Hostname: page-component-586b7cd67f-vdxz6 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-22T03:11:53.773Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

The Problem of Evil and a Plausible Defence

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 October 2008

Frank J. Murphy
Frank J. Murphy
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, East Carolina University, Greenville, North Carolina 27858–4353
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

This paper argues that God may create and exist in any possible world, no matter how much suffering of any sort that world includes. It combines the traditional free will defence with the notion of an ‘occasion’ for good or evil action and limits God's responsibility to the creation of these occasions. Since no possible world contains occasions for more evil than good action, God is morally permitted to create any possible world. With regard to suffering that is not due to free will, namely the suffering of beings who are not moral agents, the paper questions the idea that the relief of such suffering is a moral perfection.

Type
Research Article
Information
Religious Studies , Volume 31 , Issue 2 , June 1995 , pp. 243 - 250
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1995

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

REFERENCES

Gulesarian, T. (1983). God and Possible Worlds: The Modal Problem of Evil. Nous, XVII, 221–38.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Mackie, J. (1982). The Miracle of Theism. Oxford: Clarendon Press.Google Scholar
Morris, T. V. (1987). Anselmian Explorations. Notre Dame, Indiana: Notre Dame University Press.Google Scholar
Plantinga, A. (1974). The Nature of Necessity. Oxford: Clarendon Press.Google Scholar