Published online by Cambridge University Press: 24 October 2008
Appeal to experience for rational justification of religious belief is probably as old as the question whether religious belief has any rational support. The issues relevant to such appeal range widely, and I will have to be content to deal with only a few of them.
page 173 note 2 Dasgupta, S., A History of Indian Philosophy (Cambridge, 1922) Vol. I, p. 426, 428, 440.Google Scholar
page 174 note 1 Summa Theologica, I, Q 25, A6.
page 174 note 2 Schlesinger, G., ‘The Problem of Evil and the Problem of Suffering,’ American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. I (1964).Google Scholar
page 176 note 1 Mavrodes, G., Belief in God: A Study in the Epistemology of Religion (New York, 1970), chapter 3.Google Scholar
page 176 note 2 Cf. Johansson, R. E. A., The Psychology of Nirvana (London: 1969; Garden City, N.Y.: 1970), p. 53, and texts cited there.Google Scholar
page 176 note 3 The Vedanta Sutras Of Badarayana, with the commentary by Sankara, tr. Thibaut, George (Oxford: 1890; New York: 1962), p. 419 of Dover Ed.Google Scholar
page 177 note 1 For a non-monistic view (Heracleitean rather than Parmenidean, as it were) of enlightenment, see Suzuki, D. T., The Field of Zen (London: 1969; New York: 1970), p. 26, Perenial Library Ed.Google Scholar
page 177 note 2 Smart, R. N., Reasons and Faiths (London: 1958)Google Scholar and Zaehner, R. C., Mysticism, Sacred and Profane (London, 1959).Google Scholar
page 177 note 3 Suzuki, , op. cit., p. 11.Google Scholar
page 178 note 1 Baillie, John, Our Knowledge of God (London, 1939), pp. 47 ff.Google Scholar
page 178 note 2 Baille, , op. cit., pp. 155 ff.Google Scholar
page 178 note 3 See my Basic Issues in the Philosophy of Religion (Boston, 1971), chapter 4.
page 179 note 1 Moore and Radhakrishnan, A Sourcebook in Indian Philosophy (Princeton, 1957), chapter 15.
page 180 note 1 Whitehead, A. N., Religion in the Making (London, 1926; Cleveland, 1960), p. 31, Meridian Books Ed.Google Scholar
page 184 note 1 Where S appropriately takes E to be evidence for C only if E meets the relevance conditions with respect to C (cf. p. 180 above).