^{page 105 note 1} ‘Omnipresence and Incorporeality’, Religious Studies XIII (1977)Google Scholar, and ‘On Worshipping an Embodied God’, Canadian Journal of Philosophy XIII (1978).Google Scholar

^{page 105 note 2} ‘On Worshipping an Embodied God’, p. 511, n. 2.

^{page 105 note 3} ‘Omnipresence and Incorporeality’, p. 85.

^{page 105 note 4} ‘On Worshipping an Embodied God’, p. 515.

^{page 106 note 1} Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, n.s. 74, p. 36.

^{page 106 note 2} Ibid. pp. 36–42.

^{page 106 note 3} Ibid. p. 41.

^{page 106 note 4} Ibid. p. 44

^{page 106 note 5} Harrison states his purpose as a proposal ‘to defend the view…that people do not need to have bodies (though they may need to be embodied), that is, that it is not logically necessary that people have bodies’ (Ibid. p. 44).

^{page 107 note 1} Ibid. pp. 54–5.

^{page 107 note 2} In ‘On Worshipping an Embodied God’, Jantzen discusses ‘presence’ only in one paragraph (518). But she refers to her discussion on the subject in ‘Omnipresence and Incorporeality’, which constitutes the bulk of that article (86–91). And her conclusion there emphasizes both my points. She writes, ‘This paper has been designed to show that the notion that an embodied being cannot be everywhere is ambiguous between “His body is not everywhere”, which is true but harmless, and “He is not everywhere” which is not necessarily true unless it is the case that one is present only inside one's own skin’ (90–1). The ‘true but harmless’ alternative (‘His by is not everywhere’) equates ‘embodiment’ with ‘having a body’, whereas the ‘not necessarily true unless’ alternative (‘He is not everywhere’) places the whole burden of her proof on her analysis of ‘presence’.

Another, quite disparate, source of material that Jantzen could have used to strengthen her arguments about omnipresence (one which fits very nicely with Harrison's views about embodiment, incidentally) is the Heideggerian notion of Dasein, thought of a ‘a field of being’. Along such lines, God would be the being ‘spread over a field or region which is the world of its care and concern [i.e., everywhere, for God]…[who] secretly hears his own name called whenever he hears any region of Being named with which he is vitally involved’. ( Barrett, W., Irrational Man [Garden City: Doubleday, 1962], pp. 217, 219Google Scholar, q.v.).

^{page 107 note 3} ‘On Worshipping an Embodied God’, 512.

^{page 107 note 4} Ibid. p. 513 (italics in original).

^{page 107 note 5} ‘Some remarks on the independence of morality from religion’, Mind, LXX (1961)Google Scholar, reprinted in Frankena, W. K. and Granrose, J. T., eds., Introductory Readings in Ethics (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1974), p. 111.Google Scholar

^{page 108 note 1} ‘On Worshipping an Embodied God’, p. 513.

^{page 108 note 2} Ibid. p. 515.

^{page 108 note 3} See e.g. Ibid. pp. 514, 515.

^{page 108 note 4} Ibid. pp. 517–18. Omnipresence is claimed to be closely connected with God's ability to show ‘love and care for all people simultaneously’ (Ibid. p. 518). (See also ‘Omnipresence and Incorporeality’, p. 91, for another claim that embodiment does not effect any limitation on omnipresence.) All these characteristics of God are assumed to be reflected in (to follow from?) her ‘three features’ of worthiness of worship. But, clearly, one could accept these qualities of God (and/or others) without accepting any of her claims about the ‘three features of the activity of worship…which would offer a moral justification of worship’.

^{page 108 note 5} ‘On Worshipping an Embodied God’, p. 519.