^{page 265 note 1} The views expressed in this section derive from the work of Saul Kripke and Hilary Putnam, and others. See Kripke, , ‘Naming and Necessity’, Semantics of Natural Language, ed. Davidson, Donald and Harman, Gilbert (Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Co., 1972), pp. 314–23Google Scholar; Putnam, , ‘Meaning and Reference’, Naming, Necessity, and Natural Kinds, ed. Schwartz, Stephen P. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977), pp. 119–32Google Scholar; Putnam, , ‘The Meaning of “Meaning”’, Language, Mind, and Knowledge: Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, volume VII, ed. Gunderson, Keith (Minneapolis: The University of Minnesota Press, 1975), pp. 131–93.Google Scholar The Schwartz anthology (Naming, Necessity, and Natural Kinds) contains a good bibliography. Kripke and Putnam differ on many points, and my treatment of the topic in some respects diverges from either of theirs. However, it is too cumbersome to indicate all points of agreement and disagreement.

^{page 266 note 1} The assumption that meaning is in the head has come under concerted attack by philosophers in the Wittgensteinian tradition. But it should be clear that the attack developed in this paper is along quite different lines from the Wittgensteinian ones. A few contrasts between Putnam and Wittgensteinians are drawn by Hollinger, Robert, ‘Natural Kinds, Family Resemblances, and Conceptual Change’, The Personalist 55 (1974), pp. 323–33.Google Scholar See also Zemach, Eddy, ‘Putnam's Theory On the Reference of Substance Terms’, The Journal of Philosophy 73 (1976), pp. 124–27.CrossRefGoogle Scholar Zemach believes that Putnam's hypothesis of the ‘division of linguistic labor’ is not a challenge to Wittgensteinian views of reference.

^{page 266 note 2} See Putnam, , ‘Meaning and Reference’, op. cit. pp. 119–24Google Scholar, and ‘The Meaning of “Meaning”’, op. cit. pp. 134–44.Google Scholar

^{page 269 note 1} Teller, Paul, ‘Indicative Introduction’, Philosophical Studies 31 (1977), p. 174.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

^{page 270 note 1} For relevant discussion see Katz, Jerrold J., ‘Logic and Language: An Examination of Recent Criticisms of Intensionalism’, Language, Mind, and Knowledge: Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, volume VII, ed. Gunderson, Keith (Minneapolis: The University of Minnesota Press, 1975), pp. 97–8.Google Scholar

^{page 272 note 1} For Weber, Max, ‘the personal call is the decisive element in distinguishing the prophet from the priest. The latter lays claim to authority by virtue of his service in a sacred tradition, while the prophet's claim is based on personal revelation and charisma. It is no accident that almost no prophets have emerged from the priestly class.’ The Sociology of Religion, trans. Fischoff, Ephraim (Boston: The Beacon Press, 1964), p. 46.Google Scholar

^{page 276 note 1} See Lockwood, Michael, ‘On Predicating Proper Names’, The Philosophical Review 84 (1975), p. 495.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

^{page 276 note 2} Brown, Peter, Augustine of Hippo: A Biography (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), pp. 252–3.Google Scholar

^{page 277 note 1} Freud, Sigmund, The Future of an Illusion, trans. Robson-Scott, W. D. (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1961), p. 73.Google Scholar

^{page 279 note 1} Geertz, Clifford, ‘Religion as a Cultural System’, Anthropological Approaches to the Study of Religion, ed. Banton, Michael (London: Tavistock Publications, 1969), pp. 23–4.Google Scholar The subtle interplay of mystery with explanation is portrayed more astringently by Berger, Peter, The Sacred Canopy: Elements of a Sociological Theory of Religion (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1969), p. 90.Google Scholar

^{page 280 note 1} Earlier drafts of this paper were read to the philosophy departments of The University of Connecticut-Storrs (Spring, 1977) and The University of Illinois-Urbana (Spring, 1978). I am grateful for the many helpful comments made on those occasions.