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Molinism, open theism, and soteriological luck

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  16 August 2010

MARK B. ANDERSON
MARK B. ANDERSON*
Affiliation:
Tarrant County College, 300 Trinity Campus Circle, Fort Worth, TX 76102
*
e-mail: [email protected]
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Abstract

It is sometimes claimed by open theists that, on Molinism, God controls who is saved and who is damned and that, as a consequence, God's judgement of us is unjust. While this charge is usually lumped under the problem of evil, it could easily be classified under the problem of soteriological luck. I argue that the open theist is impugned by this latter problem. I then show that the Molinist has a solution to both problems and consider objections to that solution.

Type
Articles
Information
Religious Studies , Volume 47 , Issue 3 , September 2011 , pp. 371 - 381
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2010

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References

Notes

1. See Alfred J. Freddoso ‘Introduction’, in L. de Molina On Divine Foreknowledge (Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press, 1988), 65–66, and Thomas P. Flint Divine Providence: A Molinist Account (Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press, 1998), 117–118.

2. The most notable example is Lane Craig, William ‘“No other name”: a middle knowledge perspective on the exclusivity of salvation through Christ’, Faith and Philosophy, 6 (1989), 172–188CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Craig suggests that all of the unredeemed suffer from ‘transworld damnation’; that is, they would have freely acted in a way that would have resulted in their damnation no matter what circumstances they inherited. In Craig's case, this means that they would have rejected Christ no matter what.

3. See, for example, William Hasker ‘A philosophical perspective’, in C. Pinnock et al. The Openness of God: A Biblical Challenge to the Traditional Understanding of God (Downers Grove IL: InterVarsity Press, 1994), 145, and Rissler, James D. ‘Open theism: does God risk or hope?’, Religious Studies, 42 (2006), 63–74CrossRefGoogle Scholar, 71–72.

4. Thomas Nagel ‘Moral luck’, in idem Mortal Questions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 29.

5. Ibid., 26.

6. I trust I will get through life without experiencing these circumstances.

7. Zimmerman, Michael J. ‘Taking luck seriously’, Journal of Philosophy, 99 (2002), 553–576CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and Greco, John ‘A second paradox concerning responsibility and luck’, Metaphilosophy, 26 (1995), 81–96CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

8. Some passages in the Gospels suggest that Jesus leaned this way. The extraordinary demands on righteousness in Matthew 5 can be given a counterfactual interpretation – e.g. lusting after a married woman is tantamount to adultery since one would have consummated the act had one had the chance. And in Matthew 11. 21–24 and Matthew 23. 34–35, Jesus' censure of various people seems to be rooted in counterfactual reasoning.

9. Or better, quasi-memory. God can give us the phenomenology of having the memories, even if I did not in fact insult anyone.

10. Some of the clearest instances are Romans 8.29–30 and Ephesians 1.5 and 11. Other passages speak of the saved being chosen by God (e.g. Colossions 3.12, 1 Thessalonians 1.4, Titus 1.1).

11. Jesus explicitly prohibits us from making such judgements in Matthew 7.1–2, a theme which runs throughout the gospels.

12. John 10.10.

13. I would like to thank Daniel Breyer, David Werther, an anonymous referee for this journal, and the audience at the 2008 Illinois Philosophical Association meeting for helpful comments on this paper.