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7 Brooks, Stephen G. and Wohlforth, William C., ‘Hard Times for Soft Balancing’, International Security, 30:1, (2005), pp. 76–77CrossRefGoogle Scholar . Addition of ‘and’ in square brackets added by this author.

8 Craig, Campbell, ‘American power preponderance and the nuclear revolution’, Review of International Studies, 35:1 (2009), p. 27CrossRefGoogle Scholar .

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10 Although these are not the only factors that Brooks and Wohlforth include. See second section.

11 Brooks, Stephen and Wohlforth, William, World Out of Balance, p. 46Google Scholar .

12 Ferguson, Niall, Colossus: The Price of America's Empire (New York: The Penguin Press, 2004), p. 68Google Scholar . This is a summary of the theory put forward in Stephen Brooks and William Wohlforth, ‘International Relations Theory and the Case against Unilateralism’, p. 511.

13 Campbell Craig, ‘American power preponderance and the nuclear revolution’, pp. 31–2. Original statement by Waltz acknowledging their importance can be found n Waltz, Kenneth, ‘Structural Realism after the Cold War’, International Security, 25:1 (2000), p. 5CrossRefGoogle Scholar .

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17 Campbell Craig, ‘American power preponderance and the nuclear revolution’, p. 39.

18 Ibid.

19 Ibid., p. 40.

20 Ibid., p. 30.

21 See Stephen Brooks and William Wohlforth, ‘International Relations Theory and the Case against Unilateralism’, pp. 511–2.

22 Craig does in fact acknowledge their contribution in a footnote. Refer to Campbell Craig, ‘American power preponderance and the nuclear revolution’, fn. 36. Craig may counter this argument by stating that he is emphasising the fear factor, but this itself depends on the nuclear capability of a state and its potential to annihilate a rival.

23 Campbell Craig, ‘American power preponderance and the nuclear revolution’, p. 35.

24 Ibid.

25 Ibid.

26 For example, just prior to the Bush Administration withdrawing from the ABM treaty, the Russian Defence Minister, Sergei Ivanov, warned that ‘We are going to do everything possible to counter these threats when they take shape.’ Cited in Stephen Mulvey, ‘Russia's anxieties over missile defence’, BBC News Online (20 May 2002), available at: {http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/1994338.stm} accessed on 24 November 2009.

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28 Kenneth Waltz, ‘Nuclear Myths and Political Realities’, p. 84.

29 Waltz, Kenneth, Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979), pp. 91 & 204Google Scholar . On the multiple motivational assumptions of Waltz, refer to Donnelly, Jack, Realism and International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp. 54–56CrossRefGoogle Scholar .

30 Brooks, Stephen and Wohlforth, William, World Out of Balance, p. 49Google Scholar .

31 Ibid.

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33 Ibid., p. 209.

34 For earlier debates claiming that neo-realism represents a degenerative research program, refer to Vasquez, John, The Power of Power Politics: From Classical Realism to Neotraditionalism (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1998)Google Scholar ; Vasquez, John, ‘The Realist Paradigm and Degenerative versus Progressive Research Programs: An Appraisal of Neotraditional Research on Waltz's Balancing Proposition’, The American Political Science Review, 91:4 (1997), pp. 899–912CrossRefGoogle Scholar ; Waltz, Kenneth, ‘Evaluating Theories’, American Political Science Review, 91:4 (1997), pp. 913–917CrossRefGoogle Scholar ; Legro, Jeffrey and Moravcsik, Andrew, ‘Is Anybody Still a Realist’, International Security, 24:2 (Fall 1999), pp. 5–55CrossRefGoogle Scholar ; and Feaver, Peter D., Hellman, Gunther, Schweller, Randall L., Taliaferro, Jeffery W., Wohlforth, William C., Lergo, Jeffery W., Moravcsik, Andrew, ‘Brother, can you spare a Paradigm? (Or was Anybody Ever a Realist)’, International Security, 25:1 (2000), pp. 165–193CrossRefGoogle Scholar .

35 Campbell Craig, ‘American power preponderance and the nuclear revolution’, p. 42.

36 Their argument is that ‘The balancing imperative […] will not soon dominate great-powers' strategic choices in today's novel unipolar system’. William Wohlforth, ‘US Strategy in a Unipolar World’, p. 117.

37 Rosenberg, Justin, ‘Globalization Theory: A Post Mortem’, International Politics, 42:1 (2005), p. 29CrossRefGoogle Scholar .

38 Ibid., p. 29.

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41 Kenneth Waltz, ‘International Politics Is Not Foreign Policy’, pp. 54–7; Schweller, Randall, ‘New Realist Research on Alliances: Refining not Refuting, Waltz's Balancing Proposition’, American Political Science Review, 914 (1997), pp. 927–930CrossRefGoogle Scholar .

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45 In an earlier debate, Desch, Michael argued that strategic culture should also be considered as supplementing rather than supplanting neo-realism. Refer to ‘Culture Clash: Assessing the Importance of Ideas in Security Studies’, International Security, 23:1 (1998), pp. 141–170CrossRefGoogle Scholar ; See also the response by his critics in Duffield, John, Farrell, Theo, Price, Richard and Desch, Michael, ‘Correspondence – Isms and Schisms: Culturalism versus Realism in Security Studies’, International Security, 24:1 (1999), pp. 156–180CrossRefGoogle Scholar . Others have attempted to provide a causal theory that responds to these criticisms, but the main point remains that these approaches have failed to supplant neo-realism. Refer to Farrell, Theo, ‘Constructivist Security Studies: Portrait of a Research Program’, International Studies Review, 4:1 (2002), pp. 49–72CrossRefGoogle Scholar ; Johnston, Alastair Iain, ‘Thinking about Strategic Culture’, International Security, 19:4 (1995), pp. 32–64CrossRefGoogle Scholar ; Johnston, Alastair Iain, Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1995)Google Scholar ; Johnston, Alastair Iain, ‘Strategic Cultures Revisited: Reply to Colin Gray’, Review of International Studies, 25:4 (1999), pp. 519–523CrossRefGoogle Scholar .

46 Christopher Layne, ‘The Unipolar Illusion Revisited’, p. 39.