Article contents
Alternative international systems? System structure and violent conflict in nineteenth-century West Africa, Southeast Asia, and South Asia
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 02 February 2015
Abstract
Were precolonial state systems different to the European model? If so, how did these state systems vary, and do variations in system structure influence the frequency of war? In this article we assess the structure off international systems in nineteenth-century West Africa, Southeast Asia, and South Asia using new data on precolonial states that corrects for some of the biases in the existing Correlates of War state system membership data. We develop a framework to capture variation in political order above and below the state, and explore the similarities and differences between these systems and the European system we know and study. We then assess how rates of inter- and intra-state war varied across these systems. Our results suggest: (1) It is the nature of hierarchy (not so much anarchy) that varies across these systems; and (2) inter-state wars are more frequent, but less intense, in systems composed of decentralised states.
- Type
- Articles
- Information
- Copyright
- © 2015 British International Studies Association
Footnotes
A previous version of this article was presented at the 2013 ISA Conference in San Francisco. We acknowledge financial support from the National Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, University of Otago, and the Department of Government and International Relations, University of Sydney. We thank Seva Gunitsky, Peter Katzenstein, Andrew Phillips, Jason Sharman, William Thompson, and several anonymous reviewers for their comments and assistance.
References
1 Correlates of War Project, ‘State System Membership List, v2011’ (2011), available at: {http://correlatesofwar.org}.
2 The ISD identifies 96 states that were excluded in COW. Of these, twenty had populations over 500,000 and were presumably excluded because of insufficient diplomatic relations. Most of the remaining 76 appear to have been excluded because of both low diplomatic linkage and because they had populations less than 500,000. See Griffiths, Ryan and Butcher, Charles, ‘Introducing the International System(s) Dataset (ISD), 1816–2011’, International Interactions, 35:5 (2013), pp. 748–768 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
3 Griffiths and Butcher, ‘International System(s) Dataset (ISD)’.
4 Peter Brecke, ‘Violent conflicts 1400 A.D to the present in different regions of the world’, paper prepared for the 1999 Meeting of the Peace Science Society (International) on 8–10 October 1999 in Ann Arbor, Michigan.
5 Correlates of War (2011).
6 Gleditsch, Kristian and Ward, Michael, ‘A revised list of independent states since the congress of Vienna’, International Interactions, 25:4 (1999), pp. 393–413 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Bremer, Stuart and Ghosn, Faten, ‘Defining states: Reconsiderations and recommendations’, Conflict Management and Peace Science, 20:1 (2003), pp. 21–41 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Fazal, Tanisha M., State Death: the Politics and Geography of Conquest, Occupation, and Annexation. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007)Google Scholar. Another critique points to the size inconsistency between the pre-1920 and post-1920 periods. Whereas a 500,000-person threshold was used in the first period, small states can make the cut after 1920 provided they were members of either the League of Nations or the United Nations.
7 Singer, David and Small, Melvin, ‘The composition and status ordering of the international system: 1815–1940’, World Politics, 18:2 (1966), pp. 236–282CrossRefGoogle Scholar, 246.
8 The ISD identifies 363 sovereign states between 1816 and 2011.
9 Both approaches are consistent with the international legal conception of states. The Montevideo Declaration on the Rights and Duties of States declares: ‘The State as a person of international law should possess the following qualifications: (1) a permanent population; (2) a defined territory; (3) Government, and; (4) capacity to enter into relations with other states.’
10 Gleditsch and Ward, ‘Revised list of independent states’; Bremer and Ghosn, ‘Defining states’; Fazal, State Death.
11 Spruyt, Hendrick, The Sovereign State and its Competitors (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994)Google Scholar; Buzan, Barry and Little, Richard, International Systems in World History: Remaking the Study of International Relations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000)Google Scholar; Nexon, Daniel, The Struggle for Power in Early Modern Europe: Religious Conflict, Dynastic Empires, and International Change (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Hui, Victoria Tin-bor, War and State Formation in Ancient China and Early Modern Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Kang, David, East Asia Before the West: Five Centuries of Trade and Tribute (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010)Google Scholar; Phillips, Andrew, War, Religion, and Empire: The Transformation of International Orders (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011)Google Scholar; Ringmar, Erik, ‘Performing international systems: Two East-Asian alternatives to the Westphalian order’, International Organization, 66:1 (2012), pp. 1–26 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Donnelly, Jack, ‘The elements of the structures of international systems’, International Organization, 66:4 (2012), pp. 609–643 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
12 Krasner, Stephen, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Philpott, Daniel, Revolutions in Sovereignty: How Ideas Shape Modern International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001)Google Scholar; Glanville, Luke, ‘The myth of “traditional” sovereignty’, International Studies Quarterly, 57:1 (2013), pp. 79–90CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
13 Vitalis, Robert, ‘The graceful and generous liberal gesture: Making racism invisible in American international relations’, Millennium, 29:2 (2010), pp. 331–356 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Grovogui, Siba, ‘Counterpoints and the imaginaries behind them’, International Political Sociology, 3 (2009), pp. 327–350 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Henderson, Errol, ‘Hidden in plain sight: Racism in international relations theory’, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 26:1 (2013), pp. 71–92CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
14 Little, Buzan and, International Systems, pp. 77–89 Google Scholar.
15 Like COW, we employ a general understanding of the state that can include city-states, empires, federations, nation-states, etc. For a discussion of this view see Tilly, Charles, Coercion, Capital, and European States: AD 990–1992 (Cambridge: Blackwell, 1990)Google Scholar, p. 5.
16 It is also consistent with Fazal, State Death.
17 Gleditsch and Ward, ‘Revised list of independent states’.
18 Little, Buzan and, International Systems, p. 87 Google Scholar.
19 Waltz, Kenneth, Theory of International Politics (Boston: McGraw Hill, 1979)Google Scholar; Buzan, Barry and Little, Richard, ‘Reconceptualising anarchy: Structural realism meets world history’, European Journal of International Relations, 2:4 (1996)CrossRefGoogle Scholar, pp. 403-8; Ruggie, John, Constructing the World Polity (New York: Taylor and Francis Group, 1998)Google Scholar; Wendt, Alexander, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Lake, David, Hierarchy in International Relations (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009)Google Scholar.
20 This is a subtle, but we believe, important modification on the Buzan and Little framework. Structural differentiation in their framework refers to differences in the internal organisation of states across a system. Buzan and Little do not provide close guidance on how to operationalise ‘political organisation’ and we pin it here to the extent to which the centre controls the sovereign functions measured above. Our measure of structural differentiation is best understood as the mean centralisation or decentralisation of political units in a system. From this measure we could also measure the variance, which is closer to the original Buzan and Little conception.
21 See, for example, Herbst, Jeffrey, States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000)Google Scholar.
22 Little, Buzan and, International Systems, p. 80 Google Scholar. This is quite similar to Ruggie’s notion of dynamic density (Ruggie, Constructing the World Polity).
23 Little, Buzan and, International Systems, p. 85 Google Scholar.
24 Jervis, Robert, System Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997)Google Scholar; Gunitsky, Seva, ‘Complexity and theories of change in international politics’, International Theory, 5:1 (2013), pp. 35–63 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
25 See Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States; Hechter, Michael, Containing Nationalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000)Google Scholar; Scott, James, The Art of Not Being Governed: An Anarchist History of Upland Southeast Asia (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009)Google ScholarPubMed. For an alternative view see Gerring, John, Ziblatt, Daniel, Van Gorp, Johan, and Arevalo, Julian, ‘An institutional theory of direct and indirect rule’, World Politics, 63:3 (2011), pp. 377–433 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
26 See Fearon, James, ‘Rationalist explanations for war’, International Organization, 49:3 (1995), pp. 379–414 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Powell, Robert, ‘Bargaining theory and international conflict’, Annual Review of Political Science, 5:1 (2002), pp. 1–30CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Walter, Barbara, ‘Bargaining failures and Civil War’, Annual Review of Political Science, 12:1 (2009), pp. 243–261 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
27 There were 21 sovereign units in West Africa in existence at some point from 1816–1905 in the ISD. Ashanti (1816–96), Dahomey (1820–95), Kaarta (1816–54), Kanem-Bornu (1816–93), the Mandinka Empire (1878–98), Segou (1816–62), Tokolor (1848–93), Sokoto (1816–1903), Yatenga (Mossi) (1816–95), Cayor (1816–59), Saloum, (1816–87), Zinder (1851–89), Massina (1820–65), Fouta Djallon (1816–96), Fouta Toro (1816–88), Funj (1816–11), Benin (1816–92), Fante (1816–44, 1868–74), Oyo (1816–35), and Wadai (1816–1906).
28 Smith, Robert, Warfare and Diplomacy in Pre-Colonial West Africa (Suffolk: Methuen and Co., 1976)Google Scholar.
29 Hiskett, Mervyn, ‘The nineteenth century jihads in West Africa’, in John Flint (ed.), Cambridge History of Africa, Volume 5, from 1790 to 1870 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), pp. 134–135 Google Scholar, 151.
30 Smith, Robert, ‘Peace and palaver: International relations in pre-colonial West Africa’, The Journal of African History, 14:4 (1973), pp. 599–621CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
31 Newbury, C. W., ‘Credit in early nineteenth century West African trade’, The Journal of African History, 13 (1972), pp. 81–95 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
32 Herbst, States and Power.
33 Hiskett, , ‘Jihads in West Africa 1976’, p. 139 Google Scholar.
34 Zahan, Dominique, ‘The Mossi Kingdoms’, in Daryll Forde and P. M. Kaberry (eds), West African Kingdoms in the Nineteenth Century (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967)Google Scholar.
35 Arhin, K. and Ki-Zerbo, J., ‘States and peoples of the Niger Bend and the Volta’, in J. F. Ade Ajayi (ed.), Africa in the Nineteenth Century until the 1880s (Paris: UNESCO, 1989)Google Scholar, p. 667.
36 Batran, A., ‘The nineteenth century Islamic revolutions in West Africa’, in J. F. Ade Ajayi (ed.), Africa in the Nineteenth Century until the 1880s (Paris: UNESCO, 1989)Google Scholar, pp. 541–2.
37 Person, Y., ‘States and peoples of Senegambia and Upper Guinea’, in J. F. Ade Ajayi (ed.), Africa in the Nineteenth Century until the 1880s (Paris: UNESCO, 1989)Google Scholar, p. 646.
38 Herbst, States and Power.
39 These gradations of sovereignty also prevailed in the Islamic empires, which generally established thicker, more centralised bureaucratic structures for religious education and observance. Hiskett, ‘Jihads in West Africa 1976’, p. 149; Last, M., ‘The Sokoto Caliphate and Bornu’, in J. F. Ade Ajayi (ed.), Africa in the Nineteenth Century until the 1880s (Paris: UNESCO, 1989)Google Scholar, p. 580.
40 Hiskett, , ‘Jihads in West Africa 1976’, pp. 153–154 CrossRefGoogle Scholar, 167; Person, , ‘States and peoples’, p. 660 Google Scholar.
41 We identify 18 states in the post-1816 period: Annam (1816–83), Myanmar (1816–85), Siam/Thailand (1816–2011), Kedah (1816–21), Perak (1816–74), Selangor (1816–75), Pahang (1816–74), Johore (1816–85), Terengganu (1816–62), Kelantan (1816–1909), Siak (1816–58), Minangkabau (1816–37), Palembang (1816–23), Benjermassin (1816–60), Karangasem (1816–94), Aceh (1816–74), Sulu (1816–51), and Brunei (1816–88).
42 One possible exception was the Chinese tribute system where regions as distant as Annam, Sulu, and Malacca would send missions to China. See Ringmar, ‘Performing international systems’. Whether this political relationship was truly one of subordination or simple convenience is difficult to say.
43 Scott, Art of Not Being Governed.
44 Ibid., pp. 58–9.
45 Herbst, , States and Power, p. 44 Google Scholar.
46 Scott, , Art of Not Being Governed, p. 61 Google Scholar.
47 Ricklefs, M. C., A History of Modern Indonesia, 1300 to the Present (Hong Kong: The Macmillan Press, 1981), p. 185Google Scholar.
48 Both the COW and ISD registers treat holding companies as extensions of their metropoles, not states.
49 We thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing this out to us.
50 The ISD identifies 28 independent states in South Asia (modern day India, Pakistan, Nepal and Bhutan) that were in existence for some period from 1816–1905. These include Jaipur (1816–18), Jodhpur (1816–18), Udaipur (1816–17), Kotah (1816–18), Bikaner (1816–18), Bharatpur (1816–28), Sirohi (1816–23) Bhopal (1816–17), Cutch (1816), Sawantvadi (1816–38), Khaipur (1816–38), Kalat (1816–76), Swat (1816–96), Dir (1816–96), Kapurthala (1816–26), Bahawalpur (1816–38), Chamba (1816–46), Assam (1816–17), Bhutan (1816–1910), Sikkim (1816–90), Manipur (1816–91), Pune (1816–1917), Gwalior (1816–18), Nagpur (1816–18), Indore (1816–18), Sind (1816–39), Punjab (1816–46), and Nepal (1816–2011).
51 Imperial Gazetteer of India, 12 (1908), p. 424.
52 Ramusack, Barbara, The Indian Princes and Their States (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004)Google Scholar, p. 20.
53 Gordon, Stewart, The Marathas 1600–1818 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 180–182 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
54 Gordon, , The Marathas, p. 191 Google Scholar.
55 Robb, Peter, A History of India (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), pp. 119–121CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
56 Imperial Gazetteer of India, 8 (1908), p. 206; Imperial Gazetteer of India, 13 (1908), p. 386.
57 Ramusack, , The Indian Princes and Their States, p. 47 Google Scholar.
58 Ibid., p. 41; Gordon, , The Marathas, p. 187 Google Scholar.
59 Ramusack, , The Indian Princes and Their States, p. 41 Google Scholar.
60 Gordon, , The Marathas, p. 186 Google Scholar.
61 Ramusack, , The Indian Princes and Their States, p. 43 Google Scholar.
62 Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States; Ramusack, , The Indian Princes and Their States, p. 42 Google Scholar.
63 Gordon, , The Marathas, p, 182 Google Scholar; Robb, , A History of India, pp. 101–102 Google Scholar.
64 For evidence that population density was higher in South Asia than in sub-Saharan Africa, but lower than in Europe, see Herbst, , States and Power, p. 16 Google Scholar.
65 Gordon, , The Marathas, p. 184 Google Scholar.
66 Fearon, ‘Rationalist explanations for war’.
67 Walter, Barbara, Reputation and Civil War: Why Separatist Conflicts Are So Violent (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
68 Gartzke, Erik and Li, Quan, ‘War, peace, and the invisible hand: Positive political externalities of economic globalization’, International Studies Quarterly, 47 (2003), pp. 561–586 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
69 Walter, , ‘Bargaining failures and Civil War’, pp. 251–252 Google Scholar.
70 Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States.
71 Zhang, David, Brecke, Peter, Lee, Harry, He, Yuan-Qing, and Zhang, Jane, ‘Global climate change, war, and population decline in recent human history’, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 104:49 (2007)CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed; Pinker, Steven, The Better Angels of Our Nature: Why Violence Has Declined (New York: Viking, 2011)Google Scholar.
72 The analysis recorded above does not include states that intervened militarily in other civil wars. For the Brecke catalogue especially, it was difficult to code whether interveners were participating in a civil or inter-state war. Brecke, ‘Violent conflicts’.
73 Law, Robin, ‘West African cavalry state: The kingdom of Oyo’, The Journal of African History, 16:1 (1975), pp. 1–15CrossRefGoogle Scholar. This may partly be the case because reliable information on the severity of these conflicts is often not available. It may also be because there has not been a register of states to focus data collection on these regions.
74 Thornton, John, Warfare in Atlantic Africa, 1500–1800 (London: University College London Press, 2002)Google Scholar; Inikori, J. E., ‘The import of firearms into West Africa 1750–1807: a quantitative analysis’, The Journal of African History, 18:3 (1977), pp. 339–368CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Richards, W. A., ‘The import of firearms into West Africa in the eighteenth century’, The Journal of African History, 21:1 (1980), pp. 43–59CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Reid, Richard, Warfare in African History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
75 Scott, , The Art of Not Being Governed, p. 7 Google Scholar.
76 Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States; Spruyt, The Sovereign State and its Competitors; Ruggie, Constructing the World Polity.
- 8
- Cited by