Despite the title, I do not intend to launch another expedition into the domain of epistemology. I wish instead to call attention to some problems which have arisen for philosophical theologians and philosophers of religion, as a result of two facts about the development of modern philosophy and its bearing on the analysis and interpretation of religious insight. Following these considerations, I shall propose in brief compass a programme for the future which I believe will prove fruitful for the philosophical treatment of religious concerns.

Debate continues to rage among philosophers of religion over Anthony Flew's famous little paper ‘Theology and Falsification’ and the responses it provoked, most notably R. M. Hare's response that religious claims are in no way like scientific hypotheses. For now, twenty years later, we still find many theists taking a similar tack to Hare's. A particularly interesting example is J. F. Miller in Religious Studies, 1969, who replies to Flew that propositions like ‘God loves mankind’ cannot be subject to falsifiability conditions because they are used as claims expressing ‘religious first-order principles of the Judaeo-Christian Weltanschauung and as such are not amenable to falsification’ (p. 50). Miller seems to put his faith in some kind of great gulf fixed between what he would consider decently falsifiable scientific hypotheses and what he takes to be unfalsifiable first-order principles both of theology and of contemporary science. In what follows we will try to sketch a more rational strategy for modern believers of a liberal empiricist type, for those whose interest in appealing and deferring to experience includes but is not restricted to so-called ‘sense experience’. This will involve accepting analogies between theological statements and so-called hypotheses, insofar as the latter are propositions held and put forward in a somewhat tentative spirit with a view to explaining what we experience.

For Ian Ramsey, talk about God raises many philosophical problems:

‘If we are not to use anthropomorphic concepts like love, power, wisdom, we cannot talk about God; but if we do use them, how do we manage to talk of God and not man?’ (MJGC152)

‘Believers wish on the one hand to claim that he (God) is indescribable and ineffable, and yet on the other hand to talk a great deal about him. Nay more, when they speak of God they say that he is transcendent and immanent, im passible yet loving, and so on. But if we speak like this, are we talking significantly at all? Here is the Falsification Problem: What kind of talk can this talk about God be, if it permits us to use such conflicting descriptions of God and to continue to use these descriptions in the face of any and all empirical phenomena?’ (RL 13–14).

Buddhist teaching about illusion is, I think, generally considered difficult to understand. What I wish to do is to try to indicate some of its more general and prevalent features with the further aim of using them to throw some light on typical Buddhist method and procedure. I shall be concerned mainly with some of the teachings to be found in the Mahayana and will try to be as untechnical as possible. This latter is sure to be displeasing to some, but I have no wish to induce intellectual paralysis either in the reader or myself by a parade of technicalities most of which are not properly translatable into English. A great deal of scholarly and technical work has already been done and now it seems to me important to try as much as possible to express the general sense or pattern or at least some of its features in terms of our own more natural modes of thought and speech. This is what I have tried to do. I should point out that when dealing with the teaching about illusion we are concerned with only the more austere intellectual side of Buddhism. Nevertheless the religious philosophising which we encounter is as much a part of religious practice as meditation and expressing reverence and respect for the Buddha. I have confined myself throughout to exposition and have not attempted discussion and evaluation. References given are to books which are for the most part easily available in English. I will begin with three quotations.

The ‘death of self’ appears to be an essential feature of the redemptive goal on which several religious quests converge. It would seem, therefore, that here lies a convenient pragmatic criterion to determine the efficacy of the various religions in achieving their desired ends, and one which would be valid in several religious traditions, thereby overcoming the impasse of particularity in inter-faith discussion.