Hostname: page-component-586b7cd67f-dsjbd Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-28T11:13:57.305Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Schellenberg on divine hiddenness and religious scepticism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 February 2010

MARK L. McCREARY
MARK L. McCREARY*
Affiliation:
Philosophy Department, Loyola University of Chicago, 1032 W. Sheridan Road, Chicago, IL60626
*
e-mail: [email protected]
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

J. L. Schellenberg has constructed major arguments for atheism based on divine hiddenness in two separate works. This paper reviews these arguments and highlights how they are grounded in reflections on perfect divine love. However, Schellenberg also defends what he calls the ‘subject mode’ of religious scepticism. I argue that if one accepts Schellenberg's scepticism, then the foundation of his divine-hiddenness arguments is undermined by calling into question some of his conclusions regarding perfect divine love. In other words, if his scepticism is correct, then Schellenberg's case for atheism cannot stand. Finally, I demonstrate how my argument avoids the many defences that Schellenberg has employed thus far in defending these particular atheistic arguments.

Type
Articles
Information
Religious Studies , Volume 46 , Issue 2 , June 2010 , pp. 207 - 225
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2010

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Notes

1. J. L. Schellenberg Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason (Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press, 1993); idem The Wisdom to Doubt: A Justification of Religious Skepticism (Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press, 2007). All in-text references are to these works.

2. Regarding this shift in terminology to the phrase ‘non-resistant nonbelief’; see WD, 205.

3. Note that the following propositions are not Schellenberg's own words, but rather are the result of what Schellenberg affirms.

4. As explained above, it is premise (2) that is crucial in the argument developed in DH and it is premise (1) that is similarly critical in the argument developed in WD.

5. Note that this does not commit me to say that if Schellenberg drops the subject mode of religious scepticism then he would, in fact, have conclusive proof for God's nonexistence based on non-resistant or reasonable non-belief. It simply means that he cannot have such proof while also maintaining his sceptical position.

6. Among these essays and articles by Schellenberg are the following: ‘Divine hiddenness justifies atheism’, in Michael L. Peterson & Raymond J. VanArragon (eds) Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Religion (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2004), 30–41; ‘What the hiddenness of God reveals: a collaborative discussion’, in Daniel Howard-Snyder and Paul K. Moser (eds) Divine Hiddenness: New Essays (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 33–61; ‘“Breaking down the walls that divide”: virtue and warrant, belief and nonbelief’, Faith and Philosophy, 21 (2004), 195–213; ‘The hiddenness argument revisited (I)’, Religious Studies, 41 (2005), 201–215; ‘The hiddenness argument revisited (II)’, Religious Studies, 41 (2005), 287–303; ‘Response to Howard-Snyder’, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 26 (1996), 455–462; ‘On reasonable nonbelief and perfect love: replies to Henry and Lehe’, Faith and Philosophy, 22 (2005), 330–342.

7. Cf. WD, 44–45, where he implies that the need to put forward an argument at all is itself proof that the case at hand is non-clear.

8. P1 states: ‘If God exists and is perfectly loving, then for any human subject S and time t, if S is at t capable of relating personally to God, S at t is in a position to do so (i.e., can at t do so just by choosing to), except insofar as S is culpably in a contrary position at t’.

9. P2 states: ‘If God exists and is perfectly loving, then for any human subject S at time t, if S is at t capable of relating personally to God, S at t believes that God exists, except insofar as S is culpably in a contrary position at t’.

10. P2′ states: ‘If God exists and is perfectly loving, then for any human subject S at time t, if S is at t capable of relating personally to God, S at t believes that G on the basis of evidence that renders G probable, except insofar as S is culpably in a contrary position at t’. (Note that G stands for belief in the existence of God.)

11. Someone may point out that Schellenberg is arguing for what are, on his view, necessary truths. This objection may claim that if Schellenberg presents compelling arguments that these truths are necessary then they should be regarded as a clear case. It is true that Schellenberg presents his conclusions as ‘necessary truths … that we are only now discovering’ (WD, 196). However, nowhere does Schellenberg say that all necessary truths are clear cases. In fact, the very fact that he is ‘only now discovering’ them strongly suggests the opposite, that they are non-clear cases.

12. Schellenberg refers to his own approach as being an approach ‘from above’. See his ‘On reasonable nonbelief and perfect love’, 334, 339.

13. I would like to thank the Editor and an anonymous reviewer for the journal for many helpful comments and suggestions.