^{page 254 note 1} See, for example, Kockelmans', Joseph comments in his collection of Husserl studies, entitled Phenomenology (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1967), pp. 83–5.Google Scholar

^{page 254 note 2} See Farber, Marvin, ‘The Ideal of a Presuppositionless Philosophy’, in Kockelmans, (ed), op. cit.Google Scholar, part I, sect. 11.

^{page 254 note 3} Farber, Marvin, Phenomenology and Existence: Towards a Philosophy Within Nature, New York: Harper & Row (Torchbook, ed), 1967.Google Scholar

^{page 255 note 1} Leeuw, Gerardus Van der, Religion in Essence and Manifestation, trans. Turner, J. E. (New York: Harper & Row; Torchbook, ed., 1963Google Scholar), chap. 80.

^{page 255 note 2} Ibid. pp. 565, 566.

^{page 256 note 1} Ibid. p. 432.

^{page 256 note 2} Ibid.

^{page 256 note 3} Ibid. p. 645.

^{page 256 note 4} Ibid. p. 646.

^{page 257 note 1} Ibid.

^{page 257 note 2} Ibid. pp. 645, 646, n. 1.

^{page 257 note 3} Ibid. p. 105 (my italics).

^{page 258 note 1} I am overstating the case somewhat, at this point, but not too greatly. Leeuw, Van der does concede that ‘the problem [by phenomenology] becomes that of what is obviously evidence’ (pp. 684–5Google Scholar; Concerning Husserl's concept of evidence, see Meditations, Cartesian, trans. Dorion Cairns [The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1960, $ 5–6Google Scholar, especially p. 12]). Again, he says that ‘the phenomenologist… cannot proceed without submitting again and again to correction by the facts…’ (p. 685Google Scholar). But such statements are belied by others which indicate Van der Leeuw's unwillingness to have the phenomenologist's ‘interpretations’ be judged in the light of ordinary epistemological standards.

^{page 258 note 2} Brentano, Franz, The True and the Evident, ed. Kraus, Oskar, Eng. ed. trans. Roderick M., et al. (New York: Humanities, 1966).Google Scholar

^{page 258 note 3} Ibid. p. 137.

^{page 259 note 1} Ibid.

^{page 259 note 2} Sartre, Jean-Paul, Being and Nothingness: An Essay in Phenomenological Ontology, trans. Barnes, Hazel E. (New York: Philosophical Library, 1956), p. 73Google Scholar. Leeuw, Van der (op. cit. p. 676Google Scholar) denies, interestingly enough, that Husserlian phenomenology does entail idealism; he similarly denies that it entails any metaphysical realism. It is simply maintained, he says, that only by assigning things ‘form and meaning’ can they be understood.

^{page 259 note 3} Ibid. p. 235.

^{page 260 note 1} Op. cit. p. 677.Google Scholar

^{page 260 note 2} Ibid. p. 676 (‘not’ is not italicized in the original).

^{page 261 note 1} Boston: Beacon Press, 1961.Google Scholar

^{page 261 note 2} Original edition, 1921Google Scholar; English ed., London, SCM Press, 1960.

^{page 261 note 3} Scheler, (Meyerhoff ed.), p. xix.Google Scholar

^{page 261 note 4} Ibid. p. xxi.

^{page 261 note 5} Ibid. p. xxxv; text, chap. IV.

^{page 261 note 6} Farber, , op. cit.Google Scholar

^{page 261 note 7} Ibid. p. 240.