Hostname: page-component-586b7cd67f-vdxz6 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-24T16:10:14.906Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

The Possibility of Reincarnation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 October 2008

Harold W. Noonan
Harold W. Noonan
Affiliation:
University of Birmingham, England
Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Extract

Core share and HTML view are not available for this content. However, as you have access to this content, a full PDF is available via the ‘Save PDF’ action button.

Man has always hoped to survive his bodily death, and it is a central tenet of many religions that such survival is a reality. It has been supposed by many that one form such survival might take is reincarnation in another body. Subscribers to this view include Pythagoras, Plato sometimes, and a large number of Eastern thinkers. Other thinkers have, of course, disputed that reincarnation is a fact, and some have even denied that it is a possibility. But seldom has it been claimed by its opponents that reincarnation is a logical impossibility.

Type
Research Article
Information
Religious Studies , Volume 26 , Issue 4 , December 1990 , pp. 483 - 491
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1990

References

1 MacIntosh, J. J., ‘Reincarnation and Relativized Identity’, Religious Studies, xxv (1989), 153–65.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

2 See Shoemaker, S., ‘Persons and their Pasts’, American Philosophical Quarterly, VII (1970), 269–85.Google ScholarParfit, D., ‘Personal Identity’, Philosophical Review, LXXX 3–27Google Scholar and Reasons and Persons (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984)Google Scholar, Nozick, R., Philosophical Explanations (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981)Google Scholar, Lewis, D., ‘Survival and Identity’ in Rorty, A. (ed.), The Identities of Persons (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976)Google Scholar, Perry, John, ‘Can the Self Divide?’, Journal of Philosophy, LXXIII (1972), 463–88.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

3 See Williams, B., ‘Personal Identity and Individuation’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society LVII (1956–1957), 229–52.Google Scholar

4 See, for example, Shoemaker, S., ‘Persons and their Pasts’ for brain-transplants, Wiggins, D., Identity and Spatio-temporal Continuity, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1967)Google Scholar for brain-hemisphere transplants and Williams, B., ‘The Self and the Future’, Philosophical Review, LXXIX (1970), 161–80CrossRefGoogle Scholar for brain-state transfers. See also Noonan, H. W., Personal Identity (Routledge, 1989)CrossRefGoogle Scholar for a general survey.

5 This is only a rough statement of the Only x and y principle: for a discussion of its inadequacies and a reformulation designed to avoid them see H. W. Noonan, Personal Identity, Ch. 7.

6 S. Shoemaker, ‘Persons and their Pasts’ and R. Nozick, Philosophical Explanations.

7 Robinson, D., ‘Can Ameobae Divide without Multiplying?’, Australian Journal of Philosophy, LXIII (1985), 299–319.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

8 Lewis, D., Philosophical Papers, vol. 1 (Oxford University Press, 1988)Google Scholar, postscript to ‘Survival and Identity’.

9 See Nozick, Philosophical Explanations, pp. 656ff.

10 See Salmon, N., Reference and Essence (Oxford: Blackwell, 1982), Appendix 1Google Scholar.