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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 24 October 2008
James Sennett has argued that Yahweh may possess the properties of divinity contingently; that it is an open question whether Yahweh is divine in all possible worlds, and that perfect goodness cannot belong essentially to anyone. In response to Sennett it is here argued that it does not make clear sense to suppose that properties apply to Yahweh contingently, and that Sennett fails to demonstrate that perfect goodness cannot apply essentially. There are problems with the notion of perfect goodness, but these would tend to suggest that the notion lacks application anywhere.
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2 Op. cit. p. 295–296.
3 Op. cit. p. 296.
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5 Sennett, p. 301.
6 Op. cit. p. 301.
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11 Nicomachean Ethics, 1115a lines 33–4.Google Scholar
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