1 Fuel trade reached $1.8 trillion in 2007, almost 14 per cent of world trade in goods (Source: World Trade Organization). Most fuel trade was for crude oil and refined products, the exclusive topic of this article. Gas trade shows some characteristics similar to oil, but others are very different, putting it outside the scope of this work.

2 It is sufficient to recall colonial conditions under which the Anglo-Persian Company (now BP) was founded, or the political weapons used by the British government (and later by the Roosevelt administration) to obtain for their companies the right to drill oil in the Persian Gulf, or the complacency of those governments in regard to the tight oligopoly created after the Achnacarry agreement in 1928.

3 See Yergin, Daniel, The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money, and Power (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992)Google Scholar ; Jones, Geoffrey, Multinationals and Global Capitalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005)Google Scholar ; Venn, Fiona, Oil Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1986)CrossRefGoogle Scholar .

4 The special issues published by Review of International Political Economy, 16:1 and New Political Economy, 14:3, in 2009, includes several articles on the mainstream neo-classical approach and its liberal-conservative ideology. Also Cohen, Benjamin, International Political Economy: An Intellectual History (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2008)Google Scholar .

5 In fact, this issue used to be among the most frequently analysed through this approach, when oil shocks in the 1970s were seen as a major factor of change in economic and political relations. On the diversity of approaches and typologies, see Cohen, International Political Economy. Also Palan, Ronen (ed.), Global Political Economy. Contemporary Theories (London: Routledge, 2000)Google Scholar ; Paquin, Stéphane, ‘La Nouvelle conomie Politique Internationale. Théories et enjeux’ (Paris: Armand Colin, 2008)Google Scholar ; Phillips, Nicola (ed.), Globalizing International Political Economy (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005)CrossRefGoogle Scholar .

6 Strange, Susan, States and Markets (London: Pinter, 1988), p. 23Google Scholar .

7 See Kérébel, Cécile and Keppler, Jan-Horst, La Gouvernance Mondiale de lnergie, Institut Français de Rélations Internationales (Paris: IFRI, 2009)Google Scholar ; Kalicki, Jan H. and Goldwyn, David L. (eds), Energy & Security. Toward a New Foreign Policy Strategy (Baltimore: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005)Google Scholar .

8 See Karl, Terry Lynn, The Paradox of Plenty: Oil Booms and Petro-states (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997)Google Scholar ; Auty, Richard (ed.), Resource Abundance and Economic Development (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001)Google Scholar .

9 Strange, States and Markets; Strange, Susan, The retreat of the State. The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996)CrossRefGoogle Scholar .

10 Strange, Susan and Stopford, John, Rival States, Rival Firms: Competition for World Market Shares (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991)Google Scholar ; Strange, Susan, ‘States, Firms and Diplomacy’, International Affairs, 68:1 (1992), pp. 1–15CrossRefGoogle Scholar .

11 Kérébel and Keppler, La Gouvernance Mondiale.

12 Oatley, Thomas, International Political Economy. Interests and Institutions in the Global Economy (New York: Pearson, 2009)Google Scholar .

13 See, for example, Mommer, Bernard, ‘The Governance of International Oil: The Changing Rules of the Games’, Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, WPM, 26 (2000)Google Scholar ; Mommer, Bernard, Global Oil and Taxation State (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2002)Google Scholar ; Kérébel, Cécile, ‘Quelle Gouvernance du Marché du Pétrole Aujourdhui? Mécanismes, Systèmes dActeurs et Rapports de Force en volution’, IEE-Document, 42, Louvain (Octobre, 2008), pp. 12–31Google Scholar ; Graaf, Thijs de Van, ‘Old Rules, New Players? Integrating the BRIC in Global Energy Governance’, IEE-Document, 42, Lovain (Octobre, 2008), pp. 33–51Google Scholar ; Westphal, Kirsten, ‘Energy Policy between Multilateral Governance and Geopolitics: Whither Europe?’, Internationale Politik und Gesellschaft, 4 (2006), pp. 44–62.Google Scholar ; David C. Victor et al., ‘The Global Energy Regime’, available at: {www.princeton.edu/~smeunier/Victor%20et%20al%energy%20Regime.pdf}, accessed on 30 November 2007.

14 An IPE approach is taken in various works dealing with very different issues: the Middle East, Waterbury, John and Richards, Alan, A Political Economy of the Middle East (Boulder, Co.: Westview Press, 2007)Google Scholar ; Central Asia, Kleveman, Lutz, The New Great Game: Blood and Oil in Central Asia (London: Grove Press, 2003)Google Scholar ; US struggle versus Russia and China, Klare, Michael and Volman, Daniel, ‘The African “oil rush” and US national security’, Third World Quarterly, 27:4 (2006), pp. 609–628CrossRefGoogle Scholar ; the dollar as key currency and implications for exporting countries in the Middle East, Momani, Bessma, ‘Gulf Cooperation Council Oil Exporters and the Future of the Dollar’, New Political Economy, 13:3 (2008), pp. 293–314CrossRefGoogle Scholar ; and Russia, Johnson, Juliet, ‘Forbidden fruit: Russia's uneasy relationship with the US dollar’, Review of International Political Economy, 15:3 (2008), pp. 379–398CrossRefGoogle Scholar ; links between development, oil management, and resource curse, Amuzegar, JahangairManaging the Oil Wealth: OPEC's Windfalls and Pitfalls (London: Tauris, 1999)Google Scholar ; John, Jonathan Di‘Oil Abundance and Violent Political Conflict: A Critical Assessment’, Journal of Development Studies, 43:6 (2007), pp. 961–986CrossRefGoogle Scholar .

15 See Falola, Toyin and Genova, Ann, The Politics of the Global Oil Industry: An Introduction (New York, Praeger, 2005)Google Scholar .

16 See Claes, Dag Harald, The Politics of Oil Production Cooperation (Boulder, Co.: Westview Press, 2008)Google Scholar .

17 See Mitchell, John et al. , A new political economy of oil, impacts on business, geopolitics and society (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2001)Google Scholar .

18 Weintraub, Sidney, ‘Issues in International Political Economy, Oil and Natural Gas Politics in the Westhern Hemisphere’, Centre for Strategic & International Studies, 65 (2005)Google Scholar ; Kalicki and Goldwyn, Energy & Security.

19 Daniel Yergin, The Prize; Fiona Venn, Oil Diplomacy.

20 James Baker Institute, ‘The Changing Role of National Oil Companies in International Energy Market’, Policy Report, 35 (Institute for Public Policy: Rice University), available at: {http://bakerinstitute.org}, accessed November 2007}Google Scholar ; Falola and Genova, The Politics of the Global Oil Industry; Waterbury and Richards, A Political Economy.

21 Frynas, Jedrej George and Paulo, Manuel, ‘A new scramble for African oil? Historical, political, and business perspectives’. African Affairs, 106:423 (2007), pp. 229–251CrossRefGoogle Scholar ; Weitz, Richard, Kazakhstan and the New International Politics of Eurasia (Washington: Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, 2008)Google Scholar . However, there are important differences in the share of production and revenues that NOCs retain. This share depends very much on the bargaining power of each government and NOC against foreign companies. Moreover, the distinction we draw between the two groups of NOCs is not static. It may be that a company of the first group (such as PDVSA Venezuela) enters a phase of difficulties (political, financial, and technological) that forces a greater presence by foreign investors and, thus, reduces its control over production and export earnings.

22 Kalicki and Goldwyn, Energy & Security.

23 Fernández, Rafael, ‘Some scenarios of Russian oil exports up to 2020’, Europe-Asia Studies, 61:8 (2009), pp. 1441–1459CrossRefGoogle Scholar .

24 Hiroyuki Ishida, ‘Energy Strategies in China and India and Major Countries' Views’, Institute of Energy Economics, Tokyo, available at: {http://eneken.ieej.org/en, March, 2007}; Palazuelos, Enrique (dir.). El petróleo y el gas natural en la geoestrategia mundial (Madrid: Akal, 2008)Google Scholar , cap. VI, VII, VIII and IX.

25 Amy Myers Jaffe and Ronald Solingo, ‘The International Oil Companies’, The James Baker Institute for Public Policy, Rice University, available at: {http://bakerinstitute.org, November, 2007}; Falola and Genova, The Politics of the Global Oil Industry.

26 ExxonMobil comes from the merger between New Jersey Standard Oil and Mobil. Chevron is the result of merging Standard Oil of California, Gulf, Texaco and Unocal. ConocoPhillips joined Conoco and Phillips, and then purchased Burlington Resources.

27 Among the twenty biggest oil drilling companies only four are private, and the best placed, ExxonMobil, is ranked number seven, while Chevron stands at 11th place, ConocoPhillips at 16th, and British Petroleum at 19th. Their positions are even weaker on stocks, because the vast majority of oil reserves are in the hands of large NOCs. The best-positioned in stocks is again ExxonMobil, though it places at a distant 20th.

28 Although Conoco-Phillips already owns 20 per cent of Lukoil, the other private company (TNK-BP) has a more independent (and conflicting) relationship with the Russian government. Fernández, ‘Some scenarios of Russian oil’.

29 See Mabro, Robert (ed,), Oil in the Twenty-First Century. Issues, challenges and opportunities (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006)Google Scholar ; Palazuelos, El petróleo.

30 OPEC could be considered a ‘booster’ to the governments’ negotiating power with all member countries. It can be said that OPEC worked as a supply cartel between 1974 and 1982. However, after the decline of its policy of production quotas and the lack of internal discipline among its members, OPEC does not currently play an important role in international oil relations.

31 See Shaxson, Nicholas, Poisoned wells. The Dirty Policies to African Oil (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008)Google Scholar ; Auty, Resource Abundance; Jean-Pierre Angelier, ‘Lvolution des Relations Contractuelles dans le Domain Pétrolier’, Note de Travail, 11/08, LEPII (2008).

32 Oil accounts for almost half of energy consumption in Japan and Korea, and over 40 per cent in the US, and ranges from 33 per cent in France to 46 per cent in Italy among the six major European consumers. It accounts only for 20 per cent in India and China but is growing rapidly. Source: International Energy Agency, IEA, Oil Information (Paris: IEA, 2008)Google Scholar . International agency estimates (from IEA, EIA, OPEC, APERC) agree that oil will continue to provide about 35 per cent of world energy consumption over the next two decades.

33 Imports account for about 60 per cent of consumption in China, over 65 per cent in India and the US, and even higher percentages in European countries, while Japan and Korea depend entirely on imports. Estimates are for these shares to continue to grow in the coming decades.

34 Kalicki and Goldwyn, Energy & Security; Enrique Palazuelos, El petróleo, cap. I and XVI.

35 All together, the nine countries mentioned have increased their consumption from 1.7 million b/d in 1970 to 13.3 million in 2000, and to 18 million in 2008. Sources: International Energy Agency, IEA, Oil Information; British Petroleum, Statistical Review of World Energy (2008), available at: {www.bp.com} accessed on 23 April 2009.

36 We consider a four-year (2005–2008) average to be more representative than 2008 data, since the year was very peculiar (with rising prices in the first half and sharp decline in the second).

37 These three European countries quickly began production, reaching 2 million b/d in 1980 and growing through the end of the century (to 6.2 million in 2000), when output began to decline. Mexico raised its production from 0.5 to 1.4 million b/d in 1980, staying around that figure until the present decade, when output began to decline. Sources: IEA, Oil Information; British Petroleum, Statistical Review of World Energy (2008).

38 The fall in Russian output was dramatic between 1990 and 1998, from 10.4 to 6.5 million b/d. The subsequent recovery has returned production to 10 million b/d, while in Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan, output has risen from 1 to 2.5 million b/d. Sources: IEA and British Petroleum, Statistical Review of World Energy, 2008.

39 US oil production decreased from 11.3 to 10.1 million b/d during the 1970s, then continued to fall, to below 7 million beginning in 2000. Palazuelos, Enrique, ‘The Role of transnational Companies as Oil Suppliers to the US’, Energy Policy, 38:8 (2010), pp. 4064–4075CrossRefGoogle Scholar .

40 Tsereteli, Mamuka, Economic and Energy Security: Connecting Europe and the Black Sea-Caspian Region (Washington: Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, 2008)Google Scholar .

41 International Energy Agence (IEA), World Energy Outlook (Paris: IEA, 2004)Google Scholar .

42 Angelier, ‘Lvolution des Relations’.

43 Jaffe and Solingo, ‘The International Oil Companies’; Palazuelos, El petróleo, cap. III and V.

44 Baghat, Gawdat, ‘Energy Partnership: China and the Gulf States’, OPEC Review, 29:2 (2005), pp. 115–131Google Scholar ; Ishida, ‘Energy Strategies’; Erica Downs, ‘The Fact and Fiction of Sino-African Energy Relations’, China Security, 3:3 (2007), pp. 42–68Google Scholar .

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48 Fattouh, Bassam, ‘The origins and evolution of the Current International Oil Pricing System: a critical assessment’, in Mabro, R. (ed.), Oil in the 21st Century, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), pp. 41–100Google Scholar ; Fattouh, ‘The Drivers of Oil Prices’; Mabro, Robert, ‘OPEP behaviour 1960–98: a review of the literature’, Journal of Energy Literature, 4:1 (1998), pp. 3–37Google Scholar . Nominal prices fell from annual average ranges of $33–35 per barrel, depending on the variety of raw, in 1980–82, to $28–29 in 1983–85. Beginning in 1985 and for a long (12-year) period, averages were at $16–18 per barrel. Source: British Petroleum, Statistical Review of World Energy.

49 Such as the impact of natural gas (conventional and tight gas), the impact of political turmoil in the Middle East region, and the US sanctions on Iran (uncertainty for Irans oil development but also for Caspian oil/gas, and pipelines).

50 Michael Greenberger, ‘Energy Speculation: Is Greater Regulation Necessary to Stop Price Manipulation?’, Testimony before Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the US House Committee on Energy and Commerce, available at: {http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/cgi/} accessed on 17 December 2007; Hagstromer and Wlazlowski, ‘Causality in crude oil prices’; Randall Wray, ‘The Commodities Market Bubble. Money Manager Capitalism and the Financialization of Commodities’, Public Policy Brief, 96 (Levy Economics Institute, 2008).

51 Bronson, Thicker than oil; Askari, The Militarization; Palazuelos, ‘The Role of transnational Companies’; Rivlin, Paul, Economic Policy and Performance in the Arab World (Boulder, Co: Lynne Rienner, 2001)Google Scholar .

52 Russia is a possible exception to these restrictions. Russian companies control a significant proportion of world reserves and are closely associated with the state apparatus, whose autonomy of decision is ample. However, weak technological capabilities and, especially, financial constraints force these companies to develop different forms of agreements with foreign companies to exploit domestic resources. Russia is also the exporting region with less diversified exports, as 90 per cent of sales go to Europe. Moreover, although it is not an oil rentier economy, oil (and gas) export revenues are increasingly important. Mommer, , ‘The Governance of International Oil: The Changing Rules of the Games, Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, WPM, 26 (2000)Google Scholar .

53 NOCs from producing countries have 78 per cent of reserves and Russian companies 6 per cent, so that multinational corporations directly control 6 per cent and have access together with NOCs to another 10 per cent. Jaffe and Solingo, ‘The International Oil Companies’.

54 Baghat ‘Energy Partnership’; Bronson, Thicker than oil; Waterbury and Richards, A Political Economy.

55 Palazuelos, ‘The Role of transnational Companies’.

56 Ishida, ‘Energy Strategies’; Palazuelos, El petróleo, cap. VI and X; Lahn, Glada, ‘Trends in Asian National Oil Company Investmant Abroad: An Update’, Working Paper Chatham House (November, 2007)Google Scholar .

57 Strange, The retreat of the State.

58 Kérébel and Keppler, La Gouvernance Mondiale; Palazuelos, El petróleo, cap. IV and V.