It may be that states are not persons, but there is nothing in Peter Lomas' dismissive critique of my article that would help us decide one way or the other. Lomas never engages the central points of my argument, and does not appear to have read the relevant literature. This is too bad, since Lomas' evident passion about the question of whether states are persons is fully justified. At stake empirically is our ability to explain important patterns in world politics, like balancing or the tendency of states to follow international law, which seem to presuppose state persons. And normatively, state personhood has many politically charged implications, whether limiting the possibilities for individual self-realisation, as emphasised by Lomas, or providing a metaphysical ground for claims of group rights, collective responsibility and guilt, reparations, and the like. So the stakes are high, and having been neglected in IR for so long our current understanding of the issue is preliminary at best. Passion, however, is no substitute for clear thinking, and here Lomas muddies the water considerably. As such I welcome the opportunity to respond. Since Lomas concentrates on my easy case – collective intentionality – I shall do likewise, defending the reality of only that aspect of state personhood, thus bracketing whether states are also super-organisms with collective consciousness.