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Tough choices still

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 August 2015

TOMIS KAPITAN
TOMIS KAPITAN*
Affiliation:
Northern Illinois University, DeKalb, IL 60115, USA e-mail: [email protected]
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Abstract

Some argue that an omniprescient being cannot choose between mutually exclusive actions none of which is known to be uniquely reasonable. The view assumes that faced with such a choice one must believe each alternative to be epistemically possible, thereby precluding foreknowledge of what one will do. E. J. Coffman (2011) has challenged this assumption, but I argue that not only does he fail to undermine it, there are independent reasons why choice – and intentional agency generally – entails a presumption of epistemic possibility. The apparent incompatibility between omniprescience and intentional agency continues to pose a tough choice for theists.

Type
Articles
Information
Religious Studies , Volume 51 , Special Issue 3: Religious Studies at 50 , September 2015 , pp. 421 - 429
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2015 

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