There are certain primary religious beliefs which are basic to a whole religious Weltanschauung, for they are the cornerstone of the whole edifice. If these beliefs are unintelligible, incoherent, irrational or false the whole way-of-life, centering around them, is ‘a house of cards’. Certain segments of it may still be seen to have a value when viewed from some other perspective, but if these primary religious belief are faulted, the religious Weltanschauung itself has been undermined. If it has been undermined and if people recognise that it has been undermined and still go around believing in it, accepting and acting in accordance with its tenents, they are then being very irrational. And while in humility we should recognise that we all suffer from propensities to irrationality and perhaps in some spheres of our life can't help being irrational, it is a propensity we should resist, for to be irrational is to do something we ought not to do.

Many philosophers and philosophically oriented theologians hold that it is unreasonable to treat the statement ‘There is a God’ as analytic or logically true. As an existential statement, they argue, it is no different from any statement of its kind. Existential statements cannot be analytic, because contra-existential statements cannot be contradictory. (Notice, however, that existential statements can be contradictory, and contra-existential statements can be analytic.) To say, for example, that unicorns do not exist is simply to say that no entity satisfies the description ‘unicorn’. But this cannot be complex in the sense of entailing two contradictory statements. If so, then the existential statement corresponding to it cannot be analytic. In general, since no contra-existential statement can be contradictory, no existential statement can be analytic.

Recent defenders of the cognitive significance of religious language have had to face opponents from two directions; from those who demand that religious language be capable of some form of empirical verification (or falsification) and from those who demand that for religious language to be meaningful it must be capable of being understood in ordinary language. Apologists who have taken the first challenge seriously have strained to show that religious statements can be verified by ‘religious experience’, or by an ‘odd discernment’ or by an ‘eschatological verification’. Each of these responses raises further problems for the defender of religion, but in general they all are subject to their failure to provide an adequate criterion or standard by which they could be inter-subjectively tested. Facing in the other direction, theological apologists have attempted to justify religious expressions by showing that they could be subsumed under special categories of ordinary language; namely those of ‘convictional language’ and ‘performative language’. Although these defenders have shown that religious language has an ‘ordinary usage’, they have not shown that the cognitive elements of this usage can be reduced to the ‘use of ordinary language’.

In the opening sections of his Brahma-sutra-bhasya, Ramanuja makes a very forceful assault on Sankara's Advaita theory. This assault anticipates in a striking way modern western attacks on metaphysical religious positions, attacks which stem from Hume and are associated today with names like A. J. Ayer and Antony Flew. In this paper I wish to argue that certain aspects of Sankara's position, as enunciated in his Brahma-sutra-bhasya, suggest that Ramanunja's assault, and therefore by implication a modern western attack on Sankara also, depends for its success on a misinterpretation of Sankara's views. I wish then to suggest a possible alternative interpretation of Sankara's Advaita in terms viable for today, drawing, though indirectly, on such writers as R. B. Braithwaite and R. M. Hare. An incidental implication of this paper is that these two philosophers of religion would meet less opposition from the religious if they were Hindu rather than Christian! A more important implication is that light could be thrown on the present religious controversy in the west by a study of Indian philosophy of religion, if only we were more disposed to treat it as a living tradition which might teach us something, rather than as an antique.

So presumptuous a title calls for some justification. Christology has never ceased to puzzle and to perplex the minds of Christians from earliest times. It would be outrageous to assert that because something in the realm of theology remains mysterious it must for that reason alone be being misunderstood. Nevertheless modern historical thought has posed the problem of the intelligibility of traditional Christology in a particularly acute way and this fact places an obligation upon Christians to ask once again whether it is unmistakably clear that their Christological beliefs do represent the faithful response to a mystery and are not the outcome of some mistake.

‘There is nothing more negative than the result of the critical study of the Life of Jesus’, wrote Schweitzer at the end of The Quest of the Historical Jesus. The subsequent history of Gospel research in Germany was to reinforce this judgement beyond its author's expectations. The signpost to the future turned out to be Wrede's book on The Messianic Secret in the Gospels which had appeared five years earlier on the same day in 1901 as Schweitzer's own Mystery of the Kingdom of God, and which is still the classical example of redactional criticism of the gospels. Schweitzer's final alternative: either consistent eschatology or thoroughgoing scepticism proved to be unnecessary. Both won and took prizes. But whereas Schweitzer has slain his thousands, Wrede has slain his ten-thousands.

The form of this paper is unconventional. Just as composers sometimes want a change from the traditional sonata form and write a movement in the form of theme and variations, so I would like to depart from the orthodox form of philosophical paper, which contains a closely reasoned discussion of some particular problem, by stating a theme which will be a principle of pure logic, then sketching a number of applications of it in different areas of philosophy. But the variations on my theme will not be entirely disconnected with each other, for I suspect that it is a theme which could have especially important applications in philosophical theology. So my later variations on it will be increasingly oriented to concepts of God, and I will close with a coda which will consist of some controversial remarks about the controversial concept of transcendence.