^{page 280 note 1} On Certainty,(Oxford: Blackwell, 1969), #521. Cf. #37.Google Scholar

^{page 280 note 2} Ibid., #55.

^{page 280 note 3} Ibid., #155. Cf. #67–75, #195, #444–5.

^{page 280 note 4} Ibid., #176, #181.

^{page 280 note 5} Ibid., #18, #243, #325, #415, #555.

^{page 280 note 6} Ibid., #549.

^{page 280 note 7} Ibid., #4, #122.

^{page 280 note 8} Ibid., #24, #121.

^{page 281 note 1} On Certainty, #160, #354.

^{page 281 note 2} Ibid., #315.

^{page 281 note 3} Ibid., #191–2. Cf. #211 where the term ‘scaffolding’ is used.

^{page 282 note 1} On Certainty, #37.

^{page 283 note 1} On Certainty, #7.

^{page 283 note 2} Ibid., #427.

^{page 283 note 3} Ibid., #501.

^{page 283 note 4} Ibid., #94. Cf. #253, #449.

^{page 283 note 5} Ibid., #95. Cf. #341 where the world-picture is likened to the hinges upon which a door swings.

^{page 283 note 6} Ibid., #105.

^{page 283 note 7} Cf. Philosophical Investigations (New York: Macmillan, 1953), #241–242.Google Scholar

^{page 284 note 1} Philosophical Investigations, #110: ‘As if giving grounds did not come to an end sometime. But the end is not an ungrounded presupposition: it is an ungrounded way of acting.’ #146:‘…somewhere I must begin with an assumption or a decision.’ #150: ‘Must I not begin to trust somewhere? That is to say: somewhere I must begin with not-doubting; and that is not, so to speak, hasty but excusable: it is part of judging’. #254: ‘Any “reasonable” person behaves like this.’ #344: ‘My life consists in my being content to accept many things.’

^{page 284 note 2} Ibid., #411, #204, #559.

^{page 284 note 3} Ibid., #7.

^{page 284 note 4} Ibid., #534–538.

^{page 284 note 5} Ibid., #287.

^{page 284 note 6} Ibid., #475.

^{page 284 note 7} Ibid., #495–498. To set aside doubts about bedrock beliefs with the admonishment ‘Rubbish!’ is correct, but to offer rational defence against such doubts is not correct.

^{page 285 note 1} Philosophical Investigations, #262.

^{page 285 note 2} Ibid.,609–612.

^{page 286 note 1} Polanyi, Michael, Personal Knowledge (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1964), p x (preface).Google Scholar

^{page 287 note 1} Op. cit., On Certainty, #471.

^{page 287 note 2} ‘The Logic of tacit inference’, Philosophy, XLI (01 1966), p. 14.Google Scholar

^{page 287 note 3} Op. cit., On Certainty, #378.

^{page 288 note 1} Op. cit., Personal Knowledge, p. 309.

^{page 288 note 2} The term was, I think, coined by Nielsen, Kai in his article by that title in Philosophy, July 1969.Google Scholar

^{page 288 note 3} ‘Understanding a Primitive Society’, American Philosophical quarterly, October 1964, p. 309.Google Scholar

^{page 288 note 4} Two others worth mentioning are Hudson, W. D., Wittgenstein (London: Lutterworth Press, 1968)Google Scholar, and Holmer, Paul, ‘Theology and Belief’, Theology Today, 10 1965.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

^{page 289 note 1} Phillips, D. Z., Faith and Philosophical Enquiry (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1970), p. 4.Google Scholar

^{page 288 note 2} op. cit., pp. 205–6.