Published online by Cambridge University Press: 16 August 2010
Many authors claim that certain Indian (Hindu) texts and traditions deny that nature has intrinsic value. If nature has value at all, it has value only as a means to mokṣa (liberation). This view is implausible as an interpretation of any Indian tradition that accepts the doctrines of ahiṃsā (non-harm) and karma. The proponent must explain the connection between ahiṃsā and merit by citing the connection between ahiṃsā and mokṣa: ahiṃsā is valuable, and therefore produces merit, because ahiṃsā is instrumentally valuable as a means to mokṣa. Ahiṃsā is a means to mokṣa, however, because it produces merit. Hence the explanation is circular. Additionally, this view entails that morality is strictly arbitrary – it might just as well be that hiṃsā (harm) produces merit, and ahiṃsā produces demerit. An alternative interpretation that avoids these problems states that the value of ahiṃsā derives from the intrinsic value of the unharmed entities.