 1.
47 Ibid., p. 83.
48 The term ‘settled’ refers to those who have ordinary residence without a time limit on their stay (ibid., p. 115). This excluded from the birthplace rule children of illegal entrants and all others whose residence was not permanent, e.g. persons admitted for asylum but n o t yet permanently, work–permit holders, students, and other legal but temporary residents. See Dummett and Nicol, Subjects, Citizens, Aliens, p. 244.
49 Layton–Henry, Politics of Race, p. 86.
50 Gordon, Policing Immigration, pp. 14–24.
51 Foot, Paul, Immigration and Race in British Politics London, 1965)Google Scholar; Reeves, Frank, British Racial Discourse Cambridge, 1983)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
52 Frankel, British Foreign Policy, p. 223.
53 Dummett and Nicol, Subjects, Citizens, Aliens, p. 140.
54 Derrida, Other Heading, p. xxvi.
55 Conservative Central Office, June 1949, in Layton–Henry, Politics of Race, p. 14.
56 649 H.C. Deb., 16 November 1961. Emphasis mine.
57 Laclau and Mouffe, Hegemony, p. 125.
58 Laclau, Ernesto, New Reflections on the Revolution of Our Time London, 1990), p. 17Google Scholar.
59 Sir C. Osborne, 709 H.C. Deb., 402, 23 March, 1965.
60 R. A. Butler, Conservative Home Secretary, 649 H.C. Deb., 695, 16 November 1961. Emphasis mine.
61 Frank Tomney, 596 H.C. Deb, 1589, 5 December 1958.
62 Sir C. Osborne, 645 H.C. Deb., 1320–1, 1 August 1961.
63 Miles, Robert and Phizacklea, Annie, White Man's Country—Racism in British Politics London, 1984), p. 41Google Scholar.
64 Sir J. Smyth, 634 H.C. Deb., 1955, 17 February, 1961.
65 Quotes are respectively Patricia Hornsby–Smith, Joint Under–Secretary of State for the Home Department, 585 H.C. Deb., 1422, 3 April, 1958, and Norman Pannell, 634, H.C. Deb, 1967, 17 February, 1961.
66 Gilroy, There Ain't No Black, supports this notion.
67 Bhabha (ed.), Nation and Narration, p. 4.
68 The Tablet, Catholic publication. Quoted in 596 H.C. Deb., 1563, 5 December 1958.
69 Frank Soskice, Secretary of State for the Home Department, 711 H.C. Deb., 934, 3 May 1965.
70 J. Vaughan–Morgan, 709 H.C Deb., 359, 23 March, 1965.
71 Bhabha, ‘DissemiNation’, p. 296.
72 Margaret Thatcher, in a television interview with Gordon Burns on Granada Television's World in Action, 30 January 1978. Quoted in 943 H.C. Deb., 240, 31 January 1978.
73 See Freeman, Immigrant Labor, ch. 3; and Lloyd, Cathie and Waters, Hazel, ‘France: One Culture, One People?’, Race and Class, 32:3 1991)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
74 Freeman, Immigrant Labor, p. 308.
75 For example, see ‘Anti–Immigrant Platform Helps French Right’, Migration News, 2, no. 5 (May 1995). This article reports that Jean–Marie Le Pen, leader of the National Front, received about 15 per cent of all votes cast in the first round of the French Presidential elections on 23 April. Jacques Chirac, newly elected French President, appealed for votes from Le Pen supporters by playing upon their fears of immigrants. Germany also continues to struggle with racial tensions revolving around its immigrant populations, especially those from Turkey. See ‘Turkey and Germany Struggle with Racial Tensions’, Migration News, 2, no. 4 (April 1995)Google Scholar.