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Religious Commitment and the Logical Status of Doctrines

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 October 2008

William H. Austin
William H. Austin
Affiliation:
Assistant Professor of Philosophy, Rice University
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Extract

The great Falsification Debate about the logical status of religious beliefs seems fairly quiescent at present. Most philosophers of religion have opted for one or the other of two opposite responses to the falsificationists' challenge.

Type
Research Article
Information
Religious Studies , Volume 9 , Issue 1 , March 1973 , pp. 39 - 48
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1973

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References

page 39 note 1 For a crisp statement of this view see Plantinga, Alvin, God and Other Minds (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1967), pp. 156–68.Google Scholar

page 40 note 1 See MacIntyre, Alasdair, ‘The Logical Status of Religious Belief’ in Metaphysical Beliefs (London: SCM Press, 1967).Google Scholar

page 41 note 1 See Berthold, Fred Jr, ‘Empirical Propositions and Explanations in Theology’ in Meland, Bernard E. (ed.): The Future of Empirical Theology (University of Chicago Press, 1969), pp. 115 ff.Google Scholar

page 41 note 2 Bartley, William W. III, The Retreat to Commitment (New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1962).Google Scholar Bartley appeals primarily to writings of Karl Barth and Paul Tillich, though he mentions others. I think Bartley's reading of these men is in some important respects disputable, but that is not a point I wish to pursue here.

page 43 note 1 ‘Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes’ in Imre, Lakatos and Alan, Musgrave (ed.), Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge (Cambridge: At the University Press, 1970), pp. 91–195.Google Scholar My version of Lakatos' suggestion is a crude and simplified one. Moreover, I very much doubt that he would like the use to which I am putting it. I mention him to acknowledge my debt, not to claim his support. However, I do not think I have materially misrepresented him.

page 43 note 2 See Berthold, , op. cit., pp. 120 ff.Google Scholar

page 44 note 1 Actually, Lakatos appears to hold (op. cit., p. 155) that a degenerating problemshift cannot by itself be an adequate reason for rejecting a research programme; for that an alternative programme is required. However, he does not explicitly consider cases in which there is a very pro-longed degeneration and no alternative in sight. For purposes of this paper I shall adopt a version of sophisticated falsificationism which calls for the abandonment of a programme which has stalled unduly long.