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A case study of mediation as a method of International conflict resolution: the Camp David experience

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  26 October 2009

Jacob Bercovitch
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Extract

This paper purports to contribute to the development of a theory of international mediation by considering, in some detail, the experience at Camp David and more specifically the role of President Carter. The uniqueness of this event cannot of course be ignored, but even unique cases can contribute to theory development especially if they are considered as one of a class of events. Single cases can provide a powerful impetus to the development of a general explanation as long as they are historically grounded and their description is not couched in purely idiosyncratic terms.

Type
Research Article
Information
Review of International Studies , Volume 12 , Issue 1 , January 1986 , pp. 43 - 65
Copyright
Copyright © British International Studies Association 1986

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References

1. For a discussion of the logic of this approach see George, A., ‘Case studies and theory development: The method of structured focused comparison’, in Lauren, P. G. (ed.), Diplomacy (New York, 1979), pp. 43–68Google Scholar.

2. On the conditions influencing the course of conflict, see Deutsch, M., The Resolution of Conflict (New Haven, 1973)Google Scholar.

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11. This is known as the problem of transference or re-entry (how to transfer changed attitudes and perceptions to the policy process). On this issue see Bercovitch, , ‘Resolving the Middle East Conflict: A Non-Traditional Approach to International Conflict’, International Problems, 16(2), 1977, pp. 89–99.Google Scholar

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19. Bercovitch, op. cit.

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25. Brzezinski recounts how distressed and agitated Carter would be after his meetings with Begin and also how adept he was at breaking protocol (e.g. talk to Weizman and Barak rather than to Begin) in a manner that would upset Begin. See Brzezinski, Z., Power and Principle (New York, 1983)Google Scholar.

26. Text of Begin's speech at the White House, The Jerusalem Post, 22 September 1978.

27. Brzezinski, op. cit., p. 255.

28. See The Times, 4 September 1978.

29. See Carter, op. cit., pp. 359–364.

30. See Brzezinski, op. cit., pp. 256–258.

31. See Touval, S., The Peace Brokers: Mediators in the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1948–1979 (Princeton, NJ, 1982), p. 298Google Scholar.

32. For a review of the effects of these factors in international negotiation see Ikle, F., How Nations Negotiate (New York, 1964)Google Scholar.

33. See Carter, op. cit., p. 338.

34. See Brzezinski, op. cit., p. 253.

35. Ibid.

36. See The Jerusalem Post, 13 May 1977.

37. Financial Times, 14 August 1978.

38. For an analysis of Soviet objectives in the Middle East see Freedman, R., Soviet Policy Toward the Middle East Since 1970, 3rd Ed. (New York, 1982)Google Scholar, and Steele, J., The Limits of Soviet Power (London, 1984)Google Scholar.

39. See Carter, op. cit., pp. 353–355.

40. Begin's belief in this respect is supported by Fisher's notion of fractionating conflict. See Fisher, R., ‘Fractionating Conflict’, in Fisher, R. (ed.) International Conflict and the Behavioral Sciences (New York, 1964), pp. 91–110Google Scholar.

41. The Guardian, 1 September 1978.

42. See Carter, op. cit., pp. 352–355.

43. Providing parties with the opportunities to communicate does not necessarily produce effective communication. Strong role factors and commitment to one's group impair the ability to communicate effectively. See Deutsch, M. and Krauss, R., ‘Studies of Interpersonal Bargaining’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 16(1), 1962, pp. 52–76CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

44. See Ikle, op. cit. See also Nicolson, H., Diplomacy (Oxford, 1969)Google Scholar and Harrimann, W., ‘Observations on Negotiating’, Journal of International Affairs, 29(1), 1975, pp. 1–6.Google Scholar

45. Carter, op. cit., p. 318.

46. Ibid., p. 402.

47. See Hirst, D. and Beeson, I., Sadat (London, 1981), pp. 302–305Google Scholar.

48. See the Sunday Times, 24 September 1978.

49. For an account of these successive drafts see The Jerusalem Post, 26 September 1978.

50. It is interesting to note that Begin and his advisers were convinced that Carter's control over communication and his understanding of details was due to the American ‘bugging’ of the cottages at Camp David. See Dayan, M., Breakthrough: A Personal Account of the Egypt-Israel Peace Negotiation (London, 1981), p. 178Google Scholar. This was, of course, denied by American officials. See Brzezinski, op. cit., p. 254.

51. Carter, op. cit., p. 349.

52. For an interesting account of Carter's direct and active mediation see Vance, C., Hard Choices (New York, 1983)Google Scholar.

53. Dayan, op. cit., p. 193.

54. Brzezinski, op. cit., pp. 271–272.

55. See The New York Times, 16 February 1979.