I begin this essay by articulating an argument in support of the claim that theistic citizens ought not to support coercive policies for which they lack an adequate secular rationale. That argument employs various claims regarding God's nature to show: (i) that theistic citizens should expect to discern secular corroboration for each religiously grounded moral truth to which they adhere; and (ii) theistic citizens should doubt any religiously grounded moral claim for which they cannot discern an adequate secular rationale. I dispute both (i) and (ii) and conclude that theistic citizens may reasonably reject the claim that they ought not to support coercive policies for which they lack an adequate secular rationale.

The doctrine that there are no logically necessary connections in nature can be used to support both occasionalism, according to which God alone can be a cause, and ‘anti-occasionalism’, according to which God cannot be a cause. Quentin Smith has recently invoked the ‘no logically necessary connections in nature’ doctrine in support of the latter. I bring two main objections against his thesis that God (logically) cannot be a cause. The first is that there are good reasons to think that there are irreducible dispositions in nature, and that where such dispositions are manifested, there are logically necessary causal connections. The second objection is that even if the ‘no logically necessary connections in nature’ doctrine is true, one is not forced to deny causal efficacy to God: with no breach in logical propriety, one may embrace occasionalism.

The paper has two major parts. The first part articulates a working definition of what is a traditional religious Jew. This includes a discussion of whether it is necessary to have certain beliefs in order to be a religious Jew. Given the definition in the first part, the second part argues that it is rationally defensible for some persons to be traditional religious Jews. Included is a discussion of the notion of rational defensibility. The paper closes by discussing whether different religions can be rationally defensible for different persons.

In his famous Wager, Blaise Pascal attempted to adduce prudential grounds on which to base a belief in God. His argument founders, however, on the notorious ‘Many Gods Problem’ the problem of selecting among the many equi-probable gods on offer. Lycan and Schlesinger try to treat the Many Gods Problem as a problem of empirical over-determination, attempting to overcome it using methodologies familiar from empirical science. I argue that their strategy fails, but that the Many Gods Problem can be solved (or dissolved) nevertheless. The solution I offer both avoids the problem faced by Lycan and Schlesinger, and does so while respecting the original Pascalian intuitions to a greater extent than any solutions thus far proffered.

Many theists have tried to work out coherent accounts of the relationship between God and abstract objects. Some have contended that abstracta depend on God for their existence and nature. Following Christopher Menzel and Thomas Morris, I call such a position, ‘theistic activism’. In this essay, I begin by examining some motivations for holding such a position. Then, I try to make sense of how abstract objects might depend on God. Finally, I object to theistic activism on the grounds that one who holds to it is committed to the claim that God causes himself to exist and causes himself to have such properties as omnipotence and omniscience.

One of Śankara's most fundamental claims is that nirguna brahman, ‘unqualified reality’, is the origin of the world of experience. A serious challenge is posed by the Sānkhyan philosophers in terms of a principle of material causation, that the properties manifested in the effect are inherited from the material cause. Since nirguna brahman and the experienced world are so different, the principle implies that the former cannot be the material cause of the latter. Versions of the principle in relation to alternative kinds of candidates for the role of material cause are discussed, considering the particular cases which motivate both Śankara's and the Sānkhyans' metaphysics alike. Śankara seems forced to accept an implausible version of the principle by his own analysis of material causation.

According to religious pluralism, the profound differences among the chief objects of adoration in the great religious traditions are largely due to the different ways in which a single transcendent reality is experienced and conceived in human life. The most prominent developer and defender of religious pluralism in the twentieth century is John Hick. Hick uses the expression ‘the Real’ to designate the transcendent reality ‘authentically experienced’ as the different gods and impersonal absolutes worshipped in the major religious traditions. A central claim Hick makes is that, apart from some purely formal characteristics, the Real is ineffable in that the intrinsic properties making up its nature are beyond the scope of any human concepts. I explore this central claim and argue that it implies the dubious, if not incoherent, view that the Real in itself has neither one of many pairs of contradictory properties.

Grünbaum claims it is possible that all belief in God is a delusion, meaning a false belief which is engendered by irrational psychological motives. I dispute this on the grounds that in many cases belief in God is engendered by purely cultural factors, and this is incompatible with its being engendered by psychological ones. Grünbaum also claims that saying a culturally engendered belief cannot be a delusion makes social consensus the sole arbiter of reality. I dispute this on the grounds that we can say that socially engendered beliefs fail to be delusions because they fail to meet the psychological criterion, rather than because they are true.

In this paper I contribute to the ongoing debate on hell in three ways: (1) I distinguish between three questions that play a key role in any discussion of the doctrine of hell; (2) I argue positively for the need of a doctrine of hell for Christian theism; (3) after evaluating several theological positions, I argue that the doctrine of hell should be construed as intrinsically bound up with the Christian conviction that God is love and wants to live with human beings in a relationship of mutual love and fellowship. From this perspective on hell I provide some fresh criticisms on the positions of John Hick, Thomas Talbott, and Charles Seymour.

Since theistic faith involves the notion of God as personally agential and since it faces difficulties in establishing its credibility in view both of problems in warrantably ascribing natural, historical and personal states to divine activity and of the counterevidence of evil, this paper takes up the story of a quadriplegic patient and certain remarks by Whitehead and Hartshorne to explore the viability of a concept of divine activity that is non-coercive but significant. In order to develop this concept of God's agency and to warrant its credibility, the essential kenoticism of the divine is also discussed.

An argument is given showing that, on the assumptions of Molinism, human beings must bring about the truth of the counterfactuals of freedom that govern their actions. But, it is claimed, it is impossible for humans to do this, and so Molinism is involved in a contradiction. The Molinist must maintain, on the contrary, that we can indeed bring about the truth of counterfactuals of freedom about us. This question turns out to depend on whether the counterfactuals of freedom are, or are entailed by, part of the causal history of the world. A further argument is given that these counterfactuals are entailed by events intrinsic to the world's history. If this is so, then we cannot bring about the truth of these counterfactuals; the anti-Molinist argument succeeds, and Molinism is refuted.

The standard reading of Kant presumes that ‘the moral hypothesis’ is a necessary and sufficient condition for understanding his philosophy of religion. This paper opens with the assumption – taken from one of Kant's last works – that philosophy and theology must always remain in conflict. Then, by way of an abductive comparison of the positions of Ronald M. Green and John Hick, I demonstrate that the moral hypothesis leads to religious compromises that contradict this assumption. To conclude, I argue that the motif of transformation is syptomatic of the underlying problem and suggest that it be replaced by the motif of transition.

We present a valid deductive cosmological argument for the necessary existence of a powerful and intelligent creator of the actual universe. Whereas traditional cosmological arguments had to employ a strong version of the principle of sufficient reason that held that every fact actually has an explanation, our argument can make do with the weak version of Duns Scotus according to which every fact possibly has an explanation. As a result, our argument is less vulnerable to the charge of begging the question than are these traditional cosmological arguments.

John Taylor complains that the Kalam cosmological argument gives the appearance of being a swift and simple demonstration of the existence of a Creator of the universe, whereas in fact a convincing argument involving the premiss that the universe began to exist is very difficult to achieve. But Taylor's proffered defeaters of the premisses of the philosophical arguments for the beginning of the universe are themselves typically undercut due to Taylor's inadvertence to alternatives open to the defender of the Kalam arguments. With respect to empirical confirmation of the universe's beginning Taylor is forced into an anti-realist position on the Big Bang theory, but without sufficient warrant for singling out the theory as non-realistic. Therefore, despite the virtue of simplicity of form, the Kalam cosmological argument has not been defeated by Taylor's all too swift refutation.

This paper argues that William Hasker's ‘A new anti-Molinist argument’ offers a fascinating but ultimately unsuccessful new instalment in his continuing campaign to discredit the picture of providence based on the theory of middle knowledge. It is first shown that Hasker's argument, though suffering from a seemingly irreparable logical gap, does nicely highlight a significant (and hitherto unduly underemphasized) point of contention between Molinists and anti-Molinists – the question whether or not Molinists are committed to viewing counterfactuals of creaturely freedom as part of the history of the world. Hasker's argument that they are so committed is shown to be lacking, for that argument depends upon a premise against which several contemporary Molinists have already presented independent arguments. Furthermore, the premise is not one which, on reflection, many traditional Christians could easily accept. Hence, Hasker's argument fails. It may remind us that some of the things Molinists are led to say are surprising, but it by no means shows that those surprising consequences make the view unworthy of our allegiance.

The quantitative argument against the notion of a best possible world claims that, no matter how many worthwhile lives a world contains, another world contains more and is, other things being equal, better. Parfit's ‘Mere Addition Paradox’ suggests that defenders of this argument must accept his ‘Repugnant Conclusion’: that outcomes containing billions upon billions of lives barely worth living are better than outcomes containing fewer lives of higher quality. Several responses to the Paradox are discussed and rejected as either inadequate or unavailable in a theistic context. The quantitative argument fails if some world is such that addition to it is not possible, i.e., if it is intensively infinite, as Liebniz claimed. If the notion of such a world is incoherent, then no world is quantitatively best and the quantitative argument succeeds, but only at the cost of embracing the Repugnant Conclusion.

Divine commands are typically held, by theists, to be made not only at the foundations of morality, but also in an ‘everyday’ setting, when there are already moral considerations applicable to the addressee(s). My aim is to show how a particular command could relate to these pre-existing moral considerations, if it is more than just a repetition of them. If it is right that an action be obligatory, wrong or supererogatory, why would God want to change its status? Anyone can make a normative difference by giving information, making co-ordination proposals, or transferring rights, and it is clear why these actions will sometimes by worthwhile. The problem must be focused on when God makes a moral difference directly, using a ‘special moral authority’, when His commands are efficacious qua commands. Using this authority, God can perfect imperfect duties, which may make it easier to carry them out. He can extend duties, to make sure more value is produced. He can allocate sacrifices, which can be carried by anyone. And He can resolve conflict games, to everyone's benefit. This explains why God should issue commands in the way that theists typically represent him as doing.

I show that if the ontological argument is sound, it proves that a number of maximally great beings must exist. I show that maximal greatness does not imply uniqueness, that such beings can be omnipotent and yet not restrict each other's power, and that each must have its own separate stream of consciousness. I also show that attempts to unify the beings by unifying the streams of consciousness leads to a form of pantheism.

Eleonore Stump develops and defends a theodicy of redemptive suffering. In particular, God's permission of suffering (at least some classes, if not instances, of serious undeserved, involuntary suffering due to natural or free causes) is justified just in case it benefits those who suffer, it is the best possible means in the circumstances for their benefit, and God knows this is the case. The main aim of this paper is to show that for Stump's theodicy to have a good chance of working, it is reasonable to think that it requires the Molinist claim that God has middle knowledge.

James Keller recently argued that miracles in the sense of divine intervention are immoral because in such acts God would unfairly choose to help the beneficiary of the miracle over others who may be equally in need and just as deserving. I respond generally by arguing that his analysis overlooks the possibility that those who do not receive the miraculous intervention may receive other benefits of equal or greater value and that there may be purposes for miraculous intervention which transcend individual benefit. More specifically, I argue that Keller's understanding of miracles does not accommodate the Christian doctrine of grace, that he does not come to grips with the evangelical purpose of miracles depicted in Christian apologetics, that his view of the context in which miracles occur is abstract and sterile in light of charismatic experience, and finally that his argument leads to the counterintuitive conclusion that the Resurrection of Christ is somehow immoral. In the light of these considerations, I argue that miracles are not immoral.