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Two Views of Religious Certitude

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 October 2008

Stephen Maitzen
Affiliation:
Sage School of Philosophy, Cornell University, Ithaca, N.y. 14853

Extract

At least since Cardinal Newman's Grammar of Assent (1870), Anglo-American philosophers have been concerned with the role of certitude, or subjective epistemic certainty, in theistic belief. Newman is himself famous for holding that certitude is an essential feature of any sort of genuine belief, including in particular religious belief. As one recent commentator, Michael Banner, notes, for Newman

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1992

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References

REFERENCES

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