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Justice and Mercy: a Reply to Thomas Talbott

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 October 2008

Robert Holyer
Robert Holyer
Affiliation:
Lyon College, Batesville, Arkansas 72503
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Extract

In a recent issue of Religious Studies,1 Thomas Talbott argues against what he takes to be an Augustinian picture of God, pointing out what he believes to be its more important weaknesses and thereby trying to lend credibility to an alternative picture. Much of what he argues turns on questions of the nature and requirements of justice. I shall confine myself to his claims about the relation of justice and mercy, which are not only central to the essay but also probably the weakest and least well developed part of his larger project of defending a universalist view of salvation.2

Type
Research Article
Information
Religious Studies , Volume 30 , Issue 3 , September 1994 , pp. 287 - 294
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1994

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References

1 29, 2 (June 1993), 151–68. Numbers in parentheses in the text refer to page numbers in this essay.

2 Talbott's, universalism has been developed and defended in the following essays: ‘The Doctrine of Everlasting Punishment’, Faith and Philosophy, 7, 1 (01 1990), 19–42;CrossRefGoogle Scholar‘Providence, Freedom and Human Destiny’, Religious Studies, 26, 2 (June 1990), 227–45;Google Scholar‘The New Testament and Universal Reconciliation’, Christian Scholar's Review, 21, 4 (June 1992), 376–94;Google Scholar and ‘Craig on the Possibility of Eternal Damnation’, Religious Studies, 28, 4 (December 1992), 495–512Google Scholar.. Talbott's, project has not been without its critics. See William Lane Craig, ‘Talbott's Universalism’, Religious Studies, 27, 3 (09 1991), 297–308;Google ScholarLacy, Larry, ‘Talbott on Paul as a Universalist’, Christian Scholar's Review, 21, 4 (06 1992), 395–407;Google Scholar and Jensen, Paul T., ‘Intolerable but Moral? Thinking about Hell’, Faith and Philosophy, 10, 2 (04 1993), 235–42.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

3 Talbott claims that his view ‘accords very well with the New Testament analogy between God and a loving parent’ (166). I find it curious – perhaps even telling – that he eschews the locus classicus of the New Testament in favor of a story of his own making. As I argue, the story of the prodigal son requires the distinction between justice and mercy; Talbott's narrative works well for him precisely because it obscures the issue of justice. The story he uses is that of a televangelist whose daughter is arrested for drunk-driving and thereby embarrasses the family. The young woman is utterly heart-broken and willing to do anything to make amends. The father's choice is to be reconciled to her or to tell her that he never wants to see her again. Although one might understand the latter response, it would strike most people as excessive and unjust. The father of the prodigal is on firmer ground if he were to refuse to renew the rights of sonship, and it is because of this that the story teaches us more about God's love than does Talbott's.

4 Talbott seems to ignore what may be the central difficulty and that is applying the concept of harm to God.

5 Emphasis added.

6 I am reminded here of Dostoyevski's probing of the issue of justice and mercy in ‘Rebellion’ in The Brothers Karamozov. Though the passage is by no means clear, it has always seemed to me that Ivan's rejection of a final and future reconciliation is based in part on his belief that this future state of affairs does not fully make up for past sufferings.

7 I say apparently because, on the one hand, Talbott seems to deny that God is a retributivist; on the other hand, he suggests that retributivism is a special case of a larger but unspecified notion of justice.