^{page 219 note 1} I will not here attempt to describe these formal differences as Smart sees them. See Smart, Ninian, Reasons and Faiths, London, 1958Google Scholar, Introduction and Chapter I.

^{page 220 note 1} One exegesis of such a theory, which Smart notes, is set out in some detail in an article by Waismann, F., entitled ‘Language Strata’. Smart's analysis of religious discourse is clearly modelled on several points Waismann makes. See Reasons and Faiths, p. 10Google Scholar, note, and Waismann, F., ‘Language Strata’, in Logic and Language, edited by Flew, A., N.Y., 1965.Google Scholar For a critique of Smart's theory of religious discourse see Yandell, Keith, Basic Issues in the Philosophy of Religion, Boston, 1970, pp. 141–45.Google Scholar

^{page 221 note 1} Though Smart is appealing to religious experience as a test of truth, with the built-in assumption that religious experience is veridical, nonetheless Smart's use of ‘basic justification’ is as a formal criterion of truth. In appraising doctrinal schemes with respect to their being basically justified Smart is not simply appealing to whether or not experience provides prima facie evidence for the set of religious beliefs in question. Rather, he is maintaining that if there is a true doctrinal scheme S, S will incorporate on some interpretation the given of both numinous and mystical experience.

^{page 222 note 1} Smart holds that emphasis on the mystical strand, with salvation being a function of leading an ascetic or monastic life, is incompatible with equal religious opportunity. The same would hold true of agnostic doctrinal schemes, as they incorporate only the mystical strand. See Reasons and Faiths, Chapter V, pp. 157–9.

^{page 223 note 1} See Reasons and Faiths, Chapter V, pp. 140–7.

^{page 224 note 1} Smart, Ninian, ‘The Relationship between Christianity and the Other Great Religions’, in Soundings, edited by Vidler, A. R., Cambridge, 1962, pp. 115–16.Google Scholar

^{page 224 note 2} Smart, , The Philosophy of Religion, p. 14.Google Scholar

^{page 224 note 3} Smart, , Philosophers and Religious Truth, pp. 142–3.Google Scholar

^{page 225 note 1} I take it to be a necessary condition of a philosophical view being intelligible that it not be self-refuting in the sense in which Yandell has spelled out the notion of ‘self-refuting’ in Basic Issues in the Philosophy of Religion. He says: ‘It is assertions which in some manner undermine themselves, arguments which if successful would defeat their own purposes or destroy their own rationale, view-points whose correctness would leave their own existence inexplicable [which are self-refuting].’ See Yandell, K., op. cit., pp. 221–7.Google Scholar

^{page 225 note 2} The thesis of monism in its religious setting (e.g. the teachings of Sankara) is seriously and insightfully challenged by Ramanuja, , see A Source Book in Indian Philosophy, edited by Radhakrishnan, S., and Moore, C. A., Princeton, 1957, pp. 543–55.Google Scholar

^{page 226 note 1} Smart, , Philosophers and Religious Truth, p. 122.Google Scholar

^{page 227 note 1} See Yandell, , op. cit., pp. 139, also pp. 113–15.Google Scholar