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Theism, Evil and the Onus of Proof – Reply to F. J. Fitzpatrick

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 October 2008

David O' Connor
David O' Connor
Affiliation:
Professor of Philosophy, Seton Hall University
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Extract

The theism which I consider in this paper is one which affirms each of the three following propositions: ‘God exists’, ‘Omnipotence, omniscience and moral perfection are all defining traits of God’ and ‘Evil exists in the world’. I will not be concerned at all with any variety of theism which might deny the truth of any of the foregoing propositions. Broadly put, my concern, therefore, is with orthodox, traditional theism.

Type
Articles
Information
Religious Studies , Volume 19 , Issue 2 , June 1983 , pp. 241 - 247
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1983

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References

page 242 note 1 Religious Studies, XVII (1981), 19–38.Google Scholar All page references to this article will be given, within parentheses, in my text.

page 242 note 2 Fitzpatrick's claim that necessity and possibility ought not to be equated with logical necessity and possibility is not relevant to, and hence neither affirmed nor deniedby, my use of logical possibility in this paper. See op. cit. p. 24, note 3 (2).Google Scholar

page 245 note 1 ‘(The theist) is under no obligation to show that the necessary conditions obtain…’ (27). Even if philosophical argumentation could, as it seems to me it cannot, establish the existence of things, the atheistic challenge here does not depend for its success on theism's failing to meet the demand for such a proof. This I will show a little later when contrasting proving something with providing good reason for accepting it.