^{page 259 note 1} Kant, Immanuel, Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone, trans. Greene, Theodore M. and Hudson, Hoyt H. (New York: Harper and Row, 1960), p. 40.Google Scholar Hereafter, Religion.

^{page 259 note 2} Blumenberg, Hans, The Legitimacy of the Modern Age, trans. Wallace, Robert M. (Cambridge, MA and London: MIT Press, 1983), p. 178.Google Scholar

^{page 259 note 3} Religion, p. 32.

^{page 259 note 4} Ibid. p. 40.

^{page 260 note 1} Barth, Karl, Protestant Thought from Rousseau to Ritschl, trans. Cozens, Brian (New York: Harper and Row, 1959), p. 292.Google Scholar It should be immediately added that, from another point of view, the doctrine of radical evil is the natural result of Kant's effort, initiated in the Critique of Practical Reason, to think out the practical possibility of moral perfection. A threat to moral perfection is simultaneously a threat to the realization of the highest good; attention to moral evil, then, becomes a philosophical requirement rather than a source of surprise. See Wood, Allen, Kant's Moral Religion (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1970), p. 208.Google Scholar From a slightly different perspective, Sharon Anderson-Gold argues that the theory of radical evil emerges because of Kant's philosophical need to account for the ‘inner possibility’ of acts contrary to the moral law. See Anderson-Gold, . ‘Kant's Rejection of Devilishness: the Limits of Human Volition’, Idealistic Studies XIV (1984), 36–8.Google Scholar

^{page 260 note 2} Quoted in Despland, Michel, Kant on History and Religion (Montreal and London: McGill–Queen's University Press, 1973), p. 169.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

^{page 260 note 3} Religion, p. 17.

^{page 260 note 4} Ibid. p. 31, emphasis Kant's.

^{page 261 note 1} Ibid.

^{page 261 note 2} Kant himself refers to the doing of one's duty as, ideally, ‘habitual’, but it is in some ways hard to know what this could mean, on Kantian grounds. The problem concerns the principle of connection that would give point to the notion of ‘habit’ here, while protecting the element of spontaneity that is fundamental to Kant's theory of autonomy. These two aims appear to be in conflict.

^{page 261 note 3} Silber, John, ‘The Ethical Significance of Kant's RELIGION’, in Religion, pp. cxiv–cxv.Google Scholar

^{page 261 note 4} Religion, p. 26.

^{page 261 note 5} Ibid.

^{page 261 note 6} Ibid. pp. 18–19.

^{page 261 note 7} Ibid. pp. 56–7.

^{page 262 note 1} Ibid. p. 32

^{page 262 note 2} Ibid. p. 25.

^{page 262 note 3} Ibid. p. 34.

^{page 262 note 4} Ibid. p. 25.

^{page 262 note 5} Ibid. p. 28.

^{page 262 note 6} Two helpful efforts to draw out the comparison between radical evil and original sin are Quinn, Philip L., ‘Original Sin, Radical Evil and Moral Identity’, Faith and Philosophy I (1982), 188–202Google Scholar, and Brown, Robert F., ‘The Transcendental Fall in Kant and Schelling’, Idealistic Studies XIV (1984), 49–66.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

^{page 263 note 1} Religion, p.43.

^{page 263 note 2} Ibid. p. 20.

^{page 263 note 3} Keith Ward makes the interesting point that the deeper problem here lies in Kant's effort to mediate rationalism and voluntarism – a middle path, as it were, between Woolf and pietism – guaranteeing an impasse between organic unity on the one hand, and freedom and individualism on the other. The result is a philosophical position ‘expressed in a terminology which both conceals an inherent instability in the view and obscures its true character’. See Ward, , The Development of Kant's View of Ethics (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1972), p. 174.Google Scholar

^{page 263 note 4} Religion, pp. 36–7. There is a good account of Kant's use of Genesis in Despland, , op. cit. pp. 190–1.Google Scholar

^{page 263 note 5} Kroner, Richard, Kant's Weltanschauung, trans. Smith, John E. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956), p. 29.Google Scholar

^{page 263 note 6} A helpful recent discussion of the thorny problem of relating the moral and the temporal in Kant is offered by Stern, Paul, ‘The Problem of History and Temporality in Kantian Ethics’, Review of Metaphysics XXXIX (1986), pp. 505–45.Google Scholar See also O'Connor, Daniel, ‘Good and Evil Disposition’, Kant-Studien LXXVI (1985), 288–302.Google Scholar

^{page 264 note 1} Religion, p. 40.

^{page 264 note 2} Ibid.

^{page 264 note 3} Ibid.

^{page 264 note 4} Ibid.

^{page 264 note 5} An example of one such battleground would be the debate between Rudolph Bultmann and his so–called ‘left–wing’ followers over the question of retaining the appeal to an ‘act of God’ in the cross–resurrection sequence. While the debate ostensibly turned on the question of whether or not ‘act of God’ talk was mythological (and thereby subject to an existentialist hermeneutical translation), the truly substantive underlying issue was the relation between human freedom and transcendent action in the salvation process.

^{page 264 note 6} Religion, p. 40, emphasis Kant's.

^{page 264 note 7} Ibid. p. 32, emphasis Kant's.

^{page 265 note 1} Ibid. pp. 40–1, emphasis Kant's.

^{page 265 note 2} Ibid. p. 47.

^{page 265 note 3} Ibid.

^{page 265 note 4} Ibid. p. 48.

^{page 266 note 1} Kant, , Critique of Practical Reason, trans. Beck, Lewis White (Indianapolis and New York: Bobbs–Merrill, 1956), p. 12, n. 9.Google Scholar

^{page 266 note 2} See Wood, , op. cit. pp. 232–48.Google Scholar Wood goes so far as to say that Kant, was ‘very far from rejecting the doctrine of vicarious atonement’ (p. 237)Google Scholar, a judgement that I find provocative but questionable.

^{page 266 note 3} In a sense, the philosophical motions leading up to the rational hope that divine aid will be forthcoming mirror the motions leading up to Kant's postulation of God's existence in the second Critique.

^{page 266 note 4} Religion, pp. 35, 38.

^{page 267 note 1} Kant, , Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Smith, Norman Kemp (London: Macmillan and Company, 1963), A553/B581.Google Scholar

^{page 267 note 2} Religion, p. 43.

^{page 267 note 3} I have previously tried to make this clear in ‘The Impossibility of Religious Progress in Kant’, in Slater, Peter (ed.), Philosophy of Religion and Theology: 1976 Proceedings (Missoula: Scholars Press, 1976), pp. 17–29.Google Scholar

^{page 267 note 4} Religion, p. 43.

^{page 267 note 5} Ibid. p. 43, emphasis Kant's.

^{page 267 note 6} Ibid. p. 60.

^{page 267 note 7} Ibid. p. 43.

^{page 267 note 8} Ibid. pp. 60–1, emphasis Kant's.

^{page 267 note 9} See Yovel, Yirmiahu, Kant and the Philosophy of History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), pp. 112 ff.Google Scholar

^{page 268 note 1} Religion, p. 70, emphasis Kant's.

^{page 269 note 1} Ibid. pp. 43, 60.

^{page 269 note 2} Ibid. p. 60.

^{page 270 note 1} Olafson, Frederick, Principles and Persons (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1967), p. 37.Google Scholar

^{page 270 note 2} An earlier version of this article was read at the Mid-Atlantic regional meeting of the American Academy of Religion, held in April, 1988, at Union Theological Seminary in New York. My thanks to those who gave me helpful criticisms at that time, including Robert Brown, Terry Godlove, Henry Levinson, Wayne Proudfoot, and Merold Westphal.