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British wartime thinking about a post-war European security group

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  26 October 2009

John Baylis
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Extract

One of the most striking differences between British defence policy since 1945 and military policy during the inter-war period has been the acceptance by post-war Labour and Conservative governments of the value of undertaking a continental commitment. During the 1920s and 1930s Britain clearly retained a close interest in European affairs but consistently steered away from any form of major military involvement on the continent,, In traditional terms policy makers continued to recognize the importance of maintaining a favourable Balance of power in Europe and preventing any hostile state from dominating the Low Countries, At the same time there was also a fundamental political assumption that Britain and France would be in alliance in the event of renewed German aggression in Western Europe. Until Munich, however, the emphasis in defence planning centred on home and imperial defence. True, there were those in the defence establishment who recognized that Britain's vital interests were closely linked to Western Europe and who advocated serious preparation of an expeditionary force. But even they failed to recommend the kind of highly mobile mechanized force for specialized European operations which might have avoided the magnitude of the disasters which befell British forces in 1939–40. After Munich the British government did arrive at a recognition of the importance of some form of continental commitment but by then it was clearly too late either to create an expeditionary force of the kind required or to supplement Britain's military weakness through the establishment of an effective western alliance system.

Type
Research Article
Information
Review of International Studies , Volume 9 , Issue 4 , October 1983 , pp. 265 - 281
Copyright
Copyright © British International Studies Association 1983

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References

1. See Bond, Brian, British Military Policy between the Two World Wars (Oxford, 1980)Google Scholar and Howard, Michael, The Continental Commitment: The Dilemma of British Defence Policy in the era of the two world wars (London, 1972).Google Scholar

2. Some of this literature covers various issues relating to a European security group, in passing. Relevant sources include King, E. P., The New Internationalism: allied policy and the European peace, 1934–45 (Newton Abbot, 1973)Google Scholar; Sharp, T., The Wartime Alliance and the Zonal Division of Germany (Oxford, 1975)Google Scholar; Backer, J., The Decision to Divide Germany (Durham NC, 1978);Google ScholarMclnnis, E., Hiscocks, R., and Spencer, R., The Shaping of Post-war Germany (New York, 1960)Google Scholar; Snell, J. L., Wartime Origins of the East-West Dilemma over Germany (New Orleans, 1959)Google Scholar; Anderson, T. H., The United States, Great Britain and the Cold War, 1944–47 (Missouri, 1981)Google Scholar; and Trakhanovsky, V., British Foreign Policy during World War II (Moscow, 1971)Google Scholar.

3. Woodward, Sir Llewellyn, British Foreign Policy in the Second World War, Volume V (London, 1976)Google Scholar and Rothwell, Victor, Britain and the Cold War 1941–47 (London, 1982).Google Scholar

4. In this respect this article follows the approach of both Woodward and Rothwell. The author has gone back over many of the documents from the Public Records Office used in the official history as well as others not referred to, and to other published sources. The question of how influential the Foreign Office was during the war is beyond the scope of this particular paper. Thus the stress on Foreign Office sources is not intended to reflect a view that the FO was more important than other sources suggested. The aim is merely to make the case that considerable (and often prescient) planning and discussions about a European group did go on throughout the war and that this helped to lay the foundations for post-war policies.

5. To pursue the objective of post-war collaboration with France an inter-departmental committee was established by the War Cabinet at the beginning of the war. Secret AFC (PW) (40) 1,26 April 1940, CAB 85/18.

6. See the New York Times, 22 March 1943.

7. See The Memoirs of Lord Gladwyn (London, 1972)Google Scholar, chapters 8 and 9.

8. See Sir Llewellyn Woodward, op. eit. p. 2. See also ‘The Four Power Plan’, FO371/31515, U742/742/70.

9. Richard Law was Minister of State for Foreign Affairs (1942–43).

10. Nigel Ronald was Assistant Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office in 1942.

11. Gladwyn, p. 108.

12. Ibid. pp. 112–17.

13. Ibid. pp. 116–18. See also Lord Gladwyn, Private Papers, Britain, the US, the USSR, and China made up the Four Powers. China was included because it was known that the US would be insistent on bringing China into any post-war settlement. Britain also urged the inclusion of France.

14. WP (43) 31, 16 January 1943, ‘The United Nations Plan’, CAB 66/63. See also Woodward, pp.14–18.

15. Gladwyn, pp. 116–18.

16. WP (43) 96, 8 March 1943, ‘The Future of Germany’, CAB 66/34.

17. Woodward, p. 25.

18. Sir Gone Sargent (Deputy Under-Secretary of State at the Foreign Office) was largely responsible for proposing the idea of confederations. See The Balkan Federation5, FO 371/ 33134, R3793/46/67.

19. See pp. 275–7.

20. For a discussion of Smuts's views see Secret DPM (44) 17, 7 April 1944, ‘Cooperation in the British Commonwealth’, memorandum by the Dominion Affairs Secretary, Annex, CAB 66/49. See also Department of State (DOS) Files at the National Archives, Office of European Affairs, Division of British Commonwealth Affairs, memorandum on ‘The Smuts Plan’, 17 October 1944.

21. See Woodward, p. 183.

22. The Memoirs of Field Marshal Montgomery (London: Collins, 1958), pp. 236–7Google Scholar.

23. WP (42) 480, 22 October 1942, ‘Post-War Atlantic Bases’, CAB 66/30; ‘Norwegian Proposal for post-war Anglo-American Norwegian Co-operation with regard to the Atlantic’, FO 371/ 32832, N5554/463/30.

24. WP (44) 1.81, 3 April 1944, ‘The Future of Europe’, CAB 66/48; ‘The Future World Organizations: UN Plan’, FO371/40692, U4102/180/70.

25. Woodward, p. 182. Spaak's representations came at the same time as a note from Field Marshal Smuts urging the FO to prepare a paper on a Western European regional grouping for the Conference of Dominion Prime Ministers.

26. Cooper, Duff, Old Men Forget (London, 1954), pp. 344–7Google Scholar.

27. Ibid. pp. 346–7.

28. Eden, Anthony, The Eden Memoirs: The Reckoning (London, 1965), pp. 444–6Google Scholar.

29. Cooper, p. 347.

30. Eden, p. 444.

31. Ibid.

32. Ibid. p. 445.

33. See Woodward, p. 187.

34. The US had a fairly clear idea of Britain's policy towards a western European group at this time. See DOS Files (National Archives), 840.00/1–1645, ‘British Plan for a Western European Bloc’.

35. See Woodward, p. 188.

36. See Secret COS (44) 113, 3 June 1944, ‘British Policy towards Western Europe’, Annex (Final Agreed Draft), CAB 80/44.

37. See Woodward, p. 188.

38. After the Dunkirk Treaty of 1947 with France, Britain initially planned to use this bilateral treaty as the model for its approach to the Benelux countries. It was the Benelux countries themselves who urged the need for a wider multilateral arrangement.

39. This was a continuous theme throughout much of the war-time planning. See Imobighe, T. A., Wartime influences affecting Britain's attitude to a post-war continental commitment (Ph.D., University of Wales, 1975), pp. 151–77Google Scholar.

40. COS to FO, 27 July 1944, FO 371/40725, U8652/180/70.

41. The question of the treatment of Germany after the war was considered in depth by the ‘Armistice and Post-war Committee’ between May and December 1944.

42. Woodward, p. 203.

43. Ibid. p. 204.

44. Ibid. p. 205.

45. Between August and September 1944 several representations were made by Orme Sargent and Wilson, Head of the Northern Department, to Eden complaining of ‘careless talk’ by the military authorities of the possibility of Anglo-Soviet hostility after the war. They feared this might come to the attention of the Americans and Russians.

46. Memorandum to the Foreign Office on 2 October 1944. ‘The Future of Germany: Question of Dismemberment’, FO371/39080, C18518/146/18.

47. ‘Memorandum for the Secretary of State from Sir Orme Sargent’, 4.October 1944. FO 371/ 39080, C13518/146/18.

48. See ‘Soviet post-war foreign policy: estimation of’, 4 October 1944, FO 371/43336, N6177/ 183/38.

49. See P.H.P. (44) 27 (0), (Final), 9 November 1944. CAB 81/95.

50. The report was determined to stress, however, that no move should be made to bring any part or all of Germany into a bloc against the Soviet Union until relations with her had irrevocably broken down. For a discussion of the difficulties between Foreign Office officials and the military on the P.H.C. see Rothwell, op. cit. 119–20.

51. Belgian ambassador to Eden, 5 October 1944, FO 371/40720, U7917, 8652/180/70.

52. P.M. to Eden, 25 November 1944, U8472, 8473/180/70, FO 371/40723.

53. See Reynolds, P. A. and Hughes, E. J., The Historian as Diplomat: Charles Kings ley Webster and the United Nations, 1939–1946 (London, 1976), pp. 11Google Scholar, 20–1, 29, 30–4.

54. Ibid. See also Woodward, pp. 193–4.

55. See Woodward, pp. 194–6.