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The uncanny accuracy of God's mathematical beliefs

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  04 June 2019

ROBERT KNOWLES Open the ORCID record for ROBERT KNOWLES [Opens in a new window]
ROBERT KNOWLES*
Affiliation:
School of Philosophy, Religion, and History of Science, University of Leeds, Leeds, LS2 9JT, UK
*
e-mail: [email protected]
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Abstract

I show how mathematical platonism combined with belief in the God of classical theism can respond to Field's epistemological objection. I defend an account of divine mathematical knowledge by showing that it falls out of an independently motivated general account of divine knowledge. I use this to explain the accuracy of God's mathematical beliefs, which in turn explains the accuracy of our own. My arguments provide good news for theistic platonists, while also shedding new light on Field's influential objection.

Type
Original Article
Information
Religious Studies , Volume 57 , Issue 2 , June 2021 , pp. 333 - 352
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Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2019

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