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Ockhamism vs Molinism, round 2: a reply to Warfield

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 August 2010

T. RYAN BYERLY
T. RYAN BYERLY*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Baylor University, One Bear Place #97273, Waco, TX 76798
*
e-mail: [email protected]
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Abstract

Ted Warfield has argued that if Ockhamism and Molinism offer different responses to the problems of foreknowledge and prophecy, it is the Molinist who is in trouble. I show here that this is not so – indeed, things may be quite the reverse.

Type
Articles
Information
Religious Studies , Volume 47 , Issue 4 , December 2011 , pp. 503 - 511
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2010

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References

Notes

1. Ted A. Warfield ‘Ockhamism and Molinism – foreknowledge and prophecy’, in Jonathan L. Kvanvig (ed.) Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 317–332.

2. E.g., Alfred J. Freddoso Introduction to Luis de Molina, On Divine Foreknowledge, part IV of Concordia (Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press, 1988).

3. Linda Zagzebski ‘Foreknowledge and free will’, in Edward N. Zalta (ed.) Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2008) URL=http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/free-will-foreknowledge/

4. E.g. Plantinga, Alvin ‘On Ockham's way out’, Faith and Philosophy, 3 (1986), 235–269CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

5. See especially Warfield ‘Ockhamism and Molinism’, 323–324.

6. Thanks to Kraig Martin for helpful discussion of this paper.