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Governmental politics and the Conventional Arms Transfer Talks*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  26 October 2009

Joanna Spear
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Extract

In 1977 at the instigation of the Carter Administration, the United States and the Soviet Union opened negotiations aimed at concluding an agreement to control conventional arms transfers. Four rounds of talks were held over a period of twelve months and expectations were raised in both countries that the negotiations would be successful. However, at the fourth round of talks these expectations were dashed by the abrupt termination of negotiations. It is the contention of this article that the immediate fate of the talks and the timing of their collapse can be understood only in the context of the bureaucratic battles within the Carter Administration over the issue of arms transfer control and the wider question of relations with the Soviet Union and China.

Type
Research Article
Information
Review of International Studies , Volume 19 , Issue 4 , October 1993 , pp. 369 - 384
Copyright
Copyright © British International Studies Association 1993

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