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On Failing to Resolve Theism-Versus-Atheism Empirically

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 October 2008

David O'connor
David O'connor
Affiliation:
Seton Hall University, New Jersey, U.S.A
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Extract

At least since Hume's Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, theism has been under indictment; indeed it has been on trial for its life. In part, this indictment is that the enormous quantity, variety, and distribution of evils evident in the natural world disconfirm the core beliefs of theism. Those core beliefs, I think, are the following pair: there exists a being at once omnipotent, omniscient, perfectly good, the worshipful creator of the universe (henceforth G); and G stands in a relation to the natural world which might be called one of moral responsibility (henceforth M). Obviously, theism says a lot more than the above, rather abrupt, conjunction; nevertheless, that conjunction constitutes its core.

Type
Articles
Information
Religious Studies , Volume 26 , Issue 1 , March 1990 , pp. 91 - 102
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1990

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References

1 R. G. Swinburne is the prime example. In referring to the problem of justifying the scarcely imaginable amount, distribution, variety, and intensity of pain and suffering in the natural world as theism's ‘most vexing problem’, Swinburne is characterizing what he perceives to be, perhaps, a deadly problem for theism and one for which its solutions, hitherto, have been inadequate. See The Existence of God (New York, Oxford University Press), 1979, p. 219.Google Scholar

2 I am thinking here of such theologically influential philosophers-theologians as Bultmann, Rudolf, Theology of the New Testament (London, SCM Press, 1971), passimGoogle Scholar; Macquarrie, John, Principles of Christian Theology (London, SCM Press, 1971), passimGoogle Scholar; Hartshorne, Charles, Omnipotence and Other Theological Mistakes (Albany, State University of New York Press, 1984), passimGoogle Scholar; Roth, John, ‘A Theodicy of Protest’, in Encountering Evil, ed. by Davis, S. T. (Atlanta, John Knox Press, 1981), pp. 7–22, 30–7Google Scholar; Frederick Sontag, ‘Anthropodicy and The Return of God’, Ibid, pp. 137–6, who either significantly rein in the traditional definition of ‘God’ or substantially modify it so as either to concede, or to avoid having to fight, some of the traditional battles. I have cited thinkers who exert theological, rather than any particularly philosophical, influence on the grounds that those citations show evidence of significant revisionism within the fold of monotheistic theology and religious belief and that such evidence strengthens my claim in the text.

3 The atheistic argument I shall outline, and against which I shall defend theism, will be what we might aptly term a generic version. For a recent specific instance of such an argument, see Rowe, William L., ‘The Empirical Argument from Evil’, in Rationality, Religious Belief and Moral Commitment, ed. by Audi, R. and Wainwright, W. J. (Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1986), pp. 227–47.Google Scholar

4 This does not entail, though, that an agnostic conclusion drawn from the arguments of this paper would also, or equally, be invalid.

5 For discussion of the fuller meaning of the term see my ‘A Variation on the Free Will Defence’, Faith and Philosophy, IV, 2 (04 1987).Google Scholar In defining the term narrowly here, I take as given certain things that theists may be wont not to grant so readily: e.g. whether there is biologically useless pain for instance.

6 Schematized, the sequence of arguments here looks like this:

(1) (G. M)→ J

but

(2) ~ J,

therefore

(3) ~ (G. M)

The argument for (2):

(I)

and

(4) J → (E > ~ E)

but

(5) ~ (E > ~ E)

because

(6) ~ E> E.

Thus, by Modus Tollens of (4) and (5), we get:

(2) ~ J

Therefore, by Modus Tollens of (1) and (2), we get:

(3)~ (G. M)

[In the above schematized version of the argument, the symbol ‘ > ’ should be read as synonymous with ‘more than’ or ‘greater than’].

7 I realize that this claim is probably contentious. To argue for it, though, would require a separate paper. In its support here, I re-invoke the sources cited in note 2 above.

8 See Fitzpatrick, F. J., ‘The Onus of Proof in Arguments about the Problem of Evil’, Religious Studies Vol. 17 (1981), pp. 25–7.CrossRefGoogle Scholar Also, see my reply to Fitzpatrick in ‘Theism, Evil and the Onus of Proof’, Ibid. Vol. 19 (1983), 241–7.

9 In contemporary philosophical-cum-theological circles, John Hick is the notable proponent of such a view.

10 This paper is a companion to my ‘On the Problem of Evil's not being what it seems’, The Philosophical Quarterly, XXXVII, 149 (10 1987)Google Scholar and to my ‘On the Problem of Evil's still not being what it seems’, Mid, XXXX, 158 (01 1990).Google Scholar In those papers I argue for a parallel irresolvability of the logical problem of God and evil. Should I be right in both of these endeavours, then, both the logical and epistemological problems of God and natural evil, together with their respective surrounding debates, are red herrings. I should like to acknowledge my debt to G. J. Dalcourt and A. B. Hakim for their criticisms of earlier versions of this paper. I wish to acknowledge, too, the Research Council of Seton Hall University for generously supporting part of my work on this paper with a research grant.