^{page 181 note 1} The Philosophy of Martin Buber. Ed. by Paul, A. Schilpp. (La Salle; Illinois: Open Court, and London:Cambridge University Press, 1967), p. 210. References are to this book unless otherwise indicated.Google Scholar

^{page 182 note 1} p. 179.

^{page 182 note 2} p. 700.

^{page 182 note 3} Eclipse of God, Studies in the Relation between Religion and Philosophy. Trans. by Friedman, Maurice S., et al. (New York: Harper & Bros., London: Gollancz, 1953), p. 152. The affinity of all such language with that of Tillich's, Nygren's, and other religious ethicists is too evident to require documentation.Google Scholar

^{page 183 note 1} pp. 718–19. Buber's sensitivity at these points is evident from his, for him very unusual, severity, even sarcasm; he repeatedly calls Fox his ‘opponent’.

^{page 183 note 2} Ethics in A Christian Context (New York: Harper & Row, 1963), pp. 272 and passim. I cite Herbert Lehmann's claim because there are several instructive parallels between these Jewish and Protestant thinkers, e.g. their anti-principle, anti-system contextualism, their highly inter-personal stress, their over-all existential stance, and others.Google Scholar

^{page 184 note 1} The Theological Frontier of Ethics. (London: Allen and Unwin, 1961.)Google Scholar

^{page 185 note 1} See page 182. It should be noted that unlike Kierkegaard and many other existentialists, Buber, as Maurice Friedman documents, rejects the attempt to use the (unique) ethical-religious situation of Abraham as a type or symbol of any ‘Knight of faith’ who must decide what or who the ‘Isaac’ is that God wants him to sacrifice. In one sense, then, there are no ethical absolutes except, of course, the one of obedience.

^{page 185 note 2} Between Man and Man. Trans. by Ronald, Gregor Smith. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1955), p. 69.Google Scholar

^{page 185 note 3} p. 159.

^{page 185 note 4} There is in Buber, as in Karl Barth and many others, the implication, if not the assumption, that religious ethics possesses a method different from and superior to philosophical ethics. The present study exhibits the very doubtful nature of such claims. Much of the ambiguity and confusion in Buber's, and theological ethics generally, is traceable to the failure to employ the method of critical, rational thinking appropriate to any ethical analysis. Indeed, a candidate for study is the question of the meaning and propriety of speaking of ‘religious ethics’ and ‘Christian ethics’ at all.

^{page 185 note 5} p. 155

^{page 186 note 1} There is so considerable a literature on this issue, both in philosophical and theological journals and in books, that attention may be called only to some of the more recent writing. DrEwing's, splendid piece cited above appears under the title ‘The Autonomy of Ethics’, Ch. II of Prospect for Metaphysics, edited by Ramsey, Ian (New York: Philosophical Library, 1961)Google Scholar. More recently the same editor has published, Christian Ethics and Contemporary Philosophy (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1966), which bristles with religionists' claims and philosophers' criticismsGoogle Scholar. Kai, Nielsen, among others, has repeatedly argued against religious ethics, as in the above-mentioned book and in Theology Today. See ‘God and the Good: Does Morality Need Religion?’ (Vol. xxi, No. 1, April, 1964, pp. 47–58)Google Scholar. See also ‘The Religious Morality of Mr Patterson Brown’, Mind, Vol. lxxiv No. 296 pp. 578–81 by Anthony Flew.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

^{page 186 note 2} P. 58.

^{page 187 note 1} For example, Tillich, says, only such an ontologically grounded ethics makes ‘the ethical commandment … obligatory and its denial self destructive’, op. cit., Love, Power and Justice. Buber is in full agreement with Tillich on this score. In the Foreword to Good and Evil, Buber says that the content of this book is ‘to be regarded as a contribution to the foundation of an ontological ethics’. (New York: Chas. Scribner's Sons, 1953).Google Scholar

^{page 187 note 2} See: Frankena, William: Ethics (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1963), p. 85, and Chapter 6.Google Scholar

^{page 188 note 1} See: ‘Modern Moral Philosophy’, Philosophy, 33 January 1958. The above statement does not say that a Divine Command or Will of God morality may not, for many people, have a psychological power, motivating them to right action, and the like. It may have that force, and many religionists have argued that such a reinforcement of one's sense of duty is a prerequisite of effective morality. That, however, is quite another matter. What is at issue here is the claim that a Divine Law notion is the necessary context for moral discourse.Google Scholar

^{page 188 note 2} Love, Power and Justice (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1954) p. 76. Italics mineGoogle Scholar. See also, Tillich's, Morality and Beyond (New York: Harper & Row, 1963).Google Scholar

^{page 189 note 1} p. 717.

^{page 189 note 2} Between Man and Man, p. 69.Google Scholar

^{page 189 note 3} p. 718

^{page 189 note 4} p. 722. Philosophers, it might be noted, have not found principles to be ‘simple and plain’, but perhaps it is their perverseness which has led them to wrestle with the ambiguities and confusions they discovered in much talk about benevolence, justice, equality, and even ‘love’.

^{page 190 note 1} From, Hasidism, p. 135, quoted by Fox, Marvin, p. 158. Italics mine.Google Scholar

^{page 190 note 2} p. 719.

^{page 190 note 3} p. 719.

^{page 190 note 4} Morris Cohen rightly argued, speaking of the same problem in the field of law: if we claimed ‘every case is unique’ the results would be disastrous. There never would be a case to which a law, i.e., a general rule, could be said to apply.

^{page 191 note 1} He says that Judaism ‘is the strongest witness for the primacy of the dialectical that is known to me’, p. 744., and it may be that his belief in the necessity of the Judaic approach is the backbone of and the controlling insight in all he has written.Google Scholar

^{page 192 note 1} Critical Introduction to Ethics. (N.Y.: Odyssey Press, 1961), p. 39Google Scholar. See also the excellent discussion by Hospers, John in Human Conduct. (New York Harcourt, Brace and World, 1961), pp. 34–9.Google Scholar

^{page 192 note 2} Deeds and Rules in Christian Ethics. (London: Oliver & Boyd, 1965), p. 4.Google Scholar

^{page 192 note 3} p. 699.

^{page 193 note 1} p. 203.

^{page 193 note 2} PP. 697; 699.

^{page 193 note 3} In a review of Friedman's, Maurice, Martin Buber: The Life of Dialogue (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1956), Reinhold Niebuhr wrote, ‘Buber is no pacifist or utopian, but his thought clearly reveals that his approach is too personal to do justice to the collective problems of modern man.’ The review was generally favorable both to Buber's thought and to Prof. Friedman's interpretation. Niebuhr's criticism is important because of the strength of Niebuhr's statement and be cause it underscores the specific criticism voiced here.Google Scholar

^{page 194 note 1} Dictionary of Christian Ethics. Ed., Macquarrie, John. (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1967), p. 72Google Scholar, Lehmann, Paul. See also, Lehmann's Ethics In A Christian Context (New York: Harper & Row 1963).Google Scholar

^{page 194 note 2} Ibid., p. 73. Italics mine.