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The revision theory of resurrection

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 January 2008

ERIC STEINHART
ERIC STEINHART
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, William Paterson University, Wayne, NJ 07470
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Abstract

A powerful argument against the resurrection of the body is based on the premise that all resurrection theories violate natural laws. We counter this argument by developing a fully naturalistic resurrection theory. We refer to it as the revision theory of resurrection (RTR). Since Hick's replica theory is already highly naturalistic, we use Hick's theory as the basis for the RTR. According to Hick, resurrection is the recreation of an earthly body in another universe. The recreation is a resurrection counterpart. We show that the New Testament supports the idea of resurrection counterparts. The RTR asserts that you are a node in a branching tree of increasingly perfect resurrection counterparts. These ever better counterparts live in increasingly perfect resurrection universes. We give both theological arguments and an empirical argument for the RTR.

Type
Articles
Information
Religious Studies , Volume 44 , Issue 1 , March 2008 , pp. 63 - 81
Copyright
Copyright © 2008 Cambridge University Press

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