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Whither philosophy of religion?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 August 2015

BRIAN LEFTOW ,
PAMELA SUE ANDERSON  and
J. L. SCHELLENBERG
BRIAN LEFTOW
Affiliation:
Oriel College, Oxford, OX1 4EW, UK e-mail: [email protected]
PAMELA SUE ANDERSON
Affiliation:
Regents Park College, Oxford, OX1 2LB, UK e-mail: [email protected]
J. L. SCHELLENBERG
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Mount Saint Vincent University, Halifax, Nova Scotia, B3M 2J6, Canada e-mail: [email protected]
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Extract

The post-war expansion of university faculties climaxed in the early 1970s. Since then, there have been more professional philosophers than ever before in history: a startling claim, but sober truth. In analytic philosophy, they have worked with more rigour and better training than even the Scholastics. It would take a surprising lack of talent among us, or perhaps argue some deep defect in the questions we ask, if the result were not more progress in philosophy than most periods can boast. And in fact, those who know what progress in philosophy looks like can see a lot of it: just compare Malcolm's 1960 piece on the ontological argument with Plantinga's 1974 treatment in The Nature of Necessity, and then both with Oppy's book on the subject.

Type
Articles
Information
Religious Studies , Volume 51 , Special Issue 3: Religious Studies at 50 , September 2015 , pp. 441 - 454
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2015 

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