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British and American policies in the Persian Gulf, 1968–1973

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 October 1985

F. Gregory Gause
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Extract

The West is now less dependent on Persian Gulf oil than at any time in the last decade. However, the area remains economically and strategically vital. The fact that the recent escalation of hostilities in the desultory Iran-Iraq war has attracted world-wide attention bears disturbing witness to the West's continuing vulnerability in this region. This vulnerability stems, in part, from three crucial decisions—two made in London and one in Washington—during the years 1968 to 1973, Until then, the Persian Gulf was viewed, when it was considered at all, as something of an international anachronism—a sleepy outpost of the fast-dwindling British Empire where Britannia still ruled the waves and the ‘Pax Britannica’ applied as it had since the 1820s. In that six-year period the Labour government of Harold Wilson announced that Britain would end its historic role in the Gulf; the Conservative government of Edward Heath chose not to alter the Labour policy, despite indications that it would do so; and the Nixon administration decided not to ‘fill the vacuum’. This paper assesses these three cases in terms of decision making theory, testing the utility of various theoretical decision making paradigms. Developments in the Gulf itself are treated only in so far as they had an effect on the making of policy in London and Washington.

Type
Research Article
Information
Review of International Studies , Volume 11 , Issue 4 , October 1985 , pp. 247 - 273
Copyright
Copyright © British International Studies Association 1985

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References

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80. US Congress, House of Representatives, Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Development, ‘The Indian Ocean: Political and Strategic Future’, 92nd Congress, 1st Session, (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1971), p. 164. Hereafter referred to as ‘Indian Ocean Hearings—1971’. See also Darby, pp. 265–6. Also see: ‘Availability of Certain Indian Ocean Islands for Defense Purposes’, Treaties and Other International Acts Series 6196 (Washington, 1967)Google Scholar. Also found in US Government Publications series no. 11846, July 1967. For evidence of the Navy's interest in this project, see Memo from Dean Rusk to President Johnson, ‘Visit of Prime Minister Wilson, July 29, 1966’, Declassified Document Reference Service, 1979 Collection, p. 88A.

81. Darby, p. 294. For a different point of view see Memo from George Ball to President Johnson, ‘Harold Wilson's Visit—The Opportunity for an Act of Statesmanship’, 22 July 1966, Declassified Documents Reference Service, 1978 Collection, p. 208A.

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88. Long, p. 71.

89. Memo from Dean Rusk to President Johnson, ‘Visit of Prime Minister Wilson, July 29, 1966’, 27 July 1966, Declassified Documents Reference Service, 1978 Collection, p. 431B. See also ‘Background Papers on Visit of UK Foreign Secretary George Brown, October 14, 1966’, 7 October 1966, Declassified Documents Reference Service, 1979 Collection, p. 204A.

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95. Hurewitz, p. 49.

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97. NSSM on the Persian Gulf specifically referred to by Noyes, p. 54.

98. US Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on the Near East, ‘US Interests in and Policy Toward The Persian Gulf’, 92nd Congress, 2nd Session, (Washington, 1972), p. 105. Hereafter referred to as’Persian Gulf Hearings—1972’.

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104. Ibid. p. 4.

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106. Ibid. p. 54. ‘Basing in any of the smaller states would be unacceptable to the two major powers of the area upon whom any workable U.S. policy would have to depend.’ Ibid. p. 55.

107. Ibid. p. 59.

108. New York Times, 18 October 1970, pp. 1, 16.

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123. Ibid. p. 154.

124. Long, p. 72.

125. ‘Persian Gulf Hearings—1972’, p. 86.

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130. Kubal, p. 172.

131. New York Times, 25 July 1971, pp. 1, 2.

132. ‘Persian Gulf Hearings—1973’, p. 11.

133. Interview with Ambassador Eilts. See also Noyes’ statement in ‘Persian Gulf Hearings—1972’, p. 26: ‘This [Iranian arms build-up], of course, must be balanced against Saudi Arabia's very real interests’.

134. Statement by Noyes in ‘Persian Gulf Hearings—1972’, pp. 6–7.

135. Ibid. p. 83.

136. ‘Indian Ocean Hearings—1971’, pp. iv-v, 111.

137. New York Times, 1 January 1972, pp. 1, 2.

138. ‘Persian Gulf Hearings—1972’, pp. 11–12.

139. Hurewitz, The Persian Gulf: Prospects for Stability, p. 51

140. ‘Persian Gulf Hearings—1972’, pp. 5, 12.

141. See testimony of Robert Pranger, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, in ‘Indian Ocean Hearings—1971’, p. 171.

142. ‘Persian Gulf Hearings—1972’, pp. 83–4.

143. Interview with Ambassador Eilts.

144. See Sisco testimony in 1973 in which he referred to the Soviet threat in the region to justify arms sales to Iran: ‘Persian Gulf Hearings—1973’, p. 7. The Soviet Union in April 1972 signed a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with Iraq; also during this period Soviet-South Yemeni ties were being strengthened and the Soviet-backed Dhufari rebels in Oman were very active.

145. Ibid. p. 47. Transfers to Saudi Arabia decreased from $312 million in 1972 to $76 million in 1973. Although no official explanation for the decrease could be found, Saudi involvement in the October War and the oil embargo undoubtedly played a role. Also, Riyadh might have found it difficult to absorb the investment made in 1972 and perhaps requested fewer new arms in 1973.

146. Ibid. p. 9.

147. Statement by Noyes in Ibid. p. 39. For a similar statement by Sisco, asserting that the policy was not a ‘knee-jerk reaction of the last few weeks to a so-called energy crisis’, see Ibid. pp. 5–6, 8–9.

148. Ibid. p. 6.

149. Ibid. p. 195.

150. Ibid. p. 33.

151. See Waltz, op. cit., for a thorough theoretical discussion of the constraints imposed by the parliamentary system on the executive in foreign policy making.

152. Interview with Ambassador Eilts.

153. The freedom from constraints that policy making in a crisis affords the executive, the logical extension of our argument, is discussed in Quandt, pp. 35–6.