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The proper basicality of belief in God and the evil-god challenge

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  23 March 2022

Perry Hendricks Open the ORCID record for Perry Hendricks [Opens in a new window]
Perry Hendricks*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Purdue University, West Lafayette, Indiana 610 Purdue Mall, West Lafayette, IN 47907, USA
*
email: [email protected]
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Abstract

The evil-god challenge is a challenge for theists to show that belief in God is more reasonable than belief in evil-god. In this article, I show that whether or not evil-god exists, belief in evil-god is unjustified. But this isn't the case for belief in God: belief in God is probably justified if theism is true. And hence belief in God is (significantly) more reasonable than belief in evil-god, and the evil-god challenge has been answered.

Keywords

Alvin Plantingadivine hiddennessevil-god challengejustificationreligious epistemology
Type
Original Article
Information
Religious Studies , Volume 59 , Issue 1 , March 2023 , pp. 55 - 62
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2022. Published by Cambridge University Press

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