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Time and Foreknowledge: a Critique of Zagzebski

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 October 2008

L. Nathan Oaklander
L. Nathan Oaklander
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, The University of Michigan-Flint, Flint, Michigan 48502-2186
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Extract

One problem facing those who attempt to reconcile divine foreknowledge with human freedom is to explain how a temporal God can have knowledge of the future, if the future does not exist. In her recent book, The Dilemma of Freedom and Foreknowledge, Linda Zagzebski attempts to provide an explanation by making use of a fourdimensional model in which the past, present and future exist. In this note I argue that the model Zagzebski offers to support the coplausibility of divine foreknowledge and human freedom is inconsistent with the A-theory of time she propounds.

Type
Research Article
Information
Religious Studies , Volume 31 , Issue 1 , March 1995 , pp. 101 - 103
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1995

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References

1 Zagzebski, Linda Trinkaus, God, Time and Foreknowledge, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991).Google Scholar All page references will be to this book.