^{page 355 note 1} Ogden, C. K. and Richards, I. A., The Meaning of Meaning (New York, 1923), esp. pp. 212–13.Google Scholar

^{page 356 note 1} Edwards, Paul, ‘Professor Tillich's Confusions’, Mind, LXXIV (April, 1965), pp. 199–200.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

^{page 356 note 2} Alston, William, Philosophy of Language (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1964), pp. 12–22.Google Scholar

^{page 356 note 3} Richards, I. A., The Philosophy of Rhetoric (New York, 1965), p. 11.Google Scholar

^{page 356 note 4} Black, Max, in an essay in Models and Metaphors (Ithaca, N.Y., 1962), p. 28, improves on this terminology with the pair ‘focus’ and ‘linguistic frame’.Google Scholar

^{page 357 note 1} Beardsley, Monroe C., ‘The Metaphorical Twist’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research XXII (March, 1962), p. 299Google Scholar. Cf. Beardsley, , Aesthetics (New York, 1958), pp. 161–2, where he calls this the ‘controversion theory’.Google Scholar

^{page 357 note 2} The main sources here are his Religious Language (New York, 1957), and Models and Metaphors (Oxford, 1964).Google Scholar

^{page 357 note 3} Black, Max, ‘Metaphor’ and ‘Models and Archetypes’, in Models and Metaphors, pp. 25–47, 219–42.Google Scholar

^{page 357 note 4} Ramsey, I. T., Religious Language, pp. 203–4.Google Scholar

^{page 358 note 1} Hepburn, Ronald cites an example of such a model in the phrase from the Nicene Creed ‘before all worlds’. This, he says, could be explicated as ‘Back, back in time, before X, before Y, before Z … before anything’, but it would still be only ‘disguised nonsense’. ‘Poetry and Religious Belief’, Metaphysical Beliefs (London, 1937), p. 133.Google Scholar

^{page 358 note 2} Henle, Paul, ‘Metaphor’, Language, Thought, and Culture (Ann Arbor, 1958), pp. 173–4.Google Scholar

^{page 358 note 3} Ibid., p. 174.

^{page 358 note 4} Ibid.

^{page 359 note 1} Henle, Paul, ‘Metaphor’, Language, Thought, and Culture, (Ann Arbor, 1958), pp. 174–7.Google Scholar

^{page 359 note 2} Ibid., p. 177.

^{page 359 note 3} An evident misprint (‘Thus, use of language…’) is corrected by Alston (Philosophy of Language, p. 98) to the above reading.Google Scholar

^{page 359 note 4} Henle, , Language, Thought, and Culture, p. 178.Google Scholar

^{page 360 note 1} Henle, , Language, Thought, and Culture, p. 189.Google Scholar

^{page 360 note 2} Alston, William, Philosophy of Language, pp. 96–102.Google Scholar On p. 102 he suggests that the contrast ‘metaphorical’ ‘established’ is a less misleading way of speaking than the usual ‘metaphorical’ ‘literal’. In this way, he apparently is correcting his own usage in an article printed at the same time entitled ‘Elucidation of Religious Statements’, in Process and Divinity: Philosophical Essays Presented to Charles Hartshorne, ed. by Reese, William L. and Freeman, Eugene (La Salle, Illinois, 1964), pp. 429–43.Google Scholar

^{page 360 note 3} Alston, , Philosophy of Language, pp. 103–6.Google Scholar

^{page 361 note 1} Alston, , Philosophy of Language, p. 104.Google Scholar

^{page 361 note 2} Ibid., p. 105.

^{page 361 note 3} Ibid., p. 104.

^{page 361 note 4} Ibid., p. 105.

^{page 361 note 5} Ibid., pp. 103–8.

^{page 362 note 1} Henle, , ‘Metaphor’, Language, Thought, and Culture, p. 192.Google Scholar

^{page 363 note 1} Alston, , Philosophy of Language, p. 97. In what follows this phrase will be understood not only to characterise the person to whom Alston is explaining metaphors, but also to define the limits of such a person's capacity to grasp metaphors. Whether Alston would in fact be happy with these limits is uncertain; very likely he would not, but he does not make clear what additional capacities the person should have. By defining ‘Mr B’ narrowly, as we do here, we put ourselves in a position to ask Alston just what other capacities might be helpful for the understanding of a metaphor besides those indicated by this phrase.Google Scholar

^{page 364 note 1} Lucas, J. R., ‘On not Worshipping Facts’, Philosophical Quarterly, VIII (1958), pp. 44–56.Google Scholar